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INTRODUCTION
What makes us human is our self-reflective mind and our profound urge to seek 
answers to persistent questions such as why we exist, where we come from, and where 
we are heading. Our deep need for answers corresponds to our drive to create meaning, 
for ordering the universe and the world around us. This is both a blessing and a curse, as 
many thinkers through the ages have acknowledged.
A variety of concepts have been suggested to provide answers, the main sources 
being religion and science. Religious faith accords a stability that is based on the promise 
of resolution in an afterlife. We look to science in hopes that it may explain natural 
phenomena that seem otherwise incoherent, inpenetrably complex, or chaotic. These 
explanations extend to the workings of our own body and mind. 
Many would agree that neither the Christian belief system nor the analytical 
methods of science have succeeded in providing adequate explanations for such complex 
phenomena as the number phi, for example. How can we rationalize that this ratio seems 
to arise out of the basic structure of our cosmos and at the same time appears clearly and 
regularly in the metamorphosis of both animate and inanimate nature, in the seashell, or 
in the rotation of a hurricane? Even the shapes of man-made constructions, such as the 
Egyptian pyramids and Leonardo Da Vinci’s drawing, the Vitruvian Man, also follow this 
ratio.1 These startling discoveries suggest that there exists an underlying order, an 
                                                
1 Cf. Priya Hemenway and Amy Ray, Divine proportion : Phi in Art, Nature, and Science (New York: 
Sterling Publishers, 2005), pp. 69 and 92, and Joseph Turbeville, New Tabular Evidence of a Monument in 
Harmony with the Universe: a Sourcebook on Nature’s Numbers for Artists & Architects (Victoria, B.C.: 
Trafford, 2003), p. 71.
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astonishing resemblance between the underlying deep structure of works of art and the 
construction of matter in the natural world.
The failure to find satisfying answers to such questions requires us to explore 
beyond our comfort zone. For those of us in the humanities, what lies “beyond” is
frequently the realm of the sciences. Thus, in this dissertation I move beyond traditional 
boundaries of literature and venture a scientific approach that uses complexity theory to 
gain a better understanding of how poetry functions as a navigational device in a world 
filled with motion and no clear meaning. In that it provides sporadic moments of 
centeredness for both the poet and the reader, poetry exhibits an uncanny parallel to the
periodic centers in the cosmos, within the flux of life.
Science has traditionally relied on the notion of equilibrium in postulating the 
reducibility of biological phenomena to their constituent parts. We assume that 
reductionism affords us greatest access to the mysteries of nature, that it a reduced form, 
it can be explained by scientific laws. By contrast, complexity theory adopts a holistic 
approach in focusing on the dynamics of the interaction between the various parts of a 
system. It is based on a view of matter being in continuous flux and is concerned with 
hidden structures of order in seemingly random data, with a focus on self-organizing 
processes and evolutionary change in a variety of media, both natural and artificial. 
By its very nature, complexity theory tackles highly dynamic processes such as
life itself, which does not lend itself to easy reduction without loss of vital information 
because it is constantly changing, infinitely expanding its possibilities. Such is the 
essence of life. I argue that just like life, a work of art, and specifically a poem, is never a 
completed product but represents an ongoing process, due to its intrinsic thrust toward the 
                                                                                                                      
3
creation of ever greater complexity. Autopoiesis, self-creation, is the defining 
characteristic in this dynamic process of life and, as we shall see, also characterizes the 
creative impulse in poetry. For lyric poetry specifically, autopoiesis suggests that poetic 
devices cannot have absolute meaning but instead represents an ongoing process of 
perception and interpretation.
In the following we will move from a mechanistic model for explaining the creative 
impulse, to a systemic model. Instead of reducing a phenomenon to its minimalistic 
structure in order to understand it we will attempt to see it within its larger context by 
focusing on the lateral connections between its various parts. In regards to a poem, 
meaning thus emerges from the interconnections between the individual words.
To provide the basis for my discussion of the works of two Modernist poets, the 
German medical doctor Gottfried Benn (1889-1956), and the American insurance 
executive, Wallace Stevens (1879-1955), I turn to Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) 
and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Both thinkers adamantly postulate that the 
individual must break free from the scaffolding of constructed and therefore invalid 
truths, just as nature eliminates those parts of it that are ailing. Instead, man is to 
reconnect his mind with his body and through this fusion realize his true self in a process 
of becoming. Locating authority in the self rather than in society and the external world 
implies a radical break with the assumptions of the previous periods, namely the Age of 
Positivism, and is a defining aspect during the nineteenth as well as the twentieth century, 
both time periods discussed in this dissertation. 
Gottfried Benn is among the few German poets of the twentieth century who 
gained international recognition. His oeuvre spanned the years 1910 to 1955. Even 
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though his early poetry shares certain stylistic and thematic features with German 
expressionism, and although he did, even in later years, consider himself an heir of that 
school, he did not subscribe fully to their manifest. Rather, his writing is based on his 
personal philosophy which he explicitly elaborates on in his theoretical essays, and 
implicitly in his prose and poetry. Benn vehemently laments the emergence of the 
conscious mind because in his opinion it alienated the subject from the world of objects it 
inhabits. Consciousness leads to a sense of being uprooted. The individual has thought 
the world to pieces, as Benn claims in his poem “Verlorenes Ich,” and is left, isolated, on 
what both Benn and Stevens describe as a pile of historio-religious rubble. 
In this fragmentary world, solace, as a sense of wholeness, can be found only in a 
temporary state of meditation which allows the isolated individual to reconnect to his 
essence. For Benn it lies in a pre-rational and mystical holism. For Emerson and 
Nietzsche, the sense of wholeness is found in nature itself. The body assumes a vital role
in this process since it constitutes the medium for participation in mythical moments.
Also writing during the first half of the twentieth century, Wallace Stevens comes 
to a startlingly similar conclusion in both his poetry and his prose. Then again, this is 
perhaps not so surprising considering the affinities between the two poets: both Benn and 
Stevens believe in a world of flux, and in the importance of art as a “metaphysical 
activity,” which Nietzsche had contended half a century earlier. In a system of process, 
truth does not depend on definite values or absolute qualities. The latter vary and are 
dependent upon intial conditions; they emerge from the interaction between self and 
world which is both depicted in, and results in, a poem. 
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Since the relationship between self and world is never static, any assumed 
achievement of harmony is fleeting. In a world of flux, there can be only periodic centers 
during which the poet incorporates the chaotic diversity of the pluralistic world to form a 
momentary tension-filled, yet harmonious state.
An enduring harmonious state, as enticing as it might sound, would mean 
stagnation. And stagnation, in the natural world, is merely another word for death. The 
incessant struggle to achieve balance and the fact that we can never fully attain this goal 
are therefore equally vital, both in the process of life and in creativity. Within the organic 
cycle of life, death is what makes life meaningful; and it is the impetus to live and thus to 
eternally create and recreate that constitutes the autopoietic impulse in poetry. 
In an introductory chapter on traditionally held views on the concept of mimesis, 
I elucidate the shift in focus from imitating the products of nature to the processes of 
nature. The second chapter elaborates on this notion of process in a discussion of the 
theory of complex systems which holds that systems are not stable but in constant flux 
because they are defined by the interactions of their constituent parts. I argue in the third 
chapter that the same can be said of a poem – that it comprises a system that has no stable 
meaning but is incessantly evolving, in interaction with its environment, or context. 
The importance of context in regards to creation and definition of the self in its 
relationship to the world is my focus in chapter four. Pertinent writings by Ralph Waldo 
Emerson and Friedrich Nietzsche provide the basis for my examination of the relevance 
of the body in establishing self-reliance, self-organization, and self-definition.
By applying the findings of complexity theory to the works of Gottfried Benn and 
Wallace Stevens in chapters five and six, I propose to view mimesis as a complex process 
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of not only re-presentation but re-creation. In the course of this process, new creations 
come into being through the continuous de- and reconstruction of the poem, or poetic 
system. As such, the poem constitutes a subsystem – as does the human being – in the 
system of nature itself. This dissertation thus suggests that the act of poetic creation in the 
continuous and dynamic re-creation of form is grounded in natural forces themselves. In 
a world of ever changing and fleeting phenomena, the poem creates a moment of 
confluence between subject and object. 
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CHAPTER I
FROM PRODUCT TO PROCESS: THE CHANGING NATURE OF MIMESIS
A divine being has been commonly understood to be the authority upon which we 
base our view of the world and the way we render it. Throughout history artists have 
endeavored to imitate nature, a process commonly known as imitatio naturae. Traditional 
definitions of poetic imitation posit the notion of God working within and through the 
inspired poet; the concept is known as deus in nobis. Throughout history creation 
(creatio) and imitation (imitatio) have been central to poetic discourse. The first to 
ascribe to poetry an imitative quality (mimesis) was Aristotle (384 – 322 B.C.). Ever 
since, we have been trying to understand more fully the act of imitation and have raised 
questions about the authority the model is derived from.2
There was already great complexity to the concept of mimesis in classical 
Greece. Initially, the term referred not only to art, poetry and music but also to the extra-
aesthetic realm.3 In general, mimesis posits reflection; it is an interpretation of what is 
perceived and is thus the basis of creativity. Speculative concerns about the nature of the 
                                                
2 If we trace the etymological roots of the term create we find that the connotations of creatio (from latin 
crescere) are quite extraordinary in number. They range from “grow” to “produce,” “make,” “call into 
existence, construct, give rise to, constitute, represent, invest, occasion, and to “form out of nothing” Cf. 
the article on the term “create,” in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. by T. F. Hoad 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Oxford Reference Online. See also Philip P. Wiener, (ed.), 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 5 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1973-1974), I: 577-589. Here p. 577.
3 Cf. Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis, transl. by Don Reneau (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995), especially sections three and five of Part I. Here p. 25.
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creative impulse in conjunction with abstract cosmological theorizing emerged for the 
first time in the thought of the pre-Socratics, at the end of the fifth century.4
1.1. Heraclitus’ Notion of the Fluid Universe
Both Heraclitus (fl. 500 B.C.) and Parmenides (fl. 450 B.C.) were concerned with 
the problem of appearance and reality, as well as the issue of unity and diversity in the 
universe.5 The book of Heraclitus, of which only about 100 sentences survive, was 
famous for its aphoristic obscurity even in antiquity. Heraclitus’ obscurity is considered 
to be a calculated consequence of his style, which is compact and most likely,
deliberately cryptic.6 It is clear too that his statements are often intended to be self-
referential: their linguistic form exemplifies the very structure of which they speak. 
Critics seem to agree that Heraclitus’ thinking was meant as a comprehensive and 
systematic whole, covering every aspect of human experience, of which every part was 
connected with every other. Throughout his writings, the abstract notion of structure is 
omnipresent; explicitly in the word harmonia, but mostly implicitly.7
                                                
4 Cf. Jonathan Barnes’ chapter on Heraclitus in Early Greek philosophy (London: Penguin Books: 1987), 
pp. 100-126.
5
Virtually nothing is known about the lives of either Heraclitus nor Parmenides, except what transpires 
from more or less reliable later sources (mainly Plato and Aristotle). For this reason, there is conflicting 
evidence regarding their dates which is why I merely give a general date for when they flourished. Cf. T. 
M. Robinson, Heraclitus: Fragments (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 3; and David Gallop, 
Parmenides of Elea: Fragments (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 3-5.
6 Cf. Aristotle’s account of Heraclitus’ book, reflected in Barnes, p. 101. See also Thomas Busch’s analysis 
of Nietzsche’s reception of Heraclitus’ concept of becoming, Die Affirmation des Chaos. Zur Überwindung 
des Nihilismus in der Metaphysik Friedich Nietzsches, Dissertations, Philosophy Series, vol. 6 (St. Ottilien: 
EOS Verlag Erzabtei St. Ottilien, 1989), pp. 270-280.
7 Cf. Barnes, pp. 102-104.
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Heraclitus sees a parallelism or identity of structure between the operations of the 
mind, as expressed in thought and language, and those of the reality which the mind tries 
to grasp. Heraclitus also holds that everything is directed by a “firebolt,” an eternal fire, 
which he refers to as need and satiety.8 In general, the structure of his work can be 
described as unity-in-opposites and, according to Heraclitus, it appears in many 
examples, static or dynamic, drawn from everyday life.9
Because of the structural similarities between the subject (mind) and the object 
(external world) according to Heraclitus, the key to understanding the nature of the world 
is introspection; it lies in reflective self-discovering and self-extending. With his 
acknowledgement of the universality of change, and the development through internal 
contradictions, Heraclitus is essentially the first to contend that the harmonious structure 
of the world depends upon opposite tension, an agonistic state, (like that of the bow and 
the lyre).10 Within such a world of flux, Heraclitus held that only change was “real,” and 
stability an illusion.
However, the pre-Socratics were largely forgotten and their work lost except for 
what we learn about them through Aristotle and few others. As we shall see in the course 
of the following chapters, Heraclitus’ ideas of a world of persistent motion and the 
creation of energy through agonistic relationships find their way into science as well as 
literature.
                                                                                                                                                
8 Barnes, p. 104.
9 Cf. Barnes, pp. 103 and 117.
10 Barnes, p. 102. Parmenides, on the other hand, argued that anything knowable must be fully determinate 
and absolutely unified.
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1.2. The Traditional Dichotomy: Plato and Aristotle
Plato and Aristotle were the two principal philosophers in classical Greece who 
systematically examined creativity in art. For them art is a basic and significant human 
activity. However, their views diverge sharply as regards the nature and value of mimetic 
art. This is in part owing to the fact that for Plato the ideal cannot be reached in a work of 
art. What we perceive around us in the form of nature is to him merely a copy of an 
unattainable truth, or ideal (idea), which renders art an imitation of this copy; a copy of 
yet another copy so to speak. This is why Plato considers poets, painters, and other 
representational artists two steps removed from the truth.11
Possibly the most influential account of the creative process handed down to us 
from antiquity is Plato’s idea of furor poeticus, the notion that the poet is in some state of 
spiritual frenzy while he is being inspired or rather, possessed: “For the poet is a light and 
winged and holy thing, and threre is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is 
out of his senses, and reason is no longer in him.”12 Hense, Plato clearly stressed the 
passivity of the inspired poet who creates by divine dispensation but with virtually no 
knowledge of what he is doing. 
                                                
11 For the following information on Plato and Aristotle Wayne J. Hankey’s essay “Aquinas and the 
Platonists,” The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: a Doxographic Approach, by Stephen Gersh and 
M. J. F. M. Hoenen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), pp. 272-234. Here p. 320. See also Anthony J. P. Kenny, 
Essays on the Aristotelian tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001),  as well as the section on Aristotle in 
Hazard Adams et al., ed. Critical Theory since Plato, revised ed. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), pp. 
49-66.
12 Adams, p. 14. 
                                                                                                                      
11
Aristotle abandons Plato’s search for absolute forms, and places art in the area of
the variable and contingent. The scientific tradition upon which Aristotle draws is largely 
that of the biologists and members of the medical school. Not surprisingly, then, Aristotle 
approaches literature as if he were a biologist.13 He shows intense concern for the 
observed detail of natural phenomena, including those of thought, language, and 
psychology. His ethics, which to him were a branch of the natural history of human 
beings, exhibit an appreciation of the complexities of human motivation. 
Furthermore, Aristotle restricts the concept of mimesis to poetry, music, and the 
plastic arts and “develops further the beginnings of a formulation of the independent 
aesthetic realm found in Plato.”14 Another crucial feature in Aristotle’s understanding of 
imitation is exemplified in his distinction between the poet and the historian: while the 
latter simply conveys events and thus deals with particulars, the poet deals with 
universals in that he is concerned not only with what “is” but also with what is possible.
It follows that mimesis for Aristotle is “copying and changing in one.”15 Hence, the poet 
is imitator and creator, and the purpose of art is to be “innovatively iterative” and not 
monotonously repetitive.16
As Rome expanded its power and culture over the Mediterranean region in the 
centuries after two hundred B.C., Christianity slowly gained its stronghold. Meanwhile, a 
                                                
13 Aristotle is the first critic to attempt a systematic discussion of genres. 
14 Gebhard, p. 53.
15 Gebauer, p. 54.
16 John A. McCarthy, Remapping Reality. Chaos and Creativity in Science and Literature (Amsterdam and 
New York: Rodopi, 2006), p. 79.
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more complete version of the scientific portions of the classical tradition evolved and 
burst onto the scene in Christian Europe in the twelfth century.17 Continuing into the late
Middle Ages, knowledge about the world of nature was an integral part of scholarship 
even though theology and religion were regarded as legitimate participants in the 
investigation and formulation of truths.
During the Renaissance, with the heightened confidence in the capabilities of man 
which characterizes Humanism, we see the emergence of a new conception of creativity, 
namely that of the poet as a creator: like another God, velut alter deus, he invents what he 
conceives of in nature. The principle of imitatio is substituted with that of inventio.  This 
movement goes hand in hand with the beginnings of secularization, set in motion during 
the sixteenth century with the development of cosmology: in 1543, Nicolas Copernicus 
published his treatise De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (The Revolution of Celestial 
Spheres) in which a new view of the world was presented: the heliocentric model.  This 
work challenged the age long views of the way the universe worked and the 
preponderance of the Earth and, by extension, of human beings. The realization that we, 
our planet, and indeed our solar system (and even our galaxy) are quite common in the 
heavens and reproduced by myriads of planetary systems provided a sobering and at the 
same time unsettling view of the universe. The reassurance of the earth’s central position 
in Medieval cosmology succumbed to a less secure and comfortable one. 
                                                
17 Cf. David C. Lindberg, “The Medieval Church encounters the Classical Tradition: Saint Augustine, 
Bacon, and the Handmaiden Metaphor,” When Science and Christianity Meet, by David C. Lindberg and 
Ronald L. Numbers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 7-33.  
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The constituent element in the Scientific Revolution was the mathematical 
treatment of natural phenomena.18 Therefore, the early seventeenth century saw a change 
in the European attitude to the natural world that increasingly replaced the Aristotelian 
animistic conception of nature as an organism by Galileo’s metaphor of nature as a 
precisely regulated clock or machine.19 Simultaneously, this trend lead away from 
metaphysical explanations of the world and its phenomena towards an empirical 
approach which meant that nature itself became the source not only of explanation but 
also of inspiration. 
While the dichotomy between Plato’s and Aristotle’s concepts of mimesis 
remained in place for centuries to come, the Scientific Revolution slowly found its way 
into European throught. These changes were characterized by systematic doubt, empirical 
and sensory verification, and the abstraction of human knowledge into separate sciences. 
This modification in world view can be charted in painting, sculpture, architecture as well 
as literature; it is obvious that people of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries began 
looking at the world with different eyes.20
Even though the major shift from imitating the products of nature to imitation of 
the processes of nature is attributed to the eighteenth century (and is especially apparent 
in the works of Bodmer and Breitinger, Lessing, and most of all, Goethe), McCarthy  
                                                
18 Cf. Bernard Cohen, The Newtonian Revolution: with Illustrations of the Transformation of Scientific 
Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 3-33.
19 The clockwork universe is discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
20 This new way of looking at the world in turn gave rise to the new independent discipline of aesthetics. 
The term itself was coined by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in 1735 (cf. Hans Reiss, “The Rise of 
Aesthetics from Baumgarten to Humboldt,” The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. IV, ed. by 
H. B. Nisbet and Claude Rawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 658-680. Here p. 
658.
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refers us to Nikolaus von Cues (1401-1464). A German cardinal, philosopher, and 
administrator, he explained the difference between theory and appearance by relative 
motion. In his philosophical writings, composed after 1439, he set aside the definition 
and methods of the “Aristotelean Sect” and replaced them with his own deep speculations 
and mystical forms of his own. The best known is his first treatise, “De docta ignorantia”
(1439- 40), on the finite and the infinite. In his Cosmology he calls the Creator the 
Possest (posse-est, the possible- actual), alluding to the argument that God is possible, 
therefore actual. Cues’ microcosmos in created things in his emphasis of the notion of 
potential infinitiva was later elaborated on further by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.21
McCarthy attributes to Cues not only the antitipation of the topology of fractals 
but also the idea of chaos as the origin of the existing world, and therefore the suggestion 
that chaos is “themother of all beings and shapes.22
1.3. The European Debate on Creativity
Intellectuals throughout Europe looked to the creative imagination – the single 
most important attribute of the creative genius – as the key to unlocking nature’s 
secrets.23 While in Germany there was a struggle to create a native literary culture, the 
                                                
21 J. G. Hagen, “Nicholas of Cusa,” The Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. XI (New York: Robert Appleton 
Company, 1911), p. 62. See also McCarthy, p. 81.
22 McCarthy, p. 80. On a thorough discussion on Leibnitz’s expansion of the notion that the best of all 
possible worlds demands imaginative re-creations, see McCarthy, p.80. Cf. Jill Ann Kowalik, The Poetics 
of Historical Perspectivism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 50.
23 Penelope Murray points out that before the 18th century, which denoted a major paradigm change in the 
way creative inspiration was perceived, creativity was inextricably linked to the word “genius,” which itself 
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English had already established William Shakespeare as a genius.24 English criticism of 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries set up an opposition between genius, 
in the example of Shakespeare, and the strict rules of art associated with French Neo-
Classicism; an opposition which found its way into France’s as well as Germany’s 
literary debates.  
The reasons Shakespeare’s works were deemed to be those of a genius were laid 
out by Joseph Addison in his essay on genius, as well as in his series of eleven Spectator
papers on the pleasures of imagination (numbers 411-421), both of which were 
enormously influential in England as well as Germany. Addison classifies an artist’s 
“level” of genius (on a scale of multiple levels), the first of which are those “who by the 
mere Strength of natural Parts, and without any assistance of Art or Learning, have 
produced Works that were the Delight of their own Times, and the Wonder of 
Posterity.”25 In other words, true expressive strength for Addison stems from nature 
rather than from learning.
                                                                                                                                                
had a variety of different meanings (none of which correspond to our modern use of the term). Part of the 
complexity of defining the term “genius” is due to various meanings of our English word which stems from 
two sources: Latin ingenium, meaning both “natural disposition” and “innate ability” versus the Latin 
genius, denoting a guardian deity or spirit which watches over a person. While interest in the nature of 
origins of creativity began with the Greeks, to whom we owe the image of the Muses, the Greeks did not in 
fact have a word for genius, or for creativity for that matter (Genius. The History of an Idea, ed. and with 
an introduction by Penelope Murray [ New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989], pp. 9-31.
24 Cf. Jonathan Bate, “Shakespeare and Original Genius,” Genius. The History of an Idea, ed. by Penelope 
Murray (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989). pp. 76-97.
25 Joseph Addison, Article No 160 (September 3 1711), The Spectator, by Joseph Addison, Richard Steele, 
and others, ed. by G. Gregory Smith, Vol. I (London/New York, 1954), pp. 482-485.
                                                                                                                      
16
While the central concept of the neo-classical theory of literature was still the 
imitation of nature, the classical understanding of mimesis underwent a shift away from
imitating the products of nature towards imitating its processes.26
Beginning in the early 1730s in Leipzig, Gottsched advocated the imitation of 
Neo-Classical French drama, whose main representative was Corneille. He gave the old 
axiom of the imitation of nature a rationalist twist, contending that probability for the 
sake of moral education was more important than mimesis in the literal sense. Thus, 
Gottsched limited the sphere of poetry by chaining it to the laws of reason and the 
concept of probability. The latter he justified with the authority of Aristotle who had 
separated historical from poetic truth.27  
In radical opposition to Gottsched’s rationalistic regimentation of poetics, the 
Swiss theoreticians Bodmer and Breitinger valued the affects rather than reason since in 
their mind, it was the emotional rather than the rational effect of a work that was crucial. 
True to Horace’s dictum ut picture poesis, they propagated “painterly poetry,” arising 
from the imagination.28 Poetry was now no longer something that was concocted 
according to specific recipes or rules, neither was it a product of the mind, as Gottsched 
had claimed – instead, poetry originated deep within the poet.29 While the concept of 
                                                
26 Cf. McCarthy, Remapping Reality, p. 77.
27 Cf. Klaus L. Berghahn, “German Literary Theory from Gottsched to Goethe,” The Cambridge History of 
Literary Criticism, vol. IV, ed. by H. B. Nisbet and Claude Rawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), pp. 523-545. Here pp. 530-531.
28 Berghahn, pp. 530-532.
29 Goethe illustrates this in Faust in the antagonism of Wagner, who represents the poeta doctus and Faust, 
who claims that the desire to create and with it the work of art must come from within: “wenn es nicht aus 
der Seele dringt,” and “wenn es euch nicht von Herzen geht.” Cf. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Werke: 
Hamburger Ausgabe in 14 Banden (HA), ed. by Erich Trunz (München: Beck, 1981), III: 24-25.
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exciting emotions was nothing new – traditional rhetoric already had docere and movere
as its two main principles – Breitinger’s insistence on poetry that would move the heart 
of the poet as well as the reader marked the beginnings of a new rhetoric, namely 
“Gefühlsrhetorik.” This did not mean, however, that spontaneous, “natural” writing was 
now the way to go; in fact, writers such as Klopstock, Herder, and the young Goethe 
spent a great deal of effort on perfecting their rhetorical techniques in order to make the 
work of art appear to be “natural” and spontaneous.
One of Bodmer and Breitinger’s most vigorous followers was Klopstock, who 
viewed his “profession” as poet as a sort of religious calling; an understanding which 
provided him with a sort of prophetic confidence. Klopstock now opposed what he 
refered to as poeta vates (seer-poet) to Gottsched’s poeta doctus (learned poet). In this 
context, religion played the role of irrational medium that lead the way to the 
development of an accordingly irrational concept of the poet and the creative process 
itself. With the rise of irrationality, the poet achieved a new legitimacy, one that is based 
upon the impressions of the lyric “I” and therefore automatically provides the poet with 
authority.
By defending and emphasizing the power of the imagination and the creative 
genius of the poet, Bodmer and Breitinger expanded the narrow confines of the imitation 
of nature.30 In their wake, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing fully broke with the pedantic 
poetics of rules, laying down his solution to the problems of mimetic theory in Laokoon, 
oder über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie (Laokoon, or the Limits of Painting and 
                                                
30 Cf. Berghahn, p. 532.
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Poetry) in 1766. In defining poetry in opposition to painting Lessing determines the 
limits of the visual arts and at the same time frees poetry from its subjugation to painting. 
He declares poetry as the broader art form with more possibilities due to its transitory 
nature that allows it to imitate actions in a temporal sequence.31
Agreeing with Gottsched that the stage must be the medium for the new literature 
but condemning the latter’s advocacy of French Neo-Classicism, Lessing offered 
Shakespeare as a new paradigm, claiming that Shakespeare was closer to the German 
culture not only linguistically but also spiritually. In Germany, as had been the case in 
England, the debate about the term “genius” was to a large extent a means of countering 
the French literary dominance, as well as against the rationalist Enlightenment movement 
in general. No longer an imitiation of nature but an imitation of the creating, name-giving 
Godhead, the poet became a second creator.32 Hence, the genius needs neither rules nor 
models because he creates his works spontaneously out of himself, an idea which can be 
traced back to Plato’s furor poeticus.33
Shaftesbury gave it the concept of the poet as a second maker its modern meaning 
in the eighteenth century but the emphatic cult of the original genius in Germany was 
inspired by Edward Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition (1759). Translated 
within two years of its publication it played a significant role in the shaping of young 
                                                
31 Berghahn, pp. 532-533.
32 Cf. Herder, Sämtliche Werke, vol. XII, ed. Berhard Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877-1913), p. 
7.
33 Berhahn, p. 534.
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Herder’s Sturm-und-Drang aesthetics.34 In doing so, it laid the foundation for the German 
Genie- movement during the 1770s. 
An essential image which illustrates the binary opposition of the learned poet, and 
the inspired poet is the organic model. Young points to a “vegetable nature” as a 
prerequisite:
An Original may said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the 
vital root of Genius; it grows, it is not made: Imitations are often a sort of 
manufacture wrought up by those mechanics, art, and labour, out of pre-existent 
materials not their own.35
Bate affirms that although the notion that works of art have an organic form is derived 
from the Neoplatonic tradition, Young’s innovation is in putting the two ideas together.36
Young’s clear distinction between organic and mechanic anticipates the principle that 
will shape the newly established discipline of aesthetics.37
1.4. The River as Metaphor for the Creative Act
While Shakespeare became the dramatic paradigm of a genial poet, Pindar 
emerged as the lyrical paradigm. However, the opposing parties still shared the 
assumption that the key to cultural renewal lay in imitation of one sort or another, and it 
                                                
34 Cf. Bate, p. 88.
35 Young, p. 12.
36 Cf. Bate, p. 89.
37 Cf. Hans Reiss essay “The Rise of Aesthetics from Baumgarten to Humboldt,” The Cambridge History of 
Literary Criticism (vol. IV: The Eighteenth Century), ed. by H.B. Nisbeth and Claude Rawson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 659-680.
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was here that first Hamann and then his disciple Herder read Young’s Conjectures. From 
Young, Herder derived a program for the establishment of a German national literature 
that was to be just that: German. Claiming that assimilation of foreign works was not 
beneficial for this feat but in fact rather harmful and hindering, he pointed to works such 
as the Old Testament, Homer, Pindar, and Shakespeare, and Ossian as examples of 
original genius. 
According to Herder, these authors had an uncultured directness, a “naturalness” 
which could only have emerged when all imitation was shunned.  In his essay on 
Shakespeare of 1773, Herder argues the importance of cultural identity in the working of 
creativity; “nature” is now the particular historic moment, in which for example 
Shakespeare created his drama.38 From this it follows that history is not an incessant 
movement away from a sort of genial state of purity but rather, a generative principle. 
Breaking with antiquity as model for creative art, this concept at the same time advocated 
individuality and authenticity.
In the eighteenth century the Pindaric ode advanced to represent specifically 
“genial” poetry. Horace’s carm. IV, 2 was a key text in prefiguring and establishing the 
Greek poet Pindar (518-438 B.C.) as a model of the elementary and naturally-genial poet. 
Horace essentially nmjcompares Pindar to a river which plunges down the mountains and 
overflows its banks:
Monte decurrens velut amnis, imbres
Quem super notas aluere ripas, 
                                                
38 Cf. Benjamin W. Redekop, Enlightenment and Community: Lessing, Abbt, Herder and the Quest for a 
German Public, McGill-Queen’s studies in the history of ideas, 28 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2000), pp. 186-187.
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Fervet inmensusque ruit profundo
Pindarus ore.
[Wie vom Gebirge der Strom stürzt,
Den Regengüsse über sein Bett anschwellten,
So brauset, so stürmet des unerreichbaren Pindars 
Vollströmender Gesang.]39
The image of the raging river, portraying the poet’s expressive power emphasizes the 
sheer natural force of the creative act and became the metaphor for the creative genius. In 
analogy to this image, Pindar neglects the second of the traditional rhetorical goals, 
docere, but focuses entirely on movere; he achieves this by breaking with traditional 
metrical rules, using neologisms and enjambements. Clearly in opposition to classical 
tradition and its rules, Pindar, as the paradigm for lyric poetry, became a beacon for 
originality, eccentricity, and differing from the norm in general.40
1.4. Goethe and the “Geniezeit”
Herder met Goethe in Strasbourg, where the latter was a 21-year old law student. 
We find Goethe’s first theoretical expression of allegiance to Herder’s views in his essay 
“Von deutscher Baukunst.”41 In this treatise, Goethe praises original genius in the guise 
of the architect of the Strasbourg cathedral which is presented as a supreme example of 
art arising from the German national soul. Comparing the genius to a creator-God, 
                                                
39 Cf. Walter Killy and Ernst A. Schmidt (eds.), Horaz, Oden und Epoden (Zürich und München:, 1981), 
pp. 296ff.
40 Cf. Schmidt, I: 197 and D. S. Carne-Ross, Pindar (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp 1-40. 
Here especially p. 3.
41 Goethe, HA, XII: 7-15.
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Goethe claims that general principles and traditions are not only irrelevant but actually 
inhibit the genius from bringing to the surface true art – which arises from intense, 
unique, individual, and spontaneous feeling.  Everything “foreign” on the other hand, (it 
can be assumed, that above all else Goethe is referring to the French here), cannot be 
genius in its attempt to imitate antiquity, out of lack of courage to be itself.42  
As the principle hallmark of the work of genius, Goethe identifies an internal 
unity which he claims accounted for the immediate hold the cathedral gained over him 
the moment he saw it: 
Ein ganzer, großer Eindruck füllte meine Seele, den, weil er aus tausend 
harmonierenden Einzelnheiten bestand, ich wohl schmecken und genießen, 
keineswegs aber erkennen und erklären konnte.” 
[One vast, all-encompassing impression filled my soul, which, as it consisted of a 
thousand harmonizing details, I could indeed savor and enjoy, but which I could 
not identify and explain].43
It was from Young that both Herder and Goethe derived the belief that true 
artistic creation was “natural”, not only because it required no conscious cultivation of 
any kind, but because it partook of nature’s orderliness. In anticipating the Neo-Classical 
reproof that only rational – and thereby conscious – organization can impose order upon 
the work of the imagination, the supporters of original genius now claimed that the 
creative imagination is in itself imbued with organizing principles which are 
spontaneously embodied in its products.  
                                                
42 Cf. Barry Bergdoll, European architecture 1750-1890 (New York: Oxford University Press. 2000),  pp. 
145-157.
43 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, „Von deutscher Baukunst,“ (1772) Werke, Berliner Ausgabe, 22 vols, 
(Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1965-78), IXX: 33. My translation.
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In several poems written in the early and mid 1770s, Goethe is the first to 
transform what had hitherto been formulated in theory into poetic execution: the theory 
of the genius being “gottgleich” becomes “inner form.”  The lyrical form deemed to be 
best suited for expressing this poetic intensity and purity was the Pindaric Ode.  In 1728, 
Young had written a treatise about this poetic form in his “Discourse on Lyrick Poetry,” 
and Herder, to whom the ode seemed closest to nature (“der Natur am nächsten”) claims 
it to be, for this reason the most original and the source of the others” (“die  originalste, 
und der Grund der übrigen”).44  Thus, since this form of poetry is “der Ursprung der 
Dichtkunst”, Herder concludes that the ode must be the quintessential means of 
expression for the lyric genius. While the Pindaric ode does run the risk of becoming 
mannered and forcedly-exaggerated due to its focus on conveying passion, greatness, and 
originality, it nevertheless has a consciously concealed logic and order inherent in it 
which seemed to correspond with nature’s organizing principles.45
Typical for the Pindaric ode is the poet’s calling to the muse at the beginning of 
them poem, as Goethe does, for example, in “Wanderer’s Sturmlied.”  However, while 
antiquity, the muses’ inspiration gave the impetus for the poet to create, the poetic genius, 
who is convinced of his creative powers, is able to call the muses to him whenever he 
pleases – testimony of the genius’ authority. The problem which arises for the genius, 
                                                
44 Johann Gottfried Herder, Sämmtliche Werke, ed. by Bernhard Suphan et al., (Hildesheim: Georg Olms-
Verlag, 1967), XXXII: 76. My translations.
45 A more clearly distinct tradition in the composition of odes is represented by the Horatian ode which 
employs a regularly repeated stanza form. Cf. Christopher Baldick, “Pindaric,” in The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Literary Terms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Oxford Reference Online. See also 
Schmidt’s discussion of the Pindaric as opposed to the Anacreontic ode, which were symbolized by the 
eagle and the dove, respectively (p. 219). Cf. Gottfried Benn’s usage of the eagle and the dove in his poem 
“Das späte Ich,” which I discuss in chapter five.
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nevertheless, lies in the distance he has put between himself and the rest of the world, in 
effect alienating himself from the world in his “Höhenflug.” The genius can never rest, he 
is a constant wanderer.46 What Goethe presents here is the archetypical tragedy of the 
creative artist: the contradiction of art versus life, which would be a topos for centuries to 
come.47
During the Geniezeit, Goethe’s poem “Prometheus” became the archetype for the 
poetic genius’ confidence in his creative abilities.  In this poem, as well as in two others, 
namely “Ganymed” and “Mahomeds Gesang,” the genius adopts the persona of a God-
like creature. In “Prometheus,” written in 1774, the genius as Titan vaunts his 
autonomous creativity and scorning his father Zeus’ claims to homage. While the poem is 
a manifesto for humanity’s striving for social, political, and spiritual self-determination, it 
is at the same time a breaking with the hitherto held image of God as a creator; instead, 
Prometheus trusts in his own creative abilities. However, this attitude is not to be 
confused with a sort of genial hubris since leading to this self-authorization is a period of 
suffering in which Prometheus is thrown back onto himself.  The Prometheus ode marks 
an important chapter in literary history – in fact, in history in general – because not only 
does it implicitly describe the rejection of hitherto held beliefs, but Prometheus himself 
seizes hold of the power to create, in an allusion to the bible:
Hier sitz’ ich, forme Menschen
Nach meinem Bilde,
Ein Geschlecht, das mir gleich sei, 
Zu leiden, weinen,
                                                
46 Cf. Boyle, pp. 89-91.
47 Examples are Goethe’s Torquato Tasso, and later Thomas Mann’s novels.
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Geniessen und zu freuen sich,
Und dein nicht zu achten,
Wie ich. 
[Here I sit, forming man
In my image,
A people that is like me
To suffer, cry
To relish and rejoice,
And not honor you,
Like I.]48
Jochen Schmidt points out that a number of English as well as French poets were familiar 
with the image of Prometheus as the genius-creator prior to Goethe’s poem. In fact, it 
was Edward Young in his “Conjectures,” who had ascribed to Shakespeare the “genial 
fire” which enabled them, just like Prometheus, to infuse eternal life into dramatic 
works.49 The first to actually establish a connection between the figure of Prometheus 
with a concept of lyric poetry, as Schmidt notes, was Shaftesbury:
I must confess there is hardly anywhere to be found a more insipid race of mortals 
than those whom we moderns are contented to call poets, for having attained the 
chiming faculty of a language, with an injudicious random use of wit and fancy.  
But for the man who truly and in a just sense deserves the name of poet, and who 
as a real master, or architect in the kind, can describe both men and manners, and 
give to action its just body and proportions, he will be found, if I mistake not, a 
very different creature.  Such a poet is indeed a second Maker, a just Prometheus 
under Jove. Like that sovereign artist or universal plastic nature, he forms a 
whole, coherent and proportioned in itself, with due subjection and subordinacy 
of constituent parts.50
Goethe himself had referred to this poem as „Zündkraut einer Explosion” (“an 
accelerator for fire”) since it had inspired a general debate about Spinoza that would 
                                                
48 Goethe, “Prometheus,” Werke (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1972) (BA), I: 328. My translation.
49 Cf. Schmidt, p. 127.
50 Anthony Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. with an 
introduction and notes, by John M. Robertson, 2 vols. (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1963), I: 135 ff. 
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occupy contemporary debate for decades. 51 The connection to Spinoza was a prerequisite 
for this view of a creative, self-organizing nature. A contemporary of Descartes and 
Leibnitz, Spinoza had contended that “God” and “Nature” were two names for the same 
reality, namely the single substance (meaning “to stand beneath” rather than “matter”) 
that underlies the universe and of which all lesser “entities” are merely modes or 
modifications. He contended that “Deus sive Natura” (“God or Nature”) was a being of 
infinitely many attributes.52 Not surprisingly, Spinoza’s pantheism became the epitome of 
the rejection of a transcendental God.
Spinoza’s influence is even more apparent in the two other poems by Goethe 
mentioned above, “Mahomets Gesang” and “Ganymed.” In a song of praise of 
Mohammed, the genius as charismatic leader is compared to a mighty river – an allusion 
to Horace’s description of Pindar’s genius, of course – who draws out the potential of the 
lesser streams, joining their flow with his as he sweeps them on to the all-embracing 
ocean. The ocean, which is his origin as well as goal, is, of course, another metaphor for 
the immanent divine power which these poems suggest is the driving power behind all 
creativity, be it natural or artistic. At the same time, the ocean represents the goal of a sort 
of universal all-embracing harmony. In “Ganymed,” the genius is a loving worshipper of 
Nature who ecstatically gives himself up to the embrace of Zeus, here portrayed as the 
immanent divinity within a pantheistical universe. Like the river in “Mahomets Gesang” 
Ganymed yearns to be one with the “alliebender Vater,” who is no longer the 
                                                
51 Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, in HA., X: 49.
52 Cf. Barry Sandywell, Reflexivity and the Crisis of Western Reason (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 
144-147.
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transcendental God of the Christian belief system but the divine power embodied in 
nature.
5.1. Goethe’s Concept of Complexity in Nature 
In 1773, Goethe published his revised, more “spontaneous” version of Götz von 
Berlichingen, his programmatically anti-Neo-Classical drama.53 This play was 
responsible for unleashing the Sturm und Drang (Storm and Stress) movement in 
Germany, which quickly developed into a cult of original genius, finding its climax a 
year later, in 1774, with the writing and publication of Die Leiden des jungen Werthers. 
The main character, displaying a fatal inclination to cultivating his inner urges, his true 
self, in effect becomes the poster child for genial subjectivism. Claiming subjectivity as 
absolute authority, combined with a sort of Rousseauan disgust with culture 
(“Kulturekel”) and a non-requited love, leads Werther to essentially drown within 
himself. His downward spiral is echoed in his letters, especially the one of December 12, 
in which he describes the chaotic flooding of his town, thereby foreshadowing his own 
death.54 Thus, Goethe’s diagnosis of Werther exemplifies the destructive forces that can 
result when the individual and its subjectivity are absolute instances: it must necessarily 
                                                
53 For a more detailed discussion of Goethe’s understanding and treatment of creativity and its relationship 
to complexity theory, see John A. McCarthy, “’The Pregnant Point’: Goethe on Complexity, 
Interdisciplinarity, and Emergence,” Goethe, Chaos and Complexity, ed. by Herbert Rowland (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2001),  pp. 17-31. Cf. Michael Beddow’s essay “Goethe on Genius,” in Genius, pp. 98-112.
54 See Goethe, Leiden des jungen Werthers, HA VI:98. This scene could be seen as an allusion to the 
Pindaric metaphor of the creative genius as a river, its elementary power destroying and freeing Werther at 
the same time.
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lead to alienation from society and, eventually, to self-destruction. The proximity of 
creative and destructive power is also implicit in the entire theme of Faust.55
It is clear that Goethe now believed that creative genius involved more than the 
genius speaking with the original voice of nature. Michael Beddow contends that “genius 
now involves marrying individual invention with a sense of what human beings have 
collectively achieved in the development of civilization, creating works which enhance 
civilization by intertwining individuality with tradition.”56  
Though not in a separate and defintive study of poetic imagination, Goethe 
commented on the aesthetic experience and its proximity to natural phenomena in 
numerous publications.57 In fact, he attributed many of his revelations about human 
nature to his study of the natural sciences: “Even more emphatically than the German 
Romantics writing at the same time, Goethe recognized the benefit of interdisciplinary 
knowldedge for the achievement of aesthetic goals.”58 In so doing, Goethe can be 
attributed with prefiguring “the holographic conception of modern science.”59
Goethe solves the dilemma of the separation of art and nature by declaring 
humankind to be subsumed under the general laws of nature: “Humankind is the highest, 
                                                
55 Cf. John A. McCarthy’s reading of Goethe’s Faust against the backdrop of chaos, complexity, and 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of eternal emergence in Remapping Reality, chapter five: “A highly Complex 
Matter: The Spirit of the Earth, Evil, and Creativity in ‘Faust’,” pp. 169-230.
56 Beddow, p. 106.
57 McCarthy, p. 85.
58 Cf. McCarthy, pp. 85-66 and Gerhart Baumann, “Goethe: Schriften zur Kunst – Vermittlungen einer 
Poetik,” Ein unteilbares Ganzes (1997), pp. 89-116. Here p. 99.
59 McCarthy, p. 86. McCarthy also notes that Arthur Koestler frequently quotes Goethe’s holistic approach 
to science in his The Act of Creation (1964), as well as in his follow-up volume, Janus (1970), in which 
Koestler “scorns the fragmentation of research into discontinuous parts as a reductionist fallacy.” 
(McCarthy, p. 177)
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nay the actual object of the creative arts” (“Der Mensch ist der höchste, ja der eigentliche 
Gegenstand bildender Kunst”).60 The only way to compete with nature is thus to interact 
with it; analysis and categorization of natural phenomena are merely a prelude to truly 
artistic endevors. McCarthy proffers:
By means of his own creative energy, the artist transforms external reality, not 
through aggressive intrusion but through sensitive attention to hidden nuances of 
meaning and movement inherent in nature […] Hence for Goethe, the proper 
imitation of nature is premised on the artist’s ability to acquire interdisciplinary 
knowledge and bring it to bear in the creative act. It is an energizing process.61
It is thus the notion of dynamic interplay that lies at the heart of Goethe’s theoretical 
musings.62
Astrida Tantillo also offers an analysis of Goethe’s philosophy of nature in her 
book The Will to Create (2002). She points to a conversation Goethe had with Eckerman 
(February 1829) in which he admits that without his attempts in science, he would “never 
have learned to know mankind as it is.”63 Goethe’s natural philosophy clearly places 
nature’s creative powers at its center; a power which he describes as stemming from the 
interaction between polarity and “Steigerung” (increase, intensification), which he calls 
the two main catalysts in all of nature (“die zwei groβen Triebräder aller Natur”): 
der Begriff von Polarität und von Steigerung, jene der Materie, insofern wir sie 
materiell, diese ihr dagegen, insofern wir sie geistig denken, angehörig; jene ist in 
immerwährendem Anziehen und Abstoßen, diese in immerstrebendem 
                                                
60 Cf. McCarthy, p. 87 and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Sämtliche Werke. Frankfurter Ausgabe, ed. by 
Friedmar Apel, Hendrik Birus et al., 40 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985-99), 
XVIII: 482.
61 McCarthy, p. 88.
62 Cf. McCarthy, pp. 178 ff, where he applies his findings to Goethe’s Faust.
63 Astrida O. Tantillo, The Will to Create. Goethe’s philosophy of nature (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2002), p. 93.
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Aufsteigen. Weil aber die Materie nie ohne Geist, der Geist nie ohne Materie 
existiert und wirksam sein kann, so vermag auch die Materie sich zu steigern, so 
wie sichs der Geist nicht nehmen läßt, anzuziehen und abzustoßen; 
[Polarity is a state of constant attraction and. repulsion, while intensification is a 
state of ever-striving ascent. Since, however, matter can never exist and act 
without spirit, nor spirit without matter, matter is also capable of undergoing 
intensification, and spirit cannot be denied its attraction and repulsion.]64
Tantillo describes the relationship between polarity and “Steigerung” as a “pulse.”65 I 
would like to add that the movement Goethe is describing – that of continuous 
attraction/repulsion/intensification – is clearly reminiscent of a spiral-movement; a shape 
that can be found everywhere, on all scales, in nature.66
Tantillo refers to Goethe’s essay “Polarität” (“Polarity”), where he discusses the 
concept of creativity in greatest detail. Here Goethe contends that nature creates 
numerous life-forms and a variety of phenomena through the interaction of polarity and 
Steigerung. By doing so, Goethe clearly identifies intensification as the force behind 
transformations from simple into complex (and unique) forms:
Sie (die Natur) bedient sich hierzu des Lebensprinzips, welches die Möglichkeit 
enthält, die einfachsten Anfänge der Erscheinungen durch Steigerung ins 
Unendliche und Unähnlichste zu vermannigfaltigen.
                                                
64 Goethe, Erläuterungen zu dem aphoristischen Aufsatz „Die Natur,“ HA, XIII: 48-49. Translation by 
Tantillo, (pp. 60-61). Tantillo also points out that in the creation myth, „polarity was personified in the 
characteristics of Lucifer, and Steigerung in those of the godhead. The materiality of the devil threatened to 
collapse the world until the godhead contributed its expansive drive.” Thus, Tantillo continues, the 
nonmaterial side of creation leads the material outside of itself so that it “may expand and create rather than 
collapse and destroy,” (p. 61).
65 Cf. Tantillo, p. 61.
66 I discuss the spiral shape in greater detail in the following chapters, especially chapter two. See also John 
McCarthy’s mention of the spiral in his chapter on Faust (Remapping Reality, p. 196).
                                                                                                                      
31
[To do this [nature] uses the principle of life, with its inherent potential to work 
the simplest phenomenon and diversify it by intensification into the most infinite 
and varied forms.]67
In several of his writings, Goethe refers to a law of dynamic order. In his didactic poem 
“Metamorphosis of Plants” (1798) he concludes that every planbt announces universal 
laws of change and self-similarity (“wiederholte Spiegelungen”).68 Those mirrorings 
(“Spiegelungen”) evolved into a major aesthetic ordering strategy. In contemporary 
terms, McCarthy proffers, they are “reflectaphors that act together with the narrative to 
produce a strong and vital work similar to the living organism, which draws equally on 
the spiral and the vertical tendencies obvious in plant life.”69
In what is very much a holistic approach, Goethe proposes that our observations 
of nature lead to a better understanding of human beings. Due to the fact that nature’s 
essence is the drive that Goethe described in the incessant productive conflict of polarity 
and Steigerung, nature is never static. McCarthy aludes the interplay of the two forces to 
the symbol of a spiral:
Goethe explained that theses two separate tendencies [polarity and Steigerung] 
function in conjunction to ensure perfection in the plant. The spiral drive is 
structuring, nurturing, and progressive function, while the vertical drive is the 
spiritual one (“ein geistiger Stab”), the basis (or entelechy) of existence which 
ensures longevity. When not in harmony, monstrosities arise. The manifestation of 
these two drives is “Gestalt.”70
                                                
67 Goethe, Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Hendrik Birus et al., 40 vols (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker 
Verlag. 1985-); cf. Tantillo, p. 62.
68 Cf. McCarthy, pp. 178-179, and Goethe, FA, I: 640-641.
69 McCarthy, p. 179. See also my discussion of reflectaphors (Briggs) in chapter three.
70 Cf. McCarthy, p. 179, and Goethe, FA, XXIV: 187-788.
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McCarthy summarizes that “Gestalt” for Goethe is a dynamical and evolutionary event. 
The doctrine of forms is equivalent to a doctrine of metamorphosis, and metamorphosis is 
“the key to all natural signs.”71 A balance of these agonal forces is thus the prerequisite 
for success, both in the natural world as well as in the context of artistic creation.
                                                
71 McCarthy, p. 179, and Goethe, FA, XIII: 205, # 2.70.3.
                                                                                                                      
33
CHAPTER II
A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO CREATIVITY: COMPLEXITY THEORY
“Psychological exile” is the term Edward O. Wilson ascribes to the situation of 
man in the universe, a result of being faced with the chaos of the environment, the 
recognition of the self, and the finiteness of personal existence.72 This state of confusion 
is caused by perhaps the most distinctive quality of the human species, its sense of self-
awareness, which in turn has throughout human history been struggling to impose order 
on the chaos, impelling us to puzzle about the world and our role in it.73
To make sense of the world, we employ the “knowledge” obtained from the 
sciences or the humanities, two disciplines originating from the same set of questions and
seeking the same purpose: an understanding of the self, in relation to its environment.
While science seeks factual, objective knowledge by means of reductionism (i.e. reducing 
a “problem,” a phenomenon, an element, into its constituent parts and to synthesize these 
elements afterwards to recreate their original assembly), the arts complement the findings 
of science by proceeding holistically. In other words, the arts “fill the gaps” by answering
those questions which the analytical method could (until then) not answer. Wilson 
remarks that through the imagination “the arts were the means by which these 
[unexplained] forces could be ritualized and expressed in a new, simulated reality.”74
                                                
72 Edward O. Wilson, Consilience (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 246.
73 See also Christof Koch, The Quest for Consciousness: a Neurobiological Approach (Denver, Co: 
Roberts and Co., 2004), pp. 11-20.
74 Wilson, p. 246.
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However, the realization that the analytical method is not always effective and 
followed anything but a linear process. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the 
medieval worldview, which had been based on Aristotelian philosophy and Christian 
theology radically changed. The notion of an organic, living, and spiritual universe was 
replaced by that of the world as a machine, an image that became the dominant metaphor 
of the modern era.
This change was brought about by the Scientific Revolution: new discoveries in 
astronomy, physics, and mathematics by Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon and Newton. The 
growing realization since the Renaissance that our planet and solar system, even our 
galaxy are part of numerous other solar systems provided an unsettling view of the 
universe. Theo-centrism, and with it the reassurances of a cosmology based on the earth 
typical of the Middle Ages vanished, and a new view of the world, one less secure and 
comfortable, came into being. Led on by the advancing sciences, a new trend evolved 
that led away from metaphysical explanations of the world towards an empirical 
approach. Nature, having been the source of inspiration throughout history, now also 
became the basis of explanation.
Philosophy followed the lead of the sciences, as René Descartes applied the 
method of analytical thinking to philosophy, a method which, of course, consists of 
breaking up complex phenomena into their constituent parts and analyzing these 
separately, in order to gain an understanding of the functioning of the whole. Descartes 
based his view of nature on a fundamental dichotomy between two different realms, that 
of mind and that of matter. According to Descartes, the material universe, including all 
living organisms, could in principle be understood entirely by analyzing it in terms of its 
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smallest parts. The faculty of reason, therefore, he considered the only reliable method of 
attaining knowledge.
This concept of the world as a machine created by Galileo and Descartes was 
complemented by Isaac Newton, whose mechanistic explanations in the form of exact 
mathematical laws provided what seemed like the ultimate conquest of nature by 
mankind. Co-inventor of the calculus (nearly one thousand years after Archimedes, who 
first proposed the methods of integral calculus in his Palimpsest), Newton's conception of 
the universe was that of a huge, regulated and uniform machine that operated according 
to natural laws in absolute time, space, and motion.75
Much like a clock, a mechanical device made up of separate parts organized by a 
design which is not implicit in the individual parts as such. Whether this design 
presupposed an external designer remained a matter of dispute throughout the 
Enlightenment. However, what was indisputable in this mechanistic world view was that 
the order of the whole is neither intrinsic nor did it emerge from the various parts. The 
laws that controlled this clockwork universe Newton expressed in formulas which were 
independent of history and of any temporal variations in general. 
                                                
75 Calculus was in fact developed independently by Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–
1716). See A Dictionary of Physics. Ed. John Daintith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Oxford 
Reference Online.
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Figure 1: An orrery, a mechanical model of the solar system, can be taken as a metaphor for the 
clockwork universe of Newtonian Mechanics (http://www.physicalworld.org/restless_universe.html)
The world the scientist looked out upon was, in essence, a fixed, changeless world, 
governed by immutable laws. It was a predictable world of matter acted upon by force, 
ruled by a rigid determinism. In this realm, motion was constant and measurable in a 
straight line; i.e. motion was linear.
Therefore, world and universe were considered to be an intrinsically stable 
system, which meant that it was closed rather than open, deterministic rather than
random, and reversible rather than irreversible. Such a system operates at or near 
equilibrium, meaning that the closure of the structure and reversibility of its laws incline 
the system to a state of inertia. The final characteristic of an intrinsically stable system is 
the fact that its parts are independent of each other and are merely externally related. The 
whole of the system, therefore, is the sum of its parts; and the system can be understood 
by dissecting it and analyzing the various elements.
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Having laid the foundation for the Enlightenment’s understanding of the planetary 
system, Newton's mechanistic model would soon be appropriated to interpret other 
aspects of life, such as society and culture. If the universe was a machine and could be 
understood rationally, then so could economics, history, politics, and human character. It 
also followed that if economics, history, politics, and ethics were mathematically 
calculable, they could be manipulated as if they were machines, that is, they could be 
improved and made to run better. Coinciding with this human-empowering 
Enlightenment philosophy, then, the mechanistic paradigm was founded on the idea that 
all phenomena are fundamentally rational and can therefore be quantified and analyzed.
This period of European thought is characterized not only by the emphasis on 
experience and reason; it also brings with it mistrust of religion and traditional authority,
as well as a gradual emergence of the ideals of liberal, secular, democratic societies. The 
Enlightenment is associated with a materialist view of human beings, an optimism about 
their progress through education and science, and a generally utilitarian approach to 
society and ethics. In England, the movement can be discerned in the 17th century with 
the writings of Francis Bacon and Hobbes, and in France with the new emphasis on 
unaided reason in the work of Descartes.
But it was in the 18th century that the Enlightenment movement fully flourished, 
especially in France, Scotland, and Germany. Here, the critical philosophy of Kant is 
both a kind of culmination and a mark of the succeeding Romantic period. The notions of 
chaos and order and the implied agonistic relationship between them occupied his 
thinking throughout his life. And while he was deeply indebted to binary thinking, he 
“nevertheless pushed dialectical reasoning to its limits, arriving at an essentially holistic 
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view.”76 The Romantics, in their search for holistic perception, their emphasis on the 
interdependence and relatedness in nature, and their desire to restore the connections 
between man and the vast organism that constitutes the earth are thus deeply indebted to 
Kant. 77
Hence, the latter movement in literature and art reasserts passion and imagination 
in reaction to the classicistic and rationalistic tendencies of the Enlightenment. Viewed in 
a comparative perspective, such a reaction against the Enlightenment is found first in 
Germany among writers such as Goethe and Schleiermacher; in England it can be seen in 
the works of Blake, Wordsworth, and Coleridge.78
The most profound and comprehensive ideal of romanticism is the vision of a 
greater personal freedom for the individual. Its origins can be traced to the economic rise 
of the lower class, which had been struggling to free itself from feudal and monarchial 
restrictions. From there it moves to the individualism of the Renaissance and to the 
Reformation, which was based on the belief in an immediate relationship between man 
and God. The striving for personal freedom is also apparent in the psychology of Locke, 
Hartley, and others, who contended that minds are formed by environmental conditions, 
                                                
76 Cf. John McCarthy, Remapping Reality (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2006), p. 151. See also 
McCarthy, “Chaos: Motif, Theme, or Theory?,” Thematics Reconsidered, ed. by Frank Trommler, with an 
introduction by Theodore Ziolkowski (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), pp. 133-43.
77 Cf. Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 82. See also Jim McKusick’s introduction to “Romanticism and Ecology,” (a 
special issue of The Wordsworth Circle) where he argues that “much Romantic writing emerges from a 
desperate sense of alienation from the natural world and expresses an anxious endeavor to re-establish a 
vital, sustainable relationship between mankind and the fragile planet on which [we] dwell” (McKusick, 
“Introduction: Romanticism and Ecology,” The Wordsworth Circle [Summer 1997], pp. 123-24. Here p. 
123.
78 While Goethe is not a Romantic in the eyes of German literary historians, he is considered by 
comparatists to be a representative of European Romanticism.
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thus seeming to indicate that all men are created equal and may be improved by 
environmental changes. 
Such general influences were strengthened by the great English and French 
romantic authors, the “Storm and Stress” writers of Germany, and the idealistic 
philosophy of Kant. The romantic movement in the United States, as elsewhere, left its 
impressions also in the more practical spheres of action, as in revolutionary activities for 
political freedom and individual rights; humanitarian reform (Abolitionism and 
Feminism); liberal religious movements (Unitarianism and Universalism).79 In general, 
rather than labeling and defining fixed spaces, there was a thrust towards the unknown, 
the subconscious, an urge to tap into that which during the Enlightenment the mind had 
not been able to penetrate.
Similar changes were taking place in the sciences. With the publication of his 
book On the Origin of Species in 1859, Charles Darwin raised doubt about the fixed
properties of the earth and universe. He hypothesized about the evolution of organic life 
on this planet.80
                                                
79 The Concise Oxford Companion to American Literature. James D. Hart (Oxford University Press, 1986). 
80 After studying the evolutionary writings of his own grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin went 
to Cambridge in January 1828 in order to become a parson. After graduation he joined Captain Robert 
Fitzroy on the H.M.S. Beagle voyage (December 1831 to October 1836). This voyage became the key 
event in Darwin's life and greatly expanded the way he thought about the natural world. The ship surveyed 
the southern coastlines of South America and also visited Brazil, Tahiti, the Galapagos Islands, New 
Zealand, Australia, and various ports in the Indian and Atlantic oceans. During the journey Darwin learned 
from Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology (1831–1833) that the environment is constantly changing. He 
applied this idea fruitfully to the origin of mountain ranges and coral reefs, and to other questions of natural 
history. Darwin became fully converted to idea of evolution by applying to living beings Lyell’s ideas of 
gradualism and constant small changes. He took the idea of competitive struggle and survival rates from 
Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) and by the end of 1838 had set out the basic 
ideas that would underlie the Origin of Species about twenty years later. Cf. John Bowlby, Charles Darwin: 
a New Life (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), pp. 15-37, and 109-224. 
                                                                                                                      
40
Figure 2: Charles Darwin's first sketch (1837) of an evolutionary tree from his First Notebook on 
Transmutation of Species on view at the Museum of Natural History in Manhatten 
(http://www.english.uga.edu/nhilton/4890/darwin/darwin_tree).
Evolution, of course, presupposes radical change. On the macrocosmic level, 
Newton’s machine-universe was drastically undermined with the appearance of 
Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity in 1905, and, on the microcosmic level of atoms 
and subatomic particles, with the later development of quantum theory.81 A fundamental 
branch of theoretical physics, Quantum Theory, the foundations of which were 
established during the first half of the Twentieth century replaced Newtonian mechanics
and classical electromagnetism at the atomic and subatomic levels. It thereby replaced 
                                                
81 A Dictionary of Physics. Ed. John Daintith (Oxford University Press, 2000), Oxford Reference Online.
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“the classic building-blocks conception of reality with one dominated by a universal flux 
of events and processes.”82
However, the first strong opposition to the mechanistic Cartesian paradigm came 
from the Romantic Movement in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which 
interpreted mind and matter not as a dichotomy but as extensions of one another. The 
German Romantic poets and philosophers returned to the Aristotelian tradition by 
concentrating on the nature of organic form. A central figure in this European movement, 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe conceived of form as a pattern of relationships within an 
organized whole and he admired nature’s moving order.
Thus, during much of Romanticism, different forms of art, such as music, 
painting, and literature were to constitute an organic whole, in the form of what the 
Romantics themselves called a “Gesamtkunstwerk.” The term is associated later with 
Richard Wagner and is discussed by him in Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft (The Artwork of 
the Future, 1849). Literally meaning “synthesis of the arts,” the term describes a dramatic 
form in which all the arts – poetry, drama, the visual arts, music, song – are united to 
form a new and complete work of art. Because all the arts are integrated and each is 
subservient to the whole, Wagner considered it the ideal work of art that functions in an 
organic manner.83
                                                
82 John A. McCarthy, Remapping Reality. Chaos and Creativity in Science and Literature (Amsterdam, 
New York: Rodopi, 2006), p. 62.
83 Theodor W. Adorno, In Search of Wagner, transl. by Rodney Livingstone (New York: Verso, 2005), pp. 
86-87.
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The understanding of organic form had also played a part in the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant.84 Revealing the influence of German rationalist philosopher Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz, Kant believed that, in a world divided into phenomena and “things in 
themselves,” science could only offer mechanical explanations and was inadequate in 
explaining other areas. In these cases, Kant asserts, scientific knowledge needed to be 
supplemented by considering nature as purposeful. He argues in his “Kritik der 
Urteilskraft” that in contrast with machines, organisms are self-reproducing and self-
organizing wholes. Within this organic body, every part is there for the sake of the other. 
From this it follows that an organic body is one in which each part necessarily relates to 
each other part in its composition. In a machine, according to Kant, the parts only exist 
for each other, in the sense of supporting each other within a whole, but in an organism, 
the parts also exist by means of each other, namely in the sense of maintaining one 
another. Hence, organized beings are those whose parts are reciprocally means and ends:
Ein Baum zeugt erstlich einen andern Baum nach einem bekannten Naturgesetze. 
Der Baum aber, den er erzeugt, ist von derselben Gattung; und so erzeugt er sich 
selbst der Gattung nach, in der er, einerseits als Wirkung, andrerseits als Ursache, 
von sich selbst unaufhörlich hervorgebracht, und eben so, sich selbst oft 
hervorbringend, sich, als Gattung, beständig erhält [...].
Zweitens erzeugt ein Baum sich auch selbst als Individuum. [...] Die Materie, die 
er zu sich hinzusetzt, verarbeitet dieses Gewächs vorher zu spezifisch-
eigentümlicher Qualität, welche der Naturmechanism außer ihr nicht liefern kann, 
und bildet sich selbst weiter aus, vermittelst eines Stoffes, der, seiner Mischung 
nach, sein eignes Produkt ist [...]. 
Drittens erzeugt ein Teil dieses Geschöpfs auch sich selbst so: daß die Erhaltung 
des einen von der Erhaltung der andern wechselsweise abhängt [...] Der 
Selbsthülfe der Natur in diesen Geschöpfen bei ihrer Verletzung, wo der Mangel 
                                                
84 Cf. John A. McCarthy, “Beyond a Philosophy of Alternatives: Chaos, Cosmology and the Eighteenth 
Century,” Disrupted Patterns: on Chaos and Order in the Enlightenment, ed. by Theodore E. D. Braun and 
John A. McCarthy, Braun Internationale Forschungen zur Allgemeinen und Vergleichenden 
Literaturwissenschaft, 43 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 21-36, especially pp. 28ff.
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eines Teils, der zur Erhaltung der benachbarten gehörte, von den übrigen ergänzt 
wird; der Mißgeburten oder Mißgestalten im Wachstum, da gewisse Teile, wegen 
vorkommender Mängel oder Hindernisse, sich auf ganz neue Art formen, um das, 
was da ist, zu erhalten.
[In the first place, a tree generates another tree according to a known natural law. 
But the tree produced is of the same genus; and so it produces itself generically. 
On the one hand, as effect it is continually self-produced; on the other hand, as 
cause it continually produces itself, and so perpetuates itself generically.
Secondly, a tree produces itself as an individual […] The matter that the tree 
incorporates it previously works up into a specifically peculiar quality, which 
natural mechanism external to it cannot supply, and thus it develops itself by aid 
of a material which, as compounded, is its own product.
Thirdly, each part of a tree generates itself in such a way that the maintenance of 
any one part depends reciprocally on the maintenance of the rest […] The self-
help of nature in case of injury in the vegetable creation, when the want of a part 
that is necessary for the maintenance of its neighbors is supplied by the remaining 
parts; and the abortions or malformations in growth, in which certain parts, on 
account of casual defects or hindrances, form themselves in a new way to 
maintain what exists.]85
In short: A tree produces itself – it is cause and effect as species and as individual: 
assimilation of nutrients from the environment is conducive to its growth and 
maintenance. It is impossible for us to construct an organism out of dissected remains or 
out of the materials it uses as nourishment. There is mutual dependence of the parts.  If 
one part is injured, it is repaired, or else other parts take over its function. Since 
according to Kant, means and ends are reciprocally related as well as mutually 
constitutive, the parts of the organism do not point beyond themselves to an external telos
but constitute their own purpose. In this way, the organism basically displays an inner 
teleology (or purposiveness without purpose, i.e. with none other than propagating itself).
                                                
85 Immanuel Kant, „Kritik der Urteilskraft,“ § 64 and 65 (Dinge, als Naturzwecke, sind organisierte 
Wesen), Immanuel Kant’s sammtliche Werke. In chronologischer Reihenfolge, ed. by Benjamin Jaesche 
(Leipzig: L. Voss, 1867), pp. 283-286. Translation by Werner Pluhar, Critique of Judgment, (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1987).
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Kant, or as Schlegel referred to him, the “Copernicus of philosophy” leads
Schelling to view the organism as unity of mind and matter, claiming that every organic 
product carries the reason of its existence in itself, for it is cause and effect of itself. 86
Schelling writes the following on organization of an organism:
Die Organisation aber produziert sich selbst, entspringt aus sich selbst; jede 
einzelne Pflanze ist nur Produkt eines Individuums ihrer Art, und so produziert 
und reproduziert jede einzelne Organisation ins Unendliche fort nur ihre Gattung. 
Also schreitet keine Organisation fort, sondern kehrt ins Unendliche fort immer in 
sich selbst zurück. Eine Organisation als solche demnach ist weder Ursache noch 
Wirkung eines Dinges außer ihr, also nichts, was in den Zusammenhang des 
Mechanismus eingreift. Jedes organische Produkt trägt den Grund seines Daseins 
in sich selbst, denn es ist von sich selbst Ursache und Wirkung. Kein einzelner 
Teil konnte entstehen, als in diesem Ganzen, und dieses Ganze selbst besteht nur 
in der Wechselwirkung der Teile. [...] Also liegt jeder Organisation ein Begriff 
zugrunde, denn wo notwendige Beziehung des Ganzen auf Teile und der Teile auf 
ein Ganzes ist, ist Begriff. Aber dieser Begriff wohnt in ihr selbst, kann von ihr 
gar nicht getrennt werden, sie organisiert sich selbst, ist nicht etwa nur ein 
Kunstwerk, dessen Begriff außer ihm im Verstande des Künstlers vorhanden ist. 
Nicht ihre Form allein, sondern ihr Dasein ist zweckmäßig. Sie konnte sich nicht 
organisieren, ohne schon organisiert zu sein. 
[The organization, however, produces itself; it has its source in itself. Every single 
plant is only a product of an individual of its kind and therefore, every single 
organization produces and reproduces ad infinitum only its own kind. Thus, no 
organization actually progresses but forever returns to itself. It follow that such an 
organization is neither cause nor effect of anything outside of itself; thus, nothing 
which interferes with the context of the mechanism. Each organic product carries 
within it the reason for its existence because it is its own cause and effect. No 
single part could arise except in this whole; and the existence of the whole itself 
lies only in the interaction of the parts […] Hence, every organization is based on  
a concept,  since wherever there is a necessary relation of the whole to the parts, 
as well as of the parts to the whole, there is a concept, a system. But this system is 
intrinsic in the organization and cannot be separated from it. It (the organization) 
organizes itself and is not merely a work of art that is formed outside of itself, in 
                                                
86 Kant’s notion of an organism, namely as organized being, becomes the guiding metaphor behind 
Schelling’s philosophy of nature, and inspires Friedrich Schlegel and the Jena Romantics. Friedrich 
Schlegel, in “Fragmente,” writes: „Kant der Kopernicus der Philosophie hat von Natur vielleicht noch mehr 
synkretistischen Geist und Witz als Leibnitz,“ Atheneum. Eine Zeitschrift, ed. by A.W. Schlegel and F. 
Schlegel, 3 vols (1798-1800), (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992), I:235.
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the mind of the artist. Not merely its form but also its existence is purposive. The 
organization would not be able to organize itself were it not organized a priori.] 87
According to Schelling, a concept lies at the base of every organization which dwells in 
the organization itself. As unity of mind and matter, the organism is a model for self and 
world because our spirit is characterized by an infinite striving to organize itself, a 
universal tendency toward organization ought to reveal itself in the external world. And 
indeed, as we will see, it does.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, mechanism regained its 
stronghold due to the newly perfected microscope which led to remarkable advances in 
biology.88 The beginnings of modern embryology, the rise of microbiology, and the 
discovery of the laws of heredity grounded biology firmly in chemistry and physics.89 As 
a result, scientists renewed their efforts to find physical and chemical explanations for
life. Yet it became ever more clear with time that the reductionist approach could not 
account for such seemingly chaotic systems as the human brain, for example, or on a 
larger scale, even life itself, since such a system derives its significance not only from the
structure of the individual elements that constitute the whole. 
                                                
87  F.W.J. Schelling, „Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur,“  Schelling: Sämtliche Werke, ed. by K.F.A. 
Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856-1861), p. 137. My translation. See also Robert J. Richards, The Meaning 
of Evolution: the morphological construction and ideological reconstruction of Darwin’s theory (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 27.
88 Although the microscope was probably first invented during the second decade of the seventeenth 
century (the earliest printed descriptions and illustrations of a microscopically observed object, the bee, 
appeared in 1625), instruments of higher magnification did not become widely available until the 1830s. 
The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science. ed. by J. L. Heilbron, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), Oxford Reference Online.
89 Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) and Robert Koch (1843-1910) are considered to be the founders of medical 
microbiology. Pasteur is most famous for his series of experiments designed to disprove the then widely 
held theory of spontaneous generation (abiogenesis), which claims that living organisms can develop from 
non-living matter, as in the supposed origin of life on Earth, or in the concept of spontaneous generation. A 
Dictionary of Plant Sciences. Michael Allaby.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Oxford Reference 
Online.
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Systems whose functioning could not be determined by reductionism were 
originally viewed as chaotic. Only in the past three decades did researchers discover that 
there is nevertheless an underlying order to the seemingly chaotic interaction of elements 
in a complex structure such as the human brain. Hence, the patterns of such a structure 
are in fact not chaotic, just extremely complex. What makes the system so complex are 
the number of non-linear connections that the whole of the system is much more than 
merely the sum of its parts.
What then, is the difference between a complex system and a chaotic one? Let us 
begin with the latter. The roots of chaos theory date back to about 1900, to the studies of 
Henri Poincaré on the so-called ‘three-body problem,’ i.e. the problem of the motion of 
three objects in mutual gravitational attraction. In a nutshell, what Poincaré found was 
that there can be orbits that are non-periodic, and yet not forever increasing nor 
approaching a fixed point.90 Later studies on the topic of such nonlinear differential 
equations were carried out by G.D. Birkhoff, A.N. Kolmogorov, M.L. Cartwright, J.E. 
Littlewood, and Stephen Smale.91 Except for Smale, these studies were all directly 
inspired by physics: the three-body problem in the case of Birkhoff, turbulence and 
astronomical problems in the case of Kolmogorov, and radio engineering in the case of 
Cartwright and Littlewood. Although chaotic planetary motion had not been observed, 
                                                
90 Ian Kaufmann, Does God Play Dice? The New Mathematics of Chaos, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd., 1989), see especially chapter 4, pp. 49-63.
91 Aside from laying the mathematical foundations of probability theory and the algorithmic theory of 
randomness and making crucial contributions to the foundations nonlinear dynamics, Andrey Kolmogorov 
(1903-1987) had many interests outside mathematics research. An especially notable example in this 
context is his quantitative analysis of structure in the poetry of Russian author Aleksandr Pushkin. Cf. 
http://www.exploratorium.edu/complexity/CompLexicon/kolmogorov.html.
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scientists had encountered turbulence in fluid motion and non-periodic oscillation in 
radio circuits with no theory to explain these phenomena.92
Poincaré, who is credited with being the last great generalist, or universalist, 
conceived of a new kind of geometry, namely a visual kind.93 His is a mathematics of 
patterns and relationships known as topology. Topology is popularly referred to as 
“rubber sheet geometry” because its figures can be transformed into each other by 
continuous bending, stretching, and twisting.94 This general study of continuity is the 
foundation of the modern qualitative theory of dynamical systems.
Not surprisingly, the main catalyst for the development of chaos theory was the 
electronic computer in the 1970s and 1980s since much of the mathematics of chaos 
theory involves the repeated iteration of simple mathematical formulas, which were
impractical if not impossible to do by hand. Electronic computers made these repeated 
calculations possible as well as fast. One of the earliest electronic digital computers, 
ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator), was used to run simple weather 
forecasting models.95
The American mathematician and meteorologist Edward Lorenz was studying
weather patterns when he began to realize that the weather did not always change as 
predicted.96 Minute variations in the initial values of variables in his primitive computer 
                                                
92 Cf. Capra, pp. 126-127.
93 Cf. Capra, p. 126; see also McCarthy, Remapping Reality, p. 45.
94 For more information on topologically equivalent figures see Capra, pp. 126, 127.
95 Raúl Rojas and Ulf Hashagen, The First Computers: History and Architectures (Cambridge, Mass: MIT 
Press, 2002), p. 189.
96 As McCarthy points out, it was in fact Edward Lorenz who in the 1970s rediscovered Poincaré’s work 
and established it as an “an early landmark in complex dynamics,” (Remapping Reality, p. 46).
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weather model would result in grossly divergent weather patterns. This sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions came to be known as the butterfly effect. The phrase 
refers to the idea that a butterfly's wings might create tiny changes in the atmosphere that 
ultimately cause a tornado to appear (or prevent a tornado from appearing). The flapping 
of the wings of a butterfly represents a small change in the initial condition of the system, 
which nevertheless causes a chain of events leading to large-scale phenomena. In 
addition, the curve representing this phenomenon resembles butterfly wings.97
Figure 3: The butterfly effect, rendered here in a metal wire to show direction and three-dimensional 
structure (http://www.en/wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_attractor).
To sum up then, chaos theory is concerned with hidden structures of order in seemingly 
random data, and with self-organizing processes. Complexity theory, however, focuses 
                                                                                                                                                
97 Cf. Edward N. Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), pp. 14-15 
and 181-84. 
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entirely on the latter, in the context of evolutionary change in a variety of media, both 
natural and artificial: “whereas chaos is about nonlinear dynamics in general, complexity 
is more particularly concerned with nonlinear systems that evolve and, more strikingly, 
also evolve the capacity to evolve [my emphasis].”98
2.1. Connectionism and Intertextuality
The idea that the dynamics of a system have a tendency to increase the inherent 
order of a system by themselves has a long history. The ancient atomists believed that
designing intelligence was unnecessary, arguing that given enough time, space and 
matter, organization was ultimately inevitable. The German embryologist Hans Driesch 
(1867-1941) came across an example of such self-regulation while experimenting with 
sea-urchins.99 When Driesch destroyed one of the cells of a sea-urchin embryo at a very 
early stage, the so-called two-celled stage, the remaining cell did not develop into half a 
sea urchin but instead into a complete (albeit smaller) organism.100
                                                
98  N. Katherine Hayles, “Enlightened Chaos,” preface to Disrupted  Patterns, ed. by Theodore E.D. Braun 
and John A. McCarthy (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), pp. 1-5. Here p. 1.
99 Driesch received his doctorate in Jena in 1889 under Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) who had popularized 
Darwin’s theories and saw evolution as providing a framework for describing the world. In 1906 the Monist
League was formed in Jena with Haeckel as its president. The League held a strong commitment to social 
Darwinism. Man was seen as part of nature and in no way qualitatively distinct from any other organic 
form. From this it followed that human society was also a creation of natural selection. However, Haeckel 
added to this view a strong anticatholicism, a contempt for politicians, and a forecast of impending doom. 
After the chaos of World War I, Haeckel’s views were taken up by eugenicists, the Volk movement and, 
more significantly, the National Socialists. Cf. A Dictionary of Scientists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), Oxford Reference Online.
100  See Hans Driesch, The Science and Philosophy of the Organism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 
1908), p. 76. 
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Figure 4: Driesch's experiment with sea urchin cells 
(http://www.mun.ca/biology/desmid/brian/BIOL3530/DB_Ch01/fig1_9)
Such a process of self-realization of innate potentiality Aristotle had called “entelechy.”
Using Aristotle's philosophy, Driesch proposed that the autonomy of life was introduced 
by way of entelechy which he interprets as a process of development, a an impulse or 
force toward full self-realization. The word itself traces to Latin, “entelechia,” from 
Greek “enteles” (complete), from “telos” (purpose, completion) and “echein” (to have) 
and denotes realization as opposed to potentiality. In some philosophical systems, it may 
denote a force propelling one to self-fulfillment. This concept is a key element in the 
metaphysics of Leibniz, and is closely related to his monadology where each sentient 
entity contains its own entire universe within it. Each sentient entity is a monad, an 
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absolutely independent thing that has no direct contact with any other sentient entity 
(except through the mediating agency of God).
The question remains as to what exactly this force is. A popular answer to this
question in the nineteenth century, and supported by Driesch and the French philosopher 
Henri Bergson, among others, was the doctrine of vitalism. It holds that there is some 
feature in all living bodies that cannot be explained in physical or chemical terms. This 
feature may be the presence of a further entity (such as a soul), but it may also be simply 
the emergence of special relations or principles of organization arising from the 
complexity of the organism. Aristotle’s writings De Anima and De Generatione were the 
principal source of the idea of vitalism. In terms of cell biology, a return to vitalism can
be seen in the holistic idea that life is an emergent process which cannot be accurately 
described simply by understanding any number of chemical processes that occur in the 
system of the biological cell.101
During the early twentieth century, there was a shift in focus from function to
organization which correlates to shift from mechanistic to systemic thinking. Fritjof 
Capra explains in detail the emergence of “systems thinking”:
From that time on, a system has come to mean an integrated whole whose essential 
properties arise from the relationships between its parts, and “systems thinking” the 
understanding of a phenomenon within the context of a larger whole. This is, in 
fact, the root meaning of the word “system,” which derives from the Greek 
synhistanai (“to place together”). To understand things systemically literally means 
to put them into a context, to establish the nature of their relationships.102
                                                
101 Cf. Elliott Sober, Philosophy of Biology (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 22-25.
102 Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life (New York: Anchor Books [Random House], 1996), p. 27. In his most 
recent publication, entitled The Hidden Connections: A Science for Sustainable Living, Capra extends the 
framework of systems and complexity theory to the social domain and uses the extended framework to 
discuss some of the critical issues of our time, such as the management of human organizations, the 
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While analytical thinking is reductive, dividing an object into smaller parts to understand 
it, systems thinking puts an object (subsystem) into the context of a larger whole 
(system). Systems thinking therefore is contextual, i.e. an object is defined and redefined 
within the changing context, its environment. From this it can be deducted that the 
essential properties of an organism are properties of the whole that arise from the 
interactions and relationships among the parts and are destroyed when the system is 
dissected into isolated elements. Instead, we must employ “lateral thinking,” as method 
of thinking concerned with changing concepts and the perception of ideas that may not be 
obtainable by using traditional step-by-step logic which moves in vertical manner.
Systems thinking emerged as revolutionary because modern scientific thought had 
been based on the Cartesian paradigm of mathematical analysis. Therefore, the “great 
shock” of twentieth-century science has been that systems cannot be understood by 
reductionism as the properties of the parts are not intrinsic properties, but can be 
understood only as interactions. 103
In Complexity and Postmodernism, Paul Cilliers defines such complex systems as
a large number of elements that are interacting dynamically where each element in the 
system is ignorant of the behavior of the system as a whole.104 The interactions are non-
linear, short ranged, and contain feedback loops that can be positive or negative, 
enhancing or inhibiting the process. In addition, complex systems are open systems, 
                                                                                                                                                
challenges and dangers of economic globalization, the scientific and ethical problems of biotechnology, and 
the design of ecologically sustainable communities and technologies.
103 Cf. Capra, pp. 29-30.
104 Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: Understanding Complex Systems (London: Routledge, 
1998), especially pp. 1-24.
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interacting with their environment, and are characterized by a constant flow of energy,
thus ensuring the system’s survival. These systems have a history from which they evolve 
through time, and which is co-responsible for their present behavior. Therefore they must 
have both the ability to store information concerning their environment for future use and 
the ability to adapt their structure when necessary, according to the stored information. In 
this context, Mark Taylor provides a short but pointed description of the term:
The word complex means consisting of interconnected or interwoven parts; 
composite; compound; involved or intricate, as in structure. Etymologically 
considered, complexity derives from the past participle of the Latin complectere, 
complexus, which means to entwine together) (com-, together + plectere, to twine,
braid). The stem plek (to plait) forms the Latin suffix –plex, which means to fold. 
Complexity, then, is formed by interweaving, interconnecting, and folding 
together different parts, elements, or components.105
Thus, since in a complex system individual elements are intertwined and this (changing) 
form determines the system’s functioning, by analyzing parts of a whole and then putting 
it back together, the analytical method proves to be an inadequate approach to 
complexity. Therefore, Cilliers suggests the “connectionist” approach, a term adapted 
from the field of neuroscience. Cilliers exemplifies the notion of connectionism in the 
analogy of post-structuralism, specifically the theory of language proposed by Saussure 
and extended by Derrida since “the dynamics that generates meaning in language can be 
used to describe the dynamics of complex systems in general.”106
According to Saussure, language is a system made up of arbitrary signs, which
acquire meaning only through their relationships with other signs, namely, through a 
system of differences. For example, the word “green” (signifier) means “green”
                                                
105 Mark Taylor, The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001), p. 138.
106 Cilliers, p. 37.
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(signified) not because the sum of letters that constitute the word express its nature but 
because it is not “red” or “black.” In establishing the distinction between the signifier and 
the signified, observing that there is no natural link between them and that each sign is 
determined by the way in which it differs from the other signs, Saussure introduced a 
system in which linguistic components are not assigned an identity by means of rules, but 
derive their meaning from their relationships with all the other components.  
Cilliers then employs Derridaean deconstruction to point out that since the 
meaning of a sign is a result of the “play” in the space between the signs, we can assume 
that there must be some space, i.e. an excess of meaning, between the signs for this 
interaction to be possible. Derrida deconstructs Saussure’s model of language by 
stripping the sign of its “signified” component, thus causing the signified to be just 
another “signifier” which refers to yet another. This leads to the assumption that meaning 
is never simply present and therefore must always be interpreted.107
Thus, Cilliers concludes with Derrida that language is an open system, in which
the play between the components is always in progress. This implies that meaning is 
never static but constantly in flux: “in terms of a general theory of complex systems, one 
would say that these dynamics of the system of language are a result of the way in which 
the system self-organizes in order to meet the needs of the community.”108
From this analysis it can be concluded that in a complex system, there is no 
absolute truth, no extreme stability, and no perfect middle. In fact, it is in the margins 
                                                
107 Cf. the journalist and social philosopher Arthur Koestler’s commentary on the importance of context in 
his chapter “From Humor to Discovery,” The Act of Creation (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1964), pp. 89-
90. 
108 Cilliers, p. 40.
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between chaos and order, followed by order and chaos, where a system can be considered 
to be truly alive because only during those phases is the system creating by constantly 
organizing and de-organizing itself. Cilliers points out the locus of this interaction: 
“When we move from equilibrium to far-from-equilibrium conditions, we move away 
from the repetitive and the universal to the specific and the unique.”109 In equilibrium, 
matter is “blind” but in far-from equilibrium conditions, it begins to be able to perceive, 
to “take into account” in its way of functioning, differences in the external world.110
In contrast to this organically interconnected and interactive model, nineteenth
century classical science, in revealing to man “a dead, passive nature that behaves as an 
automaton which continues to follow the rules inscribed in the program” had inherently 
isolated man from nature.111 In addition, the discovery of the second law of 
thermodynamics (the knowledge that there is an inescapable degradation of energy in the 
universe entropy) that proved directionality of time (the universe cannot be run 
backwards to make up for entropy), suggested that the whole universe was aging.  As the 
system was drained of energy, it also reduced its diversity and thereby pointed to an 
increasingly homogenous future. As do several other scientists, Prigogine and Stengers 
propose instead that, although the above is true for equilibrium conditions, at least under 
non-equilibrium conditions, entropy may produce, rather than degrade, order, 
                                                
109
 Koestler refers to this phenomenon as “the defeat of habit by originality” which can be achieved by 
connecting previously unrelated dimensions of experience, in order to attain a higher level of evolution. As 
such, it constitutes “an act of liberation,” (p. 96).
110 Ilya Prigogine, Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man’s new Dialogue with Nature (New York: 
Bantam, 1984), pp. 13, 14.
111 Prigogine and Stengers, p. 6.
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organization, and therefore life.112 That discovery, they conclude, can lead us to a new 
dialogue with nature, one which recognizes its “spontaneous activity,” its creative
force.113
Thus, it has been established that creative energy evolves from non-linear
interactions of diverse factors within a complex system; the greater the diversity of these 
factors, the more complex the system. The biologist Lyall Watson refers us to the spiral 
(shape) as the perfect example of such a system. Spirals can be found everywhere in 
nature on the small (e.g. in a seashell, the rotation of a hurricane) and large scale (e.g. the 
galaxy).
                                                
112 Prigogine and Stengers, p. 13.
113 Prigogine and Stengers, p. 9.
                                                                                                                      
57
    
Figures 5.1 and 5.2: The 53rd plate from Ernst Haeckel's Kunstformen der Natur (1904), depicting a 
variety of seashells, organisms he classified as Prosobranchia. In the enlarged version (right), the 
spiral shape is clearly visible (http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image: Haeckel_Prosobranchia)
Figure 6: A picture of the galaxy taken by the Hubble Space Telescope in 2005 also reveals a spiral 
shape (http://www.hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2005/12/image/y)
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What these seemingly unrelated phenomena have in common is what astrophysicist 
Mario Livio calls “the golden ratio”: the irrational number phi (approximately 
1·618033989). This number is denoted by the Greek letter φ, when the ratio of the 
“whole” (i.e., the sum of the larger and smaller parts) to the larger part is the same as the 
ratio of the larger part to the smaller part. It also describes the ever-expanding nature of 
what is termed a logarithmic spiral and is a key shape for anything that grows because 
with growth, the ratio does not change.114 Therefore, Watson concludes, the spiral is “the 
perfect symbol of change and growth, of order within chaos, of opposites which are 
nevertheless the same.”115  
2.2. Self-Organization
How do these opposites function in a self-organizing system? To start at the 
beginning, what exactly is self-organization in a system? It is a process in which the 
internal organization of a system, normally an open system, increases in complexity
without being guided or managed by an outside source. The most robust and 
unambiguous examples of self-organizing systems are from physics, where the concept 
was first applied. The concept of self-organization is also central to the description of 
biological systems, from the sub-cellular to the ecosystem level. Obviously, the idea of 
self-organization challenges the earlier paradigm of ever-decreasing order which was 
                                                
114 Cf. Mario Livio, The Golden Ratio: The Story of Phi, the World’s Most Astonishing Number (New 
York: Broadway Books, 2002).
115 Lyall Watson, Dark Nature: A Natural History of Evil (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), pp. 11, 12.
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based on a philosophical generalization from the second law of thermodynamics in 
statistical thermodynamics where entropy is envisioned as a measure of the statistical 
“disorder” at a micro level. In open systems, it is the flow of matter and energy through 
the system that allows the system to self-organize. 
Ilya Prigogine claimed that self-organization can only occur far away from 
thermodynamic equilibrium. This view is supported by Stuart Kauffman who studied 
mathematical models of evolving systems. He noted that in these as well, the rate of 
evolution is maximized near the edge of chaos.116 To denote this phenomenon, the phrase 
“edge of chaos” was coined by computer scientist Christopher Langton in 1990.117 The
phrase has come to refer to physical, biological, economic and social systems that operate 
in a region between order and chaos, always far from equilibrium, where the complexity 
is maximal. It is here, at the edge of chaos, that living systems are most flexible and have 
the greatest potential for emergence; i.e., novelty and creativity.
Ilya Prigogine developed machinery to experiment with states far from 
equilibrium. These he called “dissipative structures,” denoting open systems operating far 
from thermodynamic equilibrium within an environment that exchanges energy, matter or 
entropy. Such systems are characterized by the spontaneous appearance of a complex, 
sometimes chaotic, structure. An example for the theory of dissipative structures is the 
Bénard cells, or Bénard instability, which Bohm and Peat explain as a “very complex but 
                                                
116 See Stuart Kauffman, At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and 
Complexity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 91.
117 Christopher G. Langton, “Computation at the edge of chaos,” Physica D, 42, 1990.
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regular array of patterns which undergo systematic movements.”118 More specifically, 
Bénard cells are so-called convection cells that appear spontaneously in a liquid layer 
when heat is applied from below.119 The experimental set-up uses the layer of liquid, e.g. 
water, between two parallel planes. If the temperature of the bottom plane is 
progressively increased, there will be a point in temperature at which convection cells 
will appear. i.e. the microscopic random movement spontaneously becomes ordered on a 
macroscopic level. The rotation of the cells is stable and will alternate from clock-wise to 
counter-clockwise, meaning that there is a spontaneous symmetry breaking.120
Figure 7: Convection cells: warm, low density fluid rises while cool, high density fluid sinks 
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/1/12/Convection_cells.png).
                                                
118 David Bohm and F. David Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 
137.
119 Convection is the process by which heat is transferred from one part of a fluid to another by movement 
of the fluid itself. This movement occurs as a result of gravity; the hot part of the fluid expands, becomes 
less dense, and is displaced by the colder, denser part of the fluid as this drops below it. Convection is one 
of the three primary mechanisms of heat transfer, the others being conduction and radiation. Convection 
occurs in the atmosphere, oceans, and planetary mantles; evaporation constitutes a large part of convection. 
While these are all examples of naturally occurring heat transfer, there is also forced convection, which 
refers to hot fluid that is transferred from one region to another by a pump or fan). Dictionary of Physics, 
ed. by John Daintith (Oxford University Press, 2000), Oxford Reference Online.
120 Cf. Bohm and Peat, pp. 137-144.
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Figure 8: When a pan with a thin layer of water is heated uniformly from below, as long as the 
system is dynamically at equilibrium the molecules move in a disorganized and random manner. 
When the heat is turned up, however, whorls begin to form that become increasingly agitated. As the 
heat is increased even more and the system turns to far from equilibrium, a critical point is reached 
when the whorls re-organize into a coherent whole. If the heat is turned up even more the cells 
dissolve (http://www.scientific-religious.com/Benard%20cells.gif).
A further example of this class of reactions which serve as a classical example of 
non-equilibrium thermodynamics, resulting in the establishment of a nonlinear chemical 
oscillator is the so-called Belousov-Zhabotinskii reaction, or BZ reaction. An essential 
aspect of the BZ reaction is its so-called “excitability.” The word indicates that under the 
influence of stimuli, patterns develop in what would otherwise be a perfectly quiescent, 
stable medium. “Clock reactions” such as the BZ, for example, can be excited into self-
organizing activity through the influence of light.
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Figure 9: The wavelike chemical activity in the Belousov-Zhabotinskii reaction is shown here in a 
petri dish. Its chemical reaction shows a periodic color change between magenta and blue within a 
period of approximately one minute. It occurs with a mixture of sulphuric acid, potassium bromate
(V), cerium sulphate, and propanedioic acid. The color change is caused by alternating oxidation–
reductions in which cerium changes its oxidation state (Ce3+ gives a magenta solution while Ce4+ gives 
a blue solution).121  (jchemed.chem.wisc.edu:8000/.../SP14/prog1-SP14.html).
Spontaneous formation is also the explanation for the phenomenon of the soliton, 
the stable solitary wave. The term “soliton” was introduced in the 1960’s, but the
scientific research of this phenomenon had started in the nineteenth century when John 
Scott-Russell, a Scottish naval engineer, observed a large solitary wave in a canal near 
Edinburgh. It was not until the mid 1960’s when scientists began to use modern digital 
computers to study nonlinear wave propagation that the soundness of Russell’s early 
ideas began to be appreciated. He had viewed the solitary wave as a self-sufficient 
dynamic entity, displaying many properties of a particle. From the modern perspective it 
is used as a constructive element to formulate the complex dynamical behavior of wave 
systems throughout science.122 From these discoveries, McCarthy draws the conclusion
that a shift of thought is in order:
                                                
121 Cf. Richard J. Field and László Gyorgyi, Chaos in chemistry and biochemistry (Singapore: World 
Scientific, 1993), pp. 47-82, especially p. 70.
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Instead of thinking in terms of discrete and separate identities, we need to think in 
terms of fluid motions such as ripples, waves, and currents but which can 
nonetheless stand apart starkly profiled. Solitons appear everywhere on the micro 
and macrolevels. […] In whatever garb the soliton might appear, it always results 
from the correlation of a whole system of movememt unlinked mechanically […] 
Because the soliton results from the nonlinear congruence of individual sine 
waves, it can be seen as an example of self-organization, contradicting with its 
positive feedback loops the principle of the equipartition of energy; dispersion is a 
sign of negative feedback loops.123
Since such self-organization necessarily relies on positive as well as negative feedback,
plus multiple interactions of these opposing forces, these opposites should be examined 
more closely. Produced by life itself, they are innumerable variations of life-enhancing 
and life-destroying forces that bring order to randomness.
This assumption inevitably leads to the next, namely that the classification of 
whether a force is “positive” or “negative” is a matter of perspective: “Whatever 
complexity such systems have is a joint property of the system and its interaction with 
another system, most often an observer and/or controller.”124  If “good” or “evil” forces 
are a matter of perspective, the concepts in themselves must, in fact, be interchangeable. 
Watson comes to the same conclusion, suggesting that good “is not necessarily the 
opposite of evil, but one part of the field in which both exist.”125  This concept not only 
                                                                                                                                                
122 Cf. Eryk Infelds and George Rowlands, Nonlinear Waves, Solitons and Chaos (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp. 202-213, especially p. 204.
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provides valid natural reasons for the existence of that which we conceive to be evil, it 
also forces us to reexamine our definitions of value-distribution: “get too close and you 
get sucked into another reality in which all the rules have been changed.”126
Thus, within a complex system, both life-enhancing and life-destroying forces are 
incessantly communicating – meaning that the system is in fact constantly destroying and 
recreating itself. While it is seeking equilibrium, it never truly reaches it because if 
movement ceased this would mean death in a biological system. The constant movement 
(struggle), then, is precisely what generates the system’s creative force.
While fluctuations, as shown, are vital to a complex system, it is important to note 
that this balance (though never in perfect equilibrium), for example that of nature, can be 
disturbed significantly, through an external, i.e. unnatural, force. To exemplify this idea, 
Watson relates the historical event of rabbits being introduced to the continent of 
Australia. After escaping their confinement, they multiplied in immense numbers, living 
outside the constraints of their original habitat in a place where they had no natural 
enemy, and, in effect, “breaking the rules of coexistence.” Watson calls the removal of 
these animals from their “original locus” an “unnatural act.” Watson introduces three 
what he calls “principles of pathics.” These denote “the study of that in nature which 
represents a loss of character and community, leading away from rather than towards 
natural cohesion.”127 Watson lists as the first principle that “good things get to be bad if 
they are displaced, taken out of context or removed from their (original) locus.” His 
second principle states that “good things get very bad if there are too few or too many of 
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them,” and finally, that “good things get really rotten if they cannot relate to each other 
properly and their degree of association is impoverished.”128 This implies that there is a 
certain near-equilibrium state in which the system functions smoothly but when this 
“balance” (which allows room for movement) is disturbed, the system eventually 
perishes.
These kinds of “unnatural acts” are processes that are inherent in postmodern 
culture and which N. Katherine Hayles calls “denaturing” because they re altered which 
results in the loss of their natural qualities.129 An example of denaturing is when alcohol’s 
natural composition is chemically altered by additives. Applied to mankind, this 
denaturing process described by Hayles proceeded in three waves, moving from the 
denaturing of language, to that of content, and then of time until “the human subject is 
also deconstructed and then reconstructed in ways that fundamentally alter what it means 
to be human.”130
2.3. Self-Reflexivity and Autopoiesis
Systems thinking is useful not only in the sciences but it can help explain 
seemingly random phenomena in all aspects of life. The contemporary German social 
                                                
128 Watson, pp. 46-47.
129 N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990). See specifically chapter 10: “Chaos and Culture: Postmoderism(s) and the 
Denaturing of Experience,” pp. 265-295.
130 Rather, Hayles suggests, the human subject is “posthuman,” anticipated and implied by postmodernism, 
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theorist Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998), for example, based his social theory on systems
theory since the latter gave him the level of abstraction that he needed to describe social 
phenomena without explicitly considering the role played by individuals. It was in the 
early 1980s when Luhmann published his central work, Soziale Systeme (1984).131 In this 
study he adopted a new version of systems theory, namely the theory of autopoietic 
systems, whose principal originators were Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, two 
Chilean neuroscientists (which is why their theory is also referred to as the “Santiago
Theory”). 
In contrast to the preceding system-theoretic paradigm, which first distinguishes a 
system from its environment and then proceeds to describe system processes by relating 
them to functions that the researcher attributes to them, the new theory radically 
dismisses this on the grounds that the old theory employs an observer-relative viewpoint 
that need not at all correspond to the “phenomenology” of the system, taken as a unified 
entity “for itself.”
Since what distinguishes a living system from a nonliving one (specifying the 
“essence” of the living was a prime concern for Maturana) is that it is able to produce 
itself by reproducing its elements while maintaining an organization of these elements 
that is characteristic of it, the way to obtain a “true” understanding of such a system is by 
focusing on this very process of self-production and self-organization.132
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Living, with a preface to “Autopoiesis” by Sir Stafford Beer (Dordrecht, Holland and Boston, MA: D. 
Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), p. 82. See also Ralph E. Anderson, Irl E. Carter, and Gary Lowe, 
Human Behavior in the Social Environment: a Social Systems Approach (New York: De Gruyter, 1999), 
pp. 23-39, especially p. 33.
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Maturana and Varela’s theory originated in insights first recorded in a paper about 
the relation between a frogs’ brain and its eyes, or rather, vice versa: by implanting 
electrodes in frogs’ brains, Maturana was able to detect the way in which sensory 
receptors process the data the brain receives. He discovered that the frog’s eye speaks to 
the brain in a language already highly organized and interpreted instead of transmitting a
more or less accurate copy of the distribution of light upon the receptors.133 Obviously, 
there are important differences between frogs and humans, the most crucial one for this 
purpose being that humans are both conscious and self-conscious. This means that a 
human being can reflect back upon itself, i.e. the relation between subject and object (or 
observer and observed) becomes self-reflexive. 
Maturana and Varela in fact emphasize the implications of self-reflexivity in their 
theory on autopoiesis. They explain that a living system capable of being an observer can 
interact with those of its own descriptive states, which are linguistic descriptions of itself. 
By doing so it generates the domain of self-linguistic description within which it is an 
observer of itself as an observer, a process which can be necessarily repeated in an 
endless manner. The observer as an observer necessarily remains in a descriptive domain 
in which no description of an absolute reality exists. Instead, any cognitive reality 
generated would unavoidably be relative to the knower.134 The fact that an observer 
cannot transcend his or her own perspective necessarily implies that the observed data 
                                                                                                                                                
133 Quoted in N. Katherine Hayles, How we became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, 
and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 135.
134 Maturana and Varela, p. 121. See also Erich Jantsch, The Self-Organizing Universe: Scientific and 
Human Implications of the Emerging Paradigm of Evolution (New York: Pergamon, 1980).
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(i.e. experience) is always already processed. This in turn means that any effort to 
describe the framework of interpretation creates a self-reflexive structure with no exit in 
sight. Thus, everything we perceive, including literary works, is already processed and is 
therefore always our own interpretation, or for that matter, our own creation.135
At this point then, Maturana and Varela transfer the notion of autopoiesis from the 
biological dimensions of cognition in order to come up with a model to describe the 
structure of living organisms in general. Again underscoring the principle of self-
organization, they claim that the organization of a system – in fact, they call such a 
system an “autopoietic machine” – must be shown in such a manner that the way in 
which all their properties arise becomes obvious:
An autopoietic machine is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of 
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that 
produces the components, which: (i) through their interactions and 
transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes 
(relations) that produce them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete 
unity in the space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the 
topological domain of its relation as such a network.136
To sum up then, the organizational structure that sustains life is autopoietic. The 
self-reflexivity in such an autopoietic system is isomorphic with Kant’s self-organizing 
being as well as Schelling’s interpretation of organization cited earlier. Maturana's theory 
could be instantiated in various spheres, namely the cellular, the cognitive, and the social. 
                                                
135 If we could – so to speak – step outside ourselves, become nothing and in turn be part of the universe, 
we might liken the experience to becoming “a transparent eye-ball,” as Emerson calls it: “standing on the 
bare ground […] I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal 
Being circulate through me,” Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Nature, in The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, ed. by Alfred R. Ferguson (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971), p. 
10. The same is true for Nietzsche whose Zarathustra-figure gained insight by being on the outside, i.e. by 
elevation (mountain). Cf. chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
136 Maturana and Varela, pp. 78-79.
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The defining characteristic of all of them is their self-production out of their elements. 
For this reason Luhmann argues that when viewed as a network of communication, social 
systems display the characteristics identified as those of an autopoietic system: “Social 
systems use communication as their particular mode of autopoietic reproduction. Their 
elements are communications that are recursively reproduced by a network of 
communications that cannot exist outside of such a network.”137 Thus, to provide a 
satisfactory theoretical treatment of a given system, it is necessary first to define what 
elements constitute it and second to show how new elements can emerge through the 
process of autopoiesis.
2.4. Emergence
Emergence, as a central concept of complex systems, can be a dynamic process 
that occurs over time, such as the evolution of the human body over thousands of 
successive generations. It can also happen over disparate size scales. Emergent behavior 
is generally difficult to predict because the number of interactions between components 
of a system increases combinatorially with the number of components. This potentially
allows for many new and subtle types of behavior to emerge. However, it is not just the 
sheer number of connections between components which encourages emergence; it is
also how these connections are organized. A hierarchical organization is one example 
that can generate emergent behavior, but perhaps more interestingly, emergent behavior 
can also arise from more decentralized organizational structures, such as a 
                                                
137 Niklas Luhmann, “The Autopoiesis of Social Systems,” Essays on Self-Reference (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), p. 63.
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marketplace.138 In many cases, the system has to reach a certain threshold of diversity, 
organization, and connectivity before emergent behavior appears.
Obviously, systems with emergent properties or emergent structures may appear 
to defy entropic principles and the second law of thermodynamics, because they form and 
increase order despite the lack of command and central control. This is possible because 
open systems can extract information and order out of the environment. In other words, 
nothing commands the system to form a pattern. Instead the interaction of each part with 
its immediate neighbors in complex manner leads to order. This is why emergent 
structures are more than the sum of their parts. Because the emergent order will not arise 
if the various parts simply coexist, the interaction of these parts is crucial.
A biological example of emergence is an ant colony. In such an organization, the 
queen does not give direct orders or tell the ants what to do. Instead, each ant reacts to 
stimuli in the form of chemical scent from larvae, other ants, intruders, food and build up 
of waste, and leaves behind a chemical trail, which, in turn, provides a stimulus to other 
ants. Each ant is an autonomous unit that reacts depending only on its local environment 
and the genetically encoded rules for its specific species. 
                                                
138 Such a hierarchy is already evident as the main characteristic in the so-called “Great Chain of Being” or 
“scala naturae,” i.e. a classical and western medieval conception of the order of the universe. This notion of 
the world's structure was accepted, and unquestioned, by most educated men from the time of Lucretius 
until the Copernican revolution and the Renaissance. The Chain of Being is composed of a great number of 
hierarchal links, from the most base and foundational elements up to the very highest perfection (which, of 
course, is God). The Principle is also known from the American intellectual historian Arthur O. Lovejoy’s 
book The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. With this book, Lovejoy founded a field 
of research in history and related fields that deals with the expression, preservation, and change of human 
ideas over time. A particular approach within the study of intellectual history, work in the history of ideas 
involves research in the history of philosophy and the history of literature. Cf. Robert F. Gleckner and 
Gerald E. Enscoe, Romanticism: Points of view (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), pp. 234-
237.
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Figure 10: A termite “cathedral” mound produced by a termite colony is a classic example of 
emergence in nature (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Termite_Cathedral_DSC03570.jpg).
Emergent structures can be found in many natural phenomena, from the physical 
to the biological domain. Emergent structures are, in fact, a favorite strategy found in 
many animal groups, in addition to colonies of ants: swarms of bees, flocks of birds, 
herds of mammals, schools of fish, and packs of wolves. As has already been 
demonstrated, extreme weather phenomena possess emergent properties, as does the 
spatial structure and shape of galaxies, all of which characterize the large-scale 
distribution of energy and matter in the universe. 
Examples of emergent behavior are also outside the natural world, for example in 
the stock market. As a whole, it precisely regulates the relative prices of companies 
across the world. However, it has no leader, i.e. there is no one entity which controls the 
workings of the entire market. Investors, have knowledge of only a limited number of 
companies within their portfolio, and must follow the regulatory rules of the market. 
Through the interactions of individual investors the complexity of the stock market as a 
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whole emerges. The World Wide Web follows the same principle in that it is constituted
by the interconnected communications between different users.
The same principle of emergence can be found in the fine arts, for example in 
paintings by Paul Klee, Marcel Duchamp, and M. C. Escher:139
Figure 11: M. C. Escher’s painting „Cycle“ from the 1930s 
exhibits an uncanny resemblance in its conception with the 
anthill pictured above.
To sum up, for a phenomenon to be termed emergent it should generally be 
unpredictable from a lower level description. At the very lowest level, the phenomenon 
usually does not exist at all or exists only in trace amounts, i.e. it is irreducible. The 
                                                
139 Cf. Roberto Giunti’s article “Complexity Art” in Tout-Fait. The Marcel Duchamp Studies Online 
Journal, issue 5 (2003), pp. 1-6. In a very convincing manner, Giunti illuminates unexpected links between 
some leading figures in twentieth century art, namely Klee, Duchamp and Escher, all of them directly 
related to some fundamental ideas of complexity. He claims thus that the science of complexity provides us 
with a realm in which we can cover the range of ideas between the three artists. He explains quite 
convincingly how he divided the common traits between Klee, Duchamp and Escher into three groups, all 
of them mathematically relevant and strictly related to each other and to corresponding complexity themes; 
the three groups are “recursion and fractals,” “feedback loops and self organization,” and “instability and 
chaos,” (p. 1).
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property itself is often unpredictable and unprecedented, and may represent a new level 
of the system's evolution. The complex behavior or properties are not properties of any 
single such entity, nor can they easily be predicted or deduced from behavior in the 
lower-level entities precisely because they are irreducible. The alignment of randomness 
with incomprehensibility forms the basis of algorithmic complexity.140
To gain a better understanding of the concept of irreducibility, let us consider a
computational definition of complexity. In the 1960s, several independent researchers 
argued that complexity can be understood in terms of algorithmic compression. In 
mathematics and computing, an algorithm is a finite set of instructions for accomplishing 
a task that will terminate in a defined end-state. In other words, an algorithm is a kind of 
recipe that serves as a program for computing. One of the above mentioned scientists, 
Gregory Chaitin, explained that a system’s level of complexity is the size of the smallest 
program which computes it or a complete description of it. The simpler the system, the 
smaller the program.141 John L. Casti adds that the complexity of an object is therefore 
directly proportional to the length of its shortest possible description. He exemplifies the 
condition for an object to be random, i.e. maximally complex, with a string of letters. The 
set of letters is random if there is no rule for generating it whose statement is appreciably 
shorter – that is, requires fewer letters to write down – than the string itself. This means 
that an object or pattern is random if its shortest possible description is the object itself.142
                                                
140 See also Casti, chapter 5: “The Irreducible,” pp. 171-205.
141 Gregory Chaitin, Information, Randomness, and Incompleteness (Singapore: World Scientific Co, 
1990), p. 88.
142 Casti, p. 9.
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Something is random when it is incompressible, such as in this example of two sequences 
of letters:
1. ABCDABCDABCD
2. ZKTDQRFZEARX143
The first sequence is compressible because two thirds of it is in fact redundant, while the 
second sequence is incompressible because it is random. Complexity and compressibility, 
then, are indirectly proportional: the less compressible, the more complex, and vice versa. 
On a larger scale, then, life itself is a major source of complexity, and autopoiesis
is the major principle or driving force behind life. In this view, autopoiesis is the main 
reason for the growth of complexity in the natural world. If we speak of the emergence of 
complex living beings and life-forms, we refer to processes of sudden and unpredictable 
changes. Far from being a machine, nature is analogous to human, namely sensitive to its 
surroundings, and ultimately unpredictable. In the deterministic world of the mechanistic 
universe neither history nor the future are relevant to the present, whereas in the living 
world of dissipative structures history plays an important role. The future is uncertain; 
precisely this uncertainty is the heart of creativity.
2.5. From Mechanical to Systems Thinking
                                                
143 Taylor, The Moment of Complexity, p. 139.
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The process of creativity, then, is the activity involved in the continual 
embodiment of the system’s pattern of organization. This process constitutes the link 
between pattern and structure. As Fritjof Capra points out, all three criteria (process, 
pattern, and structure) are mutually independent. However, their pattern of organization 
can only be recognized if it is embodied in a physical structure. Since in living systems 
this embodiment is an ongoing process, “structure and process are inextricably linked.”144
As a result, while a complex system strives to achieve equilibrium, its multi-
leveled forces pull it away from stability. This consistent movement is essentially what 
keeps it alive because it ensures its creativity, as was exemplified in the model of 
language. The same is true for the human being. This very agonistic tendency is the 
essential factor in ensuring any system’s creativity, its life even. In turn, this creativity 
provides the energy for the system to consistently self-organize and produce itself anew. 
In and of itself, the process is the ultimate goal. Reaching a consistent state of stability –
or assuming that one has reached it – leads to stagnation. Hence, “equilibrium is another 
word for death.”145
Science has traditionally relied on equilibrium in postulating that biological 
phenomena are “reducible.” In this reduced form it can be explained by scientific laws. 
By contrast, complexity theory is based on a view of matter being in constant flux. In the 
following then, we will move from a mechanistic to a systemic model. Instead of 
reducing a phenomenon to understand it, we will attempt to see it within its larger 
context. The belief that not reductionism but holism leads to understanding has been a 
key concept in literature for centuries, as was exemplified in chapter one.
                                                
144 Cf. Capra, p. 160.
145 Cilliers, p. 4.
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By its very nature, complexity theory takes into consideration life itself, which is 
not reducible because it is constantly changing, not moving backward, but forward into 
the future by infinitely expanding its possibilities. Such is the essence of life. Thus, we 
have not a completed product, but an ongoing process, where the teleological thrust is 
toward the creation of ever greater complexity. Autopoiesis is the defining characteristic 
in this process of life.
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CHAPTER III
THE LYRIC AND CREATIVITY: POETRY AS METAPHOR
Manifest in the previous chapter is the growth of the emerging field of complexity 
studies that extends to such disciplines as biology, physics, demographics, ecology, 
meteorology, economics, linguistics, and sociology. Scientists leading the exploration of 
chaotic phenomena, including Edward O. Wilson and Nobel prize-winner Ilya Prigogine, 
argue that science can never be divorced from culture, and that cultural values influence 
the development of science.146 Indeed, the apparent universality of what are considered 
complex phenomena suggests that human systems, such as historical and cultural events, 
societies, and also narratives, are shaped by seemingly “chaotic” scenarios. Rejecting 
reductionism and determinism, chaos and complexity theory favor a holistic embrace of 
complexity and flux. 
Several chaos pioneers drew inspiration from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who 
presents a somewhat unusual conception of an organism throughout his scientific texts, as 
was laid out in detail in the first chapter of this dissertation. Goethe argues that any 
seemingly individual organism is in a complex community of parts, rather than a one 
unified whole, and that the parts thus work to produce a chain of creation without end.147
                                                
146 Cf. Alvin Toffler, Introduction to Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos:
Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (London: Flamingo, 1985), xii, xiii.
147 Cf. Tantillo, p. 91.
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Even though the matrix of complexity theory seems to lend itself very well to the 
interpretation of art, and literature in particular, relatively little has been written so far 
applying complexity to literature. A few scholars from the humanities such as N. 
Katherine Hayles, Angus Fletcher, Paul Cilliers, John A. McCarthy, Ira Livingston and 
others are beginning to explore its potential. Bridging the gap between the traditional 
cultures of the humanities and science, these scholars’ work constitutes an area of 
interaction that can be called a “third culture.” 
The term “third culture” lies at the heart of John Brockman’s book The Third 
Culture, in which the author discusses the work of several well-known thinkers, including 
Stuart Kauffman and Francesco Varela, who are directly communicating their new and 
often provocative ideas to the general public.148 The title of Brockman’s book refers to 
Charles Percy Snow's 1959 work The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, which 
described the conflict between the cultures of the humanities and science.149 In a second 
edition of The Two Cultures, published in 1963, Snow added a new essay, “The Two 
Cultures: A Second Look,” in which he suggested that a new culture, a “third culture,” 
would emerge and close the communications gap between the literary intellectuals and 
the scientists. The third culture thus constitutes a realm of interaction between science 
and the humanities.150 The works by the above mentioned literary scholars serve to 
                                                
148 John Brockman, The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution, Simon & Schuster, 1995). John 
Brockman has continued the themes of “The Third Culture” in the website of the Edge Foundation, where 
leading scientists and thinkers contribute their thoughts.
149 Charles Percy Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (London and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
150 Cf. John A. McCarthy, Remapping Reality (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2006), p. 29; see also 
Elinor S. Shaffer (ed.), The Third Culture: Literature and Science (Berlin and New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1998), pp. 1-5. 
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reunite and reconfigure what McCarthy throughout Remapping Reality calls the three 
main spheres of human interaction; namely the physical, the ethical, and the creative.
3.1. The Poetic System
How can one relate complexity theory to poetry? Why poetry as opposed to prose, 
and what sort of poetry would we be talking about? While some parallels to lyric poetry 
may have already become obvious to the reader, most are more obscure. Put bluntly, at 
first sight some poems often seem chaotic, but actually have an underlying order; that is, 
they are actually interactive, dynamic systems. Angus Fletcher uses the metaphor of an 
eighteenth-century chamber group of musicians who play without a conductor: “what 
emerges is the capacity of a system to develop its own ensemble character.”151 In the 
following I will attempt to describe the autopoietic character of a typical poem and 
explain why it can be considered a complex system and it therefore lends itself 
particularly well for a study of creativity. It will be both necessary and useful to start by 
determining in what ways poetry differs from other literary genres. In other words, what 
makes lyric poetry so particularly fitting for a study about creativity?
As Niklas Luhmann points out in his system theory of art, poetry is a special case 
since it takes place in the medium of perception as well as in a linguistic code.152 While 
this might be true for all verbal arts, poetry is certainly the extreme case, mainly because 
                                                
151 Cf. Angus Fletcher, A New Theory for American Poetry (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004), p. 206.
152 Niklas Luhmann, “Art as a Social System,” transl. by Eva M. Knodt, Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, ed.  
by Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 124.
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to convince, poetry appeals to perception, not to conscious reflection. The function of the 
ornament, in poetry as elsewhere, is to intensify redundancy and variety. Poetry, then, is 
not just rhymed prose. Reading poetry as a sequence of propositions about the world and 
considering the poetic only as beautification, adornment, or decoration, is not observing it 
as a work of art. Nor can one apprehend in this way the formal combination the poet uses 
to compose his work. Luhmann elaborates on the reason poetry stands apart:
Only at the level where symbols, sounds, meanings, and rhythms conspire – a 
level that is difficult to “read” – do poems refer to themselves in the process of 
creating forms. They generate contextual dependencies, ironic references, and 
paradoxes, all of which refer back to the text that produces these effects. 
Supported by the text, poetic self-reference may eventually articulate itself 
explicitly – not as a flat, abrupt statement, but as a form within the nexus of forms 
that constitute the text.153
The two main characteristics of lyric poetry, then, are first, that written poetry not only 
appeals to our thinking but also, or perhaps even more so, to our perception. In other 
words, the form of the poem is important – how important remains to be seen. Secondly, 
Luhmann suggests that there is an underlying level, a kind of deep structure, which is the 
locus of poetic self-reference and also the place from whence form emanates. 
                                                
153 Luhmann, “Art as a Social System,” p. 125.
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Figure 12: The Ouroboros, circular symbol depicting a snake, or less commonly a dragon, 
swallowing its tail, is a symbol for self-reference. The Ouroboros also represents self-reflexivity, 
cyclicality, and the eternal return, in the sense of something constantly re-creating itself and as such 
is an emblem of wholeness and infinity.154 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Ouroboros.png)
How, then, does poetic self-reference function as a catalyst for form? Aesthetic 
self-referencing has long been a crucial structural factor in both music and the visual arts. 
Eva Müller Zettelmann points to the mirror compositions of Johann Sebastian Bach and 
Paul Hindemith, as well as the original meta-painting of Velasquez, Magritte, and M.C. 
Escher as examples of this technique.155
                                                
154 Cf “ourorobos,” A Dictionary of Phrase and Fable, ed. by Elizabeth Knowles (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 2006), Oxford Reference Online. See also Marco Bussagli’s book in which he explores 
M.C. Escher’s symbolism in regards to self-referentiality: M. Bussagli, Escher. Art dossier, 196. (Florence: 
Giunti, 2004). 
155 Eva Müller-Zettelmann, “’A Frenzied Oscillation’: Auto-Reflexivity in the Lyric,” Theory into Poetry: 
New Approaches to the Lyric (Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi, 2005), pp. 125-45.
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Figure 13: M.C. Escher’s image of hands creating themselves 
(http://www.math.technion.ac.il/~rl/M.C.Escher/2/escher-hands.gif)
Ira Livingston refers us to the linguist Roman Jakobson, who identified self-
reference as the predominant linguistic function of poetry, which he labeled poeticity. Ira 
Livingston explains the term as referring to the way poetry tends to call attention to itself 
as an artifact of language – for example, by rhyme or meter or special diction – so as to 
make what is being said secondary to how it is being said. Livingston argues that beyond 
the formal patterning of poems such as rhyme and meter, poetic self-reference edges into 
“metadiscourse” in which text takes itself as one of its themes. These self-references can 
produce multiple and contradictory effects. They can call the realism of the text into 
question and urge readers to become aware of the act of representation as a thing in 
itself.156
Zettelmann further elaborates on what she calls “the metalyric.” She diagnoses an 
interpretative stagnation resulting from the lack of clear or even basic definitions and 
standardized analytical categories concerning self-referential poetry. Taking as the 
                                                
156 Cf. Ira Livingston, Between Science and Literature. An Introduction to Autopoetics (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), pp. 58-59.
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starting point for the history of metalyric reflection the works of Archilochos (seventh  
century BC.) and Sappho (seventh to sixth centuries B.C.), Müller-Zettelmann outlines its 
evolution down to the lyric production of the twentieth century, emphasizing in particular 
the similarities between the Romantic period and the twentieth century. She notes that   
poetic guidelines in the classical period were still presented in the form of an explicit 
system of argumentation. 
However, for the Romantics the poetic imagination with its synthesis of form and 
content was the only way of creating an approach to the world that embraced more 
profound relationships. The new axiom of the indissoluble link between beauty and the 
truth, between form and content, marked the slow demise of explicit metapoetry, as well 
as the advent of a type of metalyric that made increased use of the technique of implicit 
or non-discursive presentation. This growing “opaqueness in poetic metaphor,” 
Zettelmann explains, was linked in the twentieth century to a new type of metalyric 
technique – as used extensively in concrete poetry – which focused on the fikctionality of 
a text by means of a total devaluation of its content and the use of auto-referential 
elements of textualization.157
Along with this “growing opaqueness,” Müller-Zettelmann sees as the decisive 
feature of twentieth century lyric a “particular focus on the linguistic medium” which she 
likens to the ‘linguistic turn” of contemporary philosophy. Given the general tendency to 
meta-characteristics in twentieth century lyric, she then undertakes a classification of 
what she considers metalyric elements, analyzing the conditions, forms and functions of 
                                                
157 Cf. Müller-Zettelmann, p. 127.
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self-reflection in poetry, in contrast to rather vague definitions of other critics. She 
explains:
Metalyric poems refer to lyric inspiration, to the poetic creative process, to the 
social task of literary creation, or to the intended reader’s reception. The list of 
possible meta-themes could be extended further, but their semantic common 
denominator is in their reference to some aspect of the fictionality of the lyric 
work of art. Whenever either the aesthetic construction (fictio) or the inventedness 
(fictum) is thematized or presented, we have some form of metalyric writing.158
Müller-Zettelmann differentiates between critical and non-critical metapoems, explicit 
versus implicit, as well as between self-and non-self metalyric texts. She describes as 
specifically interesting about self-metalyric forms (which she terms “primary metalyric”) 
the “impossibility of distinguishing between the act and the object of textualization. To 
make her point, she cites Jean-Pierre Dupuy:
Between the operator and the operand, the program and the data, the cause and the 
effect, the meta-language and the language, there is a continuous reversal of 
levels, a frenzied oscillation, in which each in turn sits on the higher level, then on 
the lower, and so on, not unlike two rivals, each of whom briefly gains the upper 
hand without ever completely defeating each other.159
What Dupuy and Müller-Zettelmann refer to as “frenzied oscillation” is, interestingly, 
precisely that activity from which the meaning of the poem emerges. Rather than static 
words that can be interpreted in a linear fashion, the incessant movement apparent 
between different levels of signification in a metalyric poem is testament to the energy 
emanating from it.
Another crucial aspect of metalyric poetry is its effect on the reader. The 
metalyric, Müller-Zettelmann proffers, is unlike the general literary self-referentiality; it 
                                                
158 Müller-Zettelmann, p. 132. 
159 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, “Self-Reference in Literature,” Poetics: Journal for Empirical Research on 
Literature, the Media and the Arts 18.6 (1989), pp. 491-515. Here p. 506. 
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is a form of self-focusing which forces the reader consciously to come to terms with 
various aspects of fictionality to an extent which exceeds that which is usual for the 
genre.160 She concludes that the metalyric refers to poems that are self-referential to 
(lyric) literary texts, and in the wider sense also to art in general, which “in an explicit 
discursive or implicit ‘showing’ fashion, draw particular attention to the fictio (aesthetic 
construction) and/or fictum (inventedness) aspect of the fictionality of literary works.”161
3.2. A Theory of Truth: Deep Structure
In what way then, does a self-referential poem or “meta-poem” function as an 
autopoietic system? Let us start with the obvious: a poet employs the main scientific idea 
in complexity, namely the notion of a self-organizing system since a poem generally 
lacks an obvious developmentally straightforward plot, i.e. it is non-linear, both in 
content as well as in form. This is often evident from just looking at the “broken lines” of 
a poem.162 Nevertheless, the individual parts (words) of a poem are interconnected; they 
interact on a level of deep structure, the level which Niklas Luhmann referred to as that 
where symbols, sounds, meanings, and rhythms conspire.163
The term “deep structure” is in fact quite common in linguistics and especially in 
the study of syntax. The deep structure of a linguistic expression is a theoretical construct 
                                                
160 Cf. Müller-Zettelmann, p. 141.
161 Müller-Zettelmann, p. 142
162 Cf. Fletcher, p. 191.
163 Luhmann, “Art as a Social System,” p. 124.
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that seeks to unify several related interacting forms. As such, it is a representation of the 
syntax of a sentence and is distinguished by varying criteria from its surface structure, 
indicating that every sentence exists on at least two levels: the surface structure which 
corresponds to the actual spoken sentence and the deep structure which underlies 
meaning of the sentence. A single deep idea can be expressed in many different surface
structures. The deep structure reveals the semantic components while the surface 
structure exposes the proper phonological information in order to express that thought. 
Thus, the distinction between “deep structure” and “surface structure” permits us to 
explain ambiguous sentences more than one interpretation. 
The term was initially defined in Aspects and in other works by Noam Chomsky 
in the mid-1960s, as the part of the syntactic description of a sentence that determines its 
semantic interpretation. It was renamed D-structure in the late 1970s and as such 
comprises the second of three levels of syntax – more abstract than S-structure (surface 
structure) and less abstract than Logical Form. In the history of Chomsky's theories, D-
structure derived from the deep structure of the 1960s and early 1970s and is therefore a 
sort of initial structure from which structures at other levels were derived.164
While structure can be said to be based on order, it is much more encompassing 
than the latter. As David Bohm points out, it is possible to abstract a specific structure as 
– at a specific point in time – “relevant” and “appropriate.” Later in time, however, as the 
context is made broader, the limits of the previous abstraction become evident and new 
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notions develop.165 Thus, there can be no absolute definition of structure, just as there can 
be no absolute definition of a specific meaning. “Absolute,” then, is another word for 
“static,” which, as was argued in the preceding is another word for “death.” Consider in 
this regard Bohm and Peat’s affirmation of the dynamic nature of structure:
Structure if often treated as being static and more or less complete in itself. But a 
much deeper question is that of how this structure originates and grows, how it is 
sustained, and how it finally dissolves. Structure is basically dynamic, and should 
perhaps better be called structuring, while relatively stable products of this 
process are structures. But even these latter structures should not be considered as 
basically static, for they are the results of processes which sustain them and keep 
them, for a time, more or less within certain limits.166
If we relate these insights from linguistics and complexity studies to poetry, it becomes 
clear that the only constant is in fact incessant change. The ceaseless interaction of the 
individual parts of a poem results in a whole that is naturally emergent (fluid) rather than 
artificially predetermined (rigid). In a poem, individual parts retain their differences and 
their distinctness, even as they form a coherent unity. 
John Briggs comments further on the nature of the global interaction of elements within a 
work of art, a phenomenon he refers to as “reflectaphors”:
Reflectaphors are created in the dynamics that takes place among the elements 
that comprise a work of art. In the visual arts, reflectaphors emerge in the 
interactions of elements like shape, line, color and negative space. In literature 
they appear in such techniques as irony, pun, motif, symbol and metaphor. 
Through reflectaphors are displayed an artwork's subtlety and its ability to 
astonish: they are the intersection between its parts and the whole (…) They are 
the artwork's hidden order.167
                                                
165 David Bohm and F. David Peat, Science, Order, and Creativity, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 
142.
166  Bohm and Peat, p. 141.
167 John Briggs, “Reflectaphors: The (Implicate) Universe as a Work of Art,” in Quantum Implications,
Essays in Honor of David Bohm, ed. by David Peat and Basil Hiley (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
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We cannot speak of “absolute” meaning, or “absolute” truth, then, since the reflectaphors, 
the intersections between the parts and the whole of a poem, are dynamic; they are 
constantly defined and redefined.
How, then, can we know anything to be true, if there is no absolute definition? 
The semantic theory of truth proposes that any claim that a sentence is true can only be 
made as a formal requirement regarding the language in which the proposition itself is 
expressed. The problem is obvious, and is the basis of Polish Logician Alfred Tarski’s 
Indefinability Theorem. Tarski’s shaping ideas appear in a paper entitled “On the 
Concept of Truth in Formal Languages,” which had as its goal a definition of truth for 
sentences, in a way that both ensures satisfaction of the schema of type T (“snow is 
white”) and avoids the liar paradox.168 In this essay, Tarsky states that the concept of 
truth for the sentences of a given language cannot consistently be defined within that 
language.169 To make his point, he distinguishes between a formalized language (L), on 
the one hand, whose sentences meet a purely syntactical criterion of well-formedness, 
and an interpretation (I) of (L) on the other. A general characterization of truth in I for 
sentences of L can then be specified in terms of the inductively defined relation of 
                                                                                                                                                
168 In philosophy and logic, the so-called liar paradox (allegedly due to Epimenides) stands for paradoxical 
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satisfaction. Tarski showed also that this definition could not be carried out in L itself, but 
required the resources of a richer meta-language (Tarski’s Theorem).170
The problem Tarski strives to solve is the same we encounter with the so-called 
correspondence theory of truth. Traced to Plato, it holds that an object is represented 
when it is reconstructed according to a fully described blueprint, an exact replica or an 
archetype, in a linear step-by-step fashion that excludes alternative paths. In other words, 
propositions are true if and only if they correspond with the “facts.” Immanuel Kant 
discusses the correspondence theory of truth in Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier 
syllogistischen Figuren, basing his discussion on the common belief that truth consists in 
the agreement of knowledge with the object. Abbott translates and condenses Kant’s 
elaborations as follows:
According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, 
must agree with the object. Now, I can only compare the object with my 
knowledge by this means, namely, by taking knowledge of it. My knowledge, 
then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth. For as 
the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether 
my knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object.171
According to Kant, then, the definition of truth as correspondence is merely a verbal 
definition, here making use of Aristotle's distinction between a nominal definition, a 
definition in name only, and a real definition, a definition that shows the true cause or 
essence of the thing whose term is being defined. From Kant's account of history, the 
                                                
170 Cf. Maudlin, p. 6. See also Colin Howson’s essay on “Tarski, Alfred” in The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2005), Oxford Reference Online.
171 Cf. Immanuel Kant, „Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren,“ Werke (Königsberg: 
Kanter Verlag, 1762), II: 599, here in translation by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, with an introduction by 
Dennis Sweet in Kant's Introduction to Logic and His Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Figures
(1963), (New York: Barnes and Noble, 2005), p. 45.
                                                                                                                      
90
definition of truth as correspondence was already in dispute from classical times, the 
skeptics criticizing the logicians for a form of circular reasoning.172
The question remains as to precisely what is supposed to correspond with what. In 
other words, we have no access to facts independently of the statements and beliefs that 
we hold. We cannot look over our own shoulder to compare our beliefs with a reality 
apprehended by any other means than those beliefs that were shaped by further beliefs, 
and so on. Hence we have no fixed hold on “facts” as something like structures to which 
our beliefs may or may not correspond. Thus, nothing is definitive but everything is 
relative to something that, again, is only relative.
The latter stance accurately describes the coherence theory of truth which allows 
contradictions and alternatives; in fact, it must have contradictions if it is to be complete. 
The coherence theory of truth holds that the truth of a proposition consists in its being a 
member of some suitably defined body of other propositions: a body that is consistent, 
coherent, and possibly endowed with other virtues.173 In other words, any one entity is 
part of a system, which in turn is part of a system, and so on. Thus, according to the 
coherence theory of truth a statement is true if it “coheres” with other statements – false if 
it does not. In order for a proposition to be true according to the correspondence theory, 
there must exist some fact to which it corresponds. Clearly then, connectionism and 
context are crucial concepts in this theory, as will be shown in subsequent chapters. We 
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have thus established that the emergent “one” represents the “many,” though not by 
identical correspondence but by coherence, which is not necessarily linear. 
This concept of “e pluribus unum” has also been applied to other realms, as in the 
notion of the melting pot which implies that a number of ethnic groups, cultures, and 
religions in a society will fuse together to produce new cultural as well as  social forms. 
This idea was common in the USA in the first half of the twentieth century, and is 
exemplified in the motto on American coinage e pluribus unum: one out of many. Of 
course, this newly formed unit is not a static one but will continue changing and (re-
producing), as will its constituent parts, a notion which is captured in the metaphor of the 
melting pot.
3.3. Perpetual Metamorphosis: The Wave
Angus Fletcher attributes to precisely this notion of ongoing change and inherent 
“air of mystery” the special place that poetry holds in human history: “it is indeed hard to 
imagine that poetry could have played a part in human history had it not been a 
mysterious use of language, whereby a play of perpetual metamorphosis distinguishes the 
poem from all other use of language.”174
We can imagine at this point a wave as symbol for the coherent surge of energy 
traveling through individual parts without displacing them, i.e. the pattern of a system is 
conserved while its constituent matter is in flux.175 A wave merely picks up individual 
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water molecules and releases them again. The water basically participates in the wave’s 
movement for only an instant and then falls back. John McCarthy proposes to conjoin 
this wave packet with the soliton, the so-called “standing wave,” and refers us in turn to 
Jahn and Dunne for an explanation of the soliton:
When any wave train reaches a boundary or discontinuity in the medium in which 
it is propagating, some portion of it is reflected and some portion is transmitted. If 
all relevant boundaries of the medium are fixed in some fashion, the succession of 
incident, reflected, and re-reflected propagating waves compounds to establish a 
pattern of “standing” waves, wherein the displacements of the medium wax and 
wane in a stationary, rather than propagating, configuration.176
Because the soliton results from the nonlinear congruence of individual sine waves, 
McCarthy reasons, it can be viewed as “an example of self-organization, contradicting 
with its positive feedback loops the principle of the equipartition of energy”; dispersion is 
a sign of negative feedback loops. He further reminds us that this synchronized energy of 
the standing wave occurs everywhere in the universe, from “pulsating stars to aftershocks 
to alpha rhythms and the minute electrical impulses needed to coordinate the nerve and 
muscle fibers in a body riding a bicycle.”177
Ira Livingston points out that such a process of regular interplay of patterned 
energy through matter also “constitutes the first manifestation of God in the Judeo-
Christian Bible: ‘The spirit of God moved across the face of the waters’.”178 The spirit of 
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the creator of all things, then, is likened to the wave that temporarily changes its 
environment. This wave-form is essential to any sustainable system since it lives only 
when it is changing shape. The same could be said of words of a poem washing over a 
human mind: words are essentially “recruited” to participate in a moment’s thought and 
then fall back onto the paper. The poem itself is not in fact consumed by being read; the 
words, lines, and stanzas, as well as the overall structure as it is laid out on paper remain 
the same.179
Clearly, however, this metaphor is problematic since it leaves out something 
absolutely crucial: the words in a poem are not merely what Ira Livingston calls “filler” 
for thoughts; they are what one thinks with as well as against.180 In other words, the poem 
is not only self-sustaining, it also creates; it does more than “use” what is present, it 
actually produces new components, as any living system does. This leads us to the 
characteristic organization of living systems, namely the process of autopoiesis. 
3.4. Autopoiesis
Autopoiesis literally means “self-production” and is derived from the Greek
“auto” for “self” and “poiesis” for “creation” or “production.” It expresses a fundamental 
complementarity between structure and function. The term was originally introduced by 
Chilean biologists Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana in the early 1970s and refers 
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to the dynamics of non-equilibrium structures; that is, organized states that are sometimes 
also called dissipative structures, which remain stable for long periods of time despite 
matter and energy continually flowing through them.181
The canonical example of an autopoietic system, and one of the entities that 
motivated Varela and Maturana to define autopoiesis, is the biological cell. It is made of 
various biochemical components such as nucleic acids and proteins, and is organized into 
bounded structures such as the cell nucleus, various organelles, a cell membrane and 
cytoskeleton. These structures, based on an external flow of molecules and energy, 
produce the components which, in turn, continue to maintain the organized, connected 
structure that gives rise to these components. In contrast, an allopoietic system uses its 
components to generate an organized structure other than itself.182
While it was newly introduced to biology in the 1970s, the concept of autopoiesis 
had long been part of the legacy of structuralism. A system manufacturing its own 
components is a prominent aspect in Saussure’s structuralist linguistics, and found 
applications in sociology, namely in Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. One of the 
differences between structuralist systems and autopoietic systems, however, is that 
structuralism models systems as organizations that are frozen at a single moment in time. 
Autopoiesis, on the other hand, understands them as patterns of ongoing events that are 
continually changing, oscillating between different poles. In other words, the system 
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perpetuates itself through its own operations. This, in turn, means that an autopoietic 
system is structurally determined, since it is the structure which determines its identity at 
any given moment.183 This leads to the question of what structure is as opposed to the 
less rigid and permeable term “organization” John Mingers clarifies it as follows:
By organization Maturana refers to the relations between components that give a 
system its identity, that make it a member of a particular type. Thus, if the 
organization of a system changes, so does its identity. By structure, Maturana 
means the actual components and relations between components that constitute a 
particular example of a type of system. The organization is realized through the 
structure, but it is the structure that can interact and change. So long as the 
structural changes maintain the organization, the system’s identity remains.184
Essentially, then, form is content in an autopoietic system. Applied to poetry, we 
could say that a poem creates its own form; it arises from the interactivity of the parts. In 
his widely cited Marburg speech (1951) about problems of lyric poetry, “Probleme der 
Lyrik,” Benn expands and summarizes his views which represent the major positions of 
poetic activity in the twentieth century. 185 He affirms that form is in fact the poem:
Form, isoliert, ist ein schwieriger Begriff. Aber die Form ist ja das Gedicht. Die 
Inhalte eines Gedichtes, sagen wir Trauer, panisches Gefühl, finale Strömungen, 
die hat ja jeder, das ist der menschliche Bestand, sein Besitz in mehr oder weniger 
vielfältigem und sublimem Ausmaβ, aber Lyrik wird daraus nur, wenn es in eine 
Form gerät, die diesen Inhalt autochthon macht, ihn trägt, aus ihm mit Worten 
Faszination macht. Eine isolierte Form, eine Form an sich gibt es ja gar nicht. Sie 
ist das Sein, der existentielle Auftrag des Künstlers, sein Ziel.
[Form, by itself, is a complicated term. But the Form is in fact the poem. A 
poem’s content, such as grief, a feeling of panic, drifts into finality, everyone has 
those, it is human inventory, human possession to more or less multifaceted and 
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sublime extent. But it becomes lyric poetry only whenever it takes a form which 
renders this content autochthonous, carries it, and turns it into fascination by 
means of words. There is no such thing as isolated form, form by itself. Form is 
Being, the artist’s existential task, his object and goal].186
Benn is claiming is that language is, in a way, indigenous, or “native.” In strictly 
linguistic terms, this would mean that this language is from a linguistically distinct 
community, or system. We can take this supposition further by looking at the Greek root 
of the word autochthon, which in fact indicates something that has “sprung from the 
soil,” the Greek auto- + khthon meaning earth.187 Clearly, what fascinates Benn is the 
organic nature of a poem, and the fact that it constitutes an intrinsic part of a larger 
system of organisms. The external form of the poem is thus far from being static because
it is merely a surface phenomenon that hints at a deeper structuring principle which we 
access via each encounter with the poem in a slightly different way.
It is important to point out that this “living” system is organizationally closed yet 
interactively open, according to Maturana and Varela. What this means is explained by 
David Barndollar, in his 2004 dissertation entitled The Poetics of Complexity and the 
Modern Long Poem (as yet unpublished).188 Barndollar exemplifies this concept and the 
properties of an autopoietic system by examining a human being’s functioning in and 
with its environment, a notion which Niklas Luhmann refers to as “structural 
coupling.”189 In Meaning as Sociology’s Basic Concept, Luhmann argues that systems in 
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the medium of meaning are structurally coupled in the sense of symbiosis. There are only 
two systems that use meaning as a medium of autopoeisis. They are psychic systems 
(consciousnesses) and social systems (communication networks). Luhmann defines social 
systems as being in the environment of psychic systems, and vice versa.190 Barndollar 
adopts these terms to his own purposes:
Through structural coupling, a system is linked to its environment while 
remaining separate from it. Humans, for example, are structurally coupled to the
environment of the Earth, since without its atmosphere, gravitational field, and 
other physical elements humans could not continue to live (that is, operate 
autopoietically). It is impossible for systems to be structurally coupled to one 
another, both in the way that subsystems within a system are interrelated (e.g. the 
nervous system and the circulatory system with humans) and in the sense of 
symbiosis (i.e. two systems that depend on each other for their mutual 
survival).191
When speaking in terms of physical phenomena, the notion of two or more systems 
supporting one another is referred to as agonism. In biochemistry an agonist is described 
as a substance that initiates a physiological response when combined with a receptor. The 
term originates in the Greek word agonistes, meaning “contestant”; thus, agonistic 
relationships thrive on contest – they achieve common objectives through their 
competitive interaction.192
Clearly, force as the dominating concept in natural as well as social systems, is 
being replaced by what McCarthy calls information communication as “the new ordering 
principle of systems, communication, not in the human sense of understanding but of 
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‘data transfer.’”193 Thus, social systems are the communications themselves and use 
psychic systems as their environment, while psychic systems are the consciousnesses 
themselves and have social systems as their environment. Barndollar emphasizes that 
“social systems are not made up of people. They are made up of communications, and 
only communications.”194
Since only psychic systems but not social systems can be readers and are 
therefore relevant for this study, let us focus on Luhmann’s claim that – from the 
perspective of the reader – psychic systems (human groups) are closed to each other 
individually but open through the social system of communications. They receive 
messages and derive understandings from them on an entirely internal basis. Activated by 
external input, psychic systems now produce meanings of their own that are shared with 
the social system. Communication generates additional interaction so that the social 
system functions autopoietically. In his reflections on the communicative act, Ira 
Livingston calls attention to the role of difference in constituting meaning: “meaning is 
the interaction of difference within and difference between.”195
How does the implication of closure relate to other psychic systems and the 
interactive openness of the communicative network? In this regard, Barndollar’s 
comment is insightful:
It is not possible to know the mind of another person directly, though it is possible 
to perceive communications generated by that person; perception and 
communication are structurally coupled. Since the only way we can ascertain 
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whether those communications accurately reflect the other’s mind is through 
further communications, subject to the same restriction as the first set of 
communications, we can never know for certain whether our understanding 
matches the other person’s – indeed, since we are different consciousnesses, our 
understandings could never exactly match. Now, obviously, we do communicate 
accurately about a wide variety of topics, and in terms of information, we can be 
confident in our ability to verify whether we have understood particular facts and 
data. This confidence stems from our sharing a great deal of context with our 
interlocutors, so to the degree that we share common ground with them, we can 
understand them. But as a general rule, this understanding is only more or less 
accurate, not absolute. In everyday situations, an approximate understanding may 
be sufficient; in complex situations, in which language may or may not mean 
what it appears to (e.g., while traveling in a foreign land where the language is 
unfamiliar; in diplomatic relations; in the interpretation of literature; in love and 
courtship), a misunderstood gesture or phrase may lead to a breakdown of 
communications. 196
By relating communication networks to individual consciousness, Barndollar elucidates 
how tightly linked the two contexts are; without communication, human consciousness 
cannot evolve. In the case of reading a poem (i.e. perceiving a written communication), 
then, it is clearly impossible to determine with any degree of certainty whether a reader 
has understood “what the author meant” or “what the text really means.”197 Clearly, the 
main difficulty to be overcome in the interpretation of any text, but much more so of 
poetry, is the difference between the context of the text’s creation and the context of its 
reception/reading.  Hence, contexts constitute various communication networks.
3.4.1 Context and Connectionism
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Context is defined by many factors; one of the most prominent is the historical. 
To overcome the aspect of historical contextuality, let us consider Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s approach. Known for saying that nothing exists except through language, 
Gadamer is also famous for his debate with Jürgen Habermas, in 1960, over the 
possibility of transcending history and culture in order to find a truly objective position 
from which to criticize society. Gadamer’s philosophical objective, which he explains in 
Wahrheit und Methode, was to establish the nature of “philosophical hermeneutics,” 
which Heidegger had initiated.198 Seeking to fathom the nature of human understanding, 
Gadamer criticized in this book the common modern approach to the humanities, namely 
the one modeled on the rigorous, empirical methods of the natural sciences (e.g., 
positivism), coupled with Dilthey’s claim that interpretation must entail the recovering of 
authorial intention.
In contrast to these positions, Gadamer, as had Herder and Schiller before him, 
argued that all people’s consciousness is historically affected because everyone is 
embedded in the particular history and culture that shaped them. Thus, interpreting a text 
calls for what he considers a “fusion of horizons” into a single one: 
Every encounter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness 
involves the experience of a tension between the text and the present. The 
hermeneutic task consists not in covering up this tension by attempting a naïve 
assimilation of the two but in consciously bringing it out. This is why it is part of 
the hermeneutic approach to project a historical horizon that is different from the 
horizon of the present. Historical consciousness is aware of its own otherness and 
hence foregrounds the horizon of the past from its own. 199
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However, Gadamer admits that historical consciousness is itself merely something that is 
superimposed upon continuing tradition, and hence it immediately re-combines with what 
it has fore-grounded itself from, in order to become one with itself again in the unity of 
the historical horizon that it thus acquires. The obvious paradox in this statement is that 
the present itself is a product of history while the past can only be known in the present.
During the 60s, after having written in the tradition of existential phenomenology,
the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur experienced a sort of “linguistic turn.” He 
concluded that to study human reality properly one had to combine phenomenological 
description with hermeneutic interpretation. For hermeneutics, whatever is intelligible is 
accessible to us in and through language, and with that all deployments of language calls 
for interpretation. From this it follows that there is no self-understanding that is not 
mediated by signs, symbols, and texts; in the final analysis self-understanding coincides 
with the interpretation given to these mediating terms.200
More simply, the self is basically a product of the never ceasing communication 
(via symbols, texts) between the “external” and the “internal.” Self-understanding is a 
continual process of oscillation between poles, between distanciation and appropriation, 
in order to make something “one’s own.” While one would expect the act of 
appropriation, of “trying to understand” something to be a mental process, Ricoeur 
instead proposes that it is not so much a “taking hold of” but rather an act of “letting go.” 
He claims that what is “made our own” is not something mental, some blue-print 
supposedly hidden behind the text, but rather the projection of a world. However, this 
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does not imply that a subject projects the a priori of his own understanding and 
interpolates this a priori in the text. Instead, Ricoeur proposes that “appropriation is the 
process by which the revelation of new modes of being – or, if you prefer Wittgenstein to 
Heidegger, new “forms of life” – gives the subject new capacities for knowing 
himself.”201 This implies that the reader is broadened in his capacity to project himself by 
receiving a new mode of being from the text itself: “thus appropriation ceases to appear 
as a kind of possession, as a way of taking hold of […] it implies instead a moment of 
dispossession.”202 This basically means that what is initially perceived as the “self” needs 
to be given up in order for it to “receive a new mode of being,” for its full potential to be 
actualized. 
The process of identifying the self in relation to the changing environment can be 
likened to a “Mündigwerdung,” to freeing oneself from dependence on an external 
authority. In his essay “Schreiben nach Auschwitz” (1990), Günter Grass speaks of the 
restrictions that are put on the individual by different instances of authority as a 
Grenzsetzung. Initiated by the recognition of borders, the process of becoming self-
determining constitutes for Grass an ongoing liberation.203 Becoming one “self,” is an 
ongoing process that is both forced and driven by the interaction between the individual 
and the conceived “borders” which constitute an incessant, oscillating movement, a 
                                                
201 See Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action,
and Interpretation, ed. & transl. by John B. Thompson (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge UP, 1981), 
p. 192.
202 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 192.
203 Cf. Günter Grass, “Schreiben nach Auschwitz,” Der Autor als fragwürdiger Zeuge, ed. by Daniela 
Hermes (München: dtv, 1997), pp. 195-222. 
                                                                                                                      
103
driving force. Consider in this context also Karl Jaspers’ comment that at all points we 
are “led to the frontiers, in order to obtain the most extreme horizons.”204
The goal of the author, then, is to capture time (“die Zeit festzuhalten”) in order to 
establish for himself – as well as for the conscious reader – a connection between history 
and the present.205 History itself is an open-ended process, “the totality of life is an open 
whole”; it consists of human attempts to give meaning to life and therefore is never 
static.206 Establishing this connection between history and present, or rather, locating the 
present within the process of history stimulates “Ich-Bildung” on the individual level, 
self-creation, autopoiesis in a more general sense. The action forces the ‘I’ (author and 
reader) to (non-permanently) locate itself, in relation to external factors. The “I” becomes 
an author himself, namely of himself/herself.
Ira Livingston projects the idea of the present as part of the process of history in 
the image of a family tree and thereby suggests the organic nature of these and thereby of 
history. As one looks forward in time from what appears to be the center (one’s own 
position), one can imagine a first parent as the trunk of a tree that splits into many limbs, 
which in turn split into many more branches of offspring. However, if one were to look 
back, one also finds the trunk branching into roots and then into rootlets: two parents, 
four grandparents, eight great-grandparents, and so on. Livingston draws the following 
conclusion: 
                                                
204 Karl Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte (München: R. Piper, 1949), quoted here in 
translation: The Origin and Goal of History, transl. by Michael Bullock (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press,1953), p. 240.
205 Grass, p. 217.
206 Cf. Jaspers, p. 240.
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If this observation gives even a moment of vertigo in wondering which end is up, 
it mainly functions to ground all branches and roots in the individual who is their 
unique center. In doing so, the familiar metaphor obscures what is otherwise quite 
obvious: that unique and center  are wildly inappropriate, since every node of 
every root and branch of a single tree is also the node of other roots and branches 
of other trees, and that, taken together, the structure doesn’t resemble a tree at all 
but a kind of web.207
Adopting Livingston’s metaphor, what may seem, on first sight, like a set of two 
opposing forces (because pointing in different directions) is in fact a multitude of 
different influences which cause the subject to oscillate between an infinite number of 
poles. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that Angus Fletcher compares the writing 
of a poem with meditation. In New Theory, he writes that “meditation ties directly to the 
most ancient of words for the middle, for measuring, and for medicine.” 208 Fletcher 
refers to Eric Partridge, who in his etymological dictionary points out that, meditation is 
the thought-measuring of an idea, a fact, or a thing while the Latin term medicus denotes 
a measurer of man’s ills and injuries.209 Fletcher explains that meditation derives from 
Old English median, which means to judge, and more importantly is etymologically 
traceable to the ancient Greek medesthai, which means attend to or estimate. Partridge 
points to an essential component of the meditative process, claiming that it is loosely 
“medical” in the sense of attending carefully, such as an “attending physician.”210
                                                
207 Livingston, p. 87.
208 Fletcher, p. 192.
209 Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English (New York, 1958), p. 393.
210 Cf.  the etymological dictionary’s definition which supports Partridges’ claim regarding the term 
“meditation,” (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=meditation).
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Considering the fact that poetry is mostly thought to be deliberately inattentive, this 
reference to attentiveness is somewhat unexpected. With Fletcher we might ask 
nonetheless, “attentive in what sense?” Apparently the poet sees something, in the sense 
of examining closely, and in describing he basically offers a diagnosis. The implication is 
that an order is operative here, a hidden order.
German Modernist poet Gottfried Benn cultivated his own version of 
attentiveness in his very precise way of observing, analyzing and describing what he saw 
from a medical point of view. By training Benn was a doctor who specialized in venereal 
diseases. During his time as assistant doctor (1912/13) at the Berlin-Charlottenburg 
Westend hospital, Benn authored almost three hundred autopsy protocols. These were 
recently found in an external archive belonging to Berlin’s Charité Hospital by historian 
Christoph Hoffmann, who calls it a manner-of-death-cycle, devised by no one 
(“Todesarten-Zyklus, den niemand sich ausgedacht hat”).211 Since 1912 is also the 
publication year of Benn’s collection of poem’s Morgue, it makes sense to assume that 
his medical work influenced if not determined his creative work. Hoffmann describes the 
language Benn uses in the protocols as elliptical and flat (“formelhaft”), and economical, 
attributes which are clearly reflected in Benn’s poetry as well. Perhaps the most 
interesting aspect Hoffmann calls attention to is what we might refer to as the immediate 
nature of an autopsy protocol: 
Kaum eine Wissenschaft hat für ihre schriftlichen Erhebungen so viel 
Aufmerksamkeit entwickelt wie die Pathologie. Der Grund dafür ist einfach: 
                                                
211 Christoph Hoffmann, „Benns Todesarten-Projekt,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 May 2006, no. 
111, p. 42. After having been forgotten for decades, Benn’s autopsy protocols were reintroduced and on 
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Beobachtungen lassen sich hier nicht ohne weiteres wiederholen. Vom 
Gegenstand der Untersuchung verbleiben Laborergebnisse, vielleicht ein 
Gewebeschnitt oder ein Präparat, aber sonst überdauert der tote Körper im 
Protokoll.
(Rarely has a science received as much attention for its written manifestations as 
is the case with pathology. The reason is obvious: observations cannot be repeated 
at random. What remains of the object of analysis are lab results, possibly a tissue 
sample or dissection, but other than that, the body is sustained only in the 
protocol).212
The similarity to poetry is striking: with an autopsy protocol in hand, a reader is able to 
conjure up an image of the deceased at a later point in time, an image based upon 
immediate findings recorded at a very unique point in the past that cannot be recreated 
identically. While the information recorded in the autopsy protocol is the same, these 
findings can later be applied to different contexts, for example in court. The same can be 
said of reading a poem: the reader creates his own interpretation of the web of words 
before him, making what is before him his own. What the reader in both cases does, or 
rather, is forced to do, is not so much a recreation of the original image (which is 
impossible) but an image, a creation in its own right. Thus, the reader creates another 
original image that relates to the current context.
Let us return to the author, however. In his autopsy protocols Benn was in the 
habit of always looking for something when he looked at someone or something, he was 
always diagnosing:
In mir entsteht immer eine Empfindung von ganz eigentümlichem Gefühlston, 
wenn ich mir Jacobsen vorstelle, wie er mit einem Mikroskop an der Arbeit ist
und eine Zelle studiert: wie das Leben, aufgegipfelt in eines seiner subtilsten 
Exemplare, in dem das Seelische, das Zerebrale sich aufgefasert hat in seine 
feinsten und äussersten Vibrationen, sich über ein anderes Leben beugt: dumpf, 
triebhaft, feucht, alles eng beieinander, und wie doch beide zusammengehören 
und durch beide die eine Welle läuft und wie beide leibsverwandt sind bis in die 
chemische Zusammensetzung ihrer Säfte.
                                                
212 Hoffmann, p. 42. My translation.
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[Imagining Jacobsen studying a cell with the microscope evokes most peculiar 
sentiments in me; the way one life – culminated in one of its subtlest specimen, in 
which the spiritual, the cerebral is dissipated, vibrated, into their most delicate and 
utmost fibers – bends over another life; this one dull, libidinal, damp, all close 
together, and how nevertheless both belong together, and how one wave runs 
through both, and how both bodies are related all the way to their juices’ chemical 
composition.]213
Clearly, he is not only diagnosing illness and death but also ascertaining the chemical 
composition of life, discovering the similarities between the transcendent and the cerebral 
(“das Seelische” and “das Zerebrale”). The brain and the soul, Benn claims, are 
fundamentally connected, with one and the same wave (“Welle”) flowing through them. 
While this conjecture may seem at first sight to be somewhat far fetched, recent 
research in fact supports Benn’s theory. As brain imaging technology became more 
powerful during the last decade of the twentieth century, scientists used it to seek 
solutions to the deeper mysteries of consciousness. At the turn of the century, world-
renowned neuroscientists Antonio Damasio (1999) and Nobel Laureate Gerald Edelman 
(2000) published separate but related acclaimed theories of the neurobiology of 
consciousness.214 At the same time, biologists were striving to complete the genome 
project, which makes use of parallels discovered between DNA sequences and human 
language, both of which follow a similar “grammar.”215
                                                
213 Benn, “Gespräch,” (1910) Sämtliche Werke, Stuttgarter Ausg. (StA) / in Verbindung mit Ilse Benn, ed. 
by  Gerhard Schuster (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986-2003), VII/I: 168. Benn is referring to Danish natural 
scientist and poet Jens Peter Jacobsen. My translation.
214 Antonio R. Damasio, The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness. 
(New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999); Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi. AUniverse of Consciousness: 
how Matter becomes Imagination (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000). 
215 The Human Genome Project is a coordinated international project, begun in 1988, to map the entire 
human genome so that the genes could be isolated and sequenced. The full draft sequence was completed in 
2000 and published in February 2001. The process of identifying the boundaries between genes and other 
features in raw DNA sequence is called genome annotation and is the domain of bioinformatics. The best 
current technologies for annotation make use of statistical models that take advantage of parallels between 
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Brain imaging technology allowed researchers to probe into areas that had long 
eluded exploration, such as the search for the underlying biology of religious belief and 
mystical experiences. In their 2001 publication Why God Won’t Go Away, researchers 
Andrew Newberg and Eugene D’Aquili focus on the basic question of why religion and 
spirituality continue to thrive in an era of unprecedented scientific and technological 
enlightenment.216 Their answer is basically that religion and spirituality are a natural 
outcome of the way our brain is organized to respond to the dangers and opportunities it 
confronts. In other words, the authors claim that transcendent beliefs are deeply rooted in 
the manner in which specific brain systems respond to internal and external stimuli. 
An example for this fundamental connection is an especially intriguing discovery 
that emerged out of brain imaging studies Newberg and D’Aquili conducted with 
meditating Tibetan Buddhists and praying Franciscan nuns. The research focused on 
regions of the parietal lobes (in the top rear section of our brain) that orient us in and 
allow us to navigate through physical space. The left hemisphere segment of this system 
processes our inner sense of self, and the right hemisphere segment processes our outer 
sense of the surrounding environment, both important components of our consciousness.
What Newberg and D’Aquili discovered is that both hemispheric segments are 
normally quite active, but that they – especially the left hemisphere, namely the self 
segment – exhibit a marked decrease in neuronal activity during peak transcendent 
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periods. In effect, the self/non-self system loses its ability to locate the mental border 
between self and the surrounding world. In a way, then, the system perceives the 
biological reality of an endless self that is embedded in all creation, or – if we were to 
speak in grammatical terms – within its context. 217
  If religion and spirituality are inherent results of the way our brain is organized, 
this would imply that the same is true for art as well. As a matter of fact, Gottfried Benn 
comments on an organic nature of art: “Artistik,” which means the creation of art, is for 
Benn mainly the conscious usage of available linguistic means, a kind of 
“experimenting” with language. Indeed, Benn uses the metaphor of a laboratory when he 
writes:
Es ist ein Laboratorium, ein Laboratorium für Worte, in dem der Lyriker sich 
bewegt. Hier modelliert, fabriziert er Worte, öffnet sie, sprengt, zertrümmert sie, 
um sie mit Spannungen zu laden, deren Wesen dann durch einige Jahrzehnte geht. 
(...) Silben werden psychoanalysiert, Diphthonge umgeschult, Konsonanten 
transplantiert. Für ihn ist das Wort real und magisch, ein moderner Totem.
[It is a laboratory, a laboratory of words, in which the lyric poet moves. Here, he 
molds, fashions words; he bursts them opens, shatters them, in order to charge 
them with voltages whose essence will go through several decades. […] Syllables 
are psychoanalyzed, diphthongs are reskilled, consonants transplanted. To the 
poet, the word is real and magical, a modern totem.]218
Just like a scientist in a laboratory, the poet experiments with words, their sounds, 
and their meanings. The words he/she creates are “magical,” a claim that conjures up the 
image of God creating man. The poet is thus God-like himself/herself in that he/she 
creates a miniature cosmos with every poem. In “Probleme der Lyrik” (1951), Benn 
                                                
217 Newberg et al., p. 213.
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remarks that a modern poem is a vehicle for all the life struggles because it concentrates 
more energy on the problems and burning issues of the day than a novel does:
Im Gedicht spielen sich all diese Seinskämpfe wie auf einem Schauplatz ab, 
hinter einem modernen Gedicht stehen die Probleme der Zeit, der Kunst, der 
inneren Grundlagen unserer Existenz weit gedrängter und radikaler als hinter 
einem Roman oder gar einem Bühnenstück. Ein Gedicht ist immer die Frage nach 
dem Ich.
[In a poem, all these struggles of life are played out as in a showplace; behind a 
modern poem are the problems of the time, of art, of the inner foundations of our 
existence, but in much more dense and radical manner than behind a novel or, 
even more, a drama. A poem is always the question of and the quest for the 
Self.]219
In regards to what Benn refers to as essence (“gedrängter und radikaler”), we might then 
think of a poem as a DNA-like vortex made of numerous nucleotides, a “blueprint” that 
promises to hold answers to the question of who we are. The poet is attempting to answer 
this question by attempting to position the self, in a continual effort. Poetry thus serves as 
a kind of compass in an endless (because evolving) endeavor to locate the self, in 
relationship to its environment, to both the author as well as the reader – who in 
interpreting it becomes author himself.
3.4.2. Text and Interpretation
The autopoetic property of a poem as its defining aspect is perhaps most apparent 
when one tries to translate a poem, as opposed to translating prose. Translation is the 
interpretation of the meaning of a text in one language and the following production, in 
another language, of an equivalent text that, ideally, communicates the same message. 
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Since different languages reflect different cultural and social histories, because of the 
holism of meaning, and because of the different associations and tone of different words, 
translation may be an ideal which can only be approached but never fully achieved. 
However, the so-called thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation goes beyond this 
by claiming that radically different translations can be equally correct, thereby denying 
determinacy of meaning to the original expression.220 Hence, according to this theory 
there is “wiggle room” for interpretation, not only between the source text and the 
translated text, but even, and already, between the interpretation of the source text and the 
text itself. Poetry, because it consists of essences, rather than finished thoughts, leaves 
more room for creative movement on the part of the reader (it actually forces it) than 
prose can (or strives to).
Gottfried Benn’s claim that “Lyrik ist national” (poetry is “national”) while 
images, statues, and symphonies are “international” is based on the premise that colors 
and sound exist in nature, words do not: („Farben und Klänge gibt es in der Natur, Worte 
nicht“).221 What he means by this is that the word is rooted in consciousness in the sense 
that a person’s consciousness defines each and every word (“Das Bewusstsein wächst in 
die Worte hinein, das Bewusstsein definiert die Worte”). 
However, a word’s rootedness (Verwurzelung) is in fact not only national but 
based on many other factors as well.222 This is apparent when we encounter a rhetorical 
                                                
220 Cf. “translation,” The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Simon Blackburn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), Oxford Reference Online.
221 Benn, “Probleme der Lyrik,” Gesammelte Werke, I:510.
222 The German word „Verwurzelung“ is more fitting in this regard because it is more precise. The prefix 
“Ver-“ implies connections in many directions, a seemingly chaotic web of roots (Ver = thorough, through 
and through).
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device such as metalepsis, which denotes a figure of speech in which one thing is 
referenced by something else which is only remotely associated with it. Often the 
association works through a different figure of speech, or through a chain of cause and 
effect. It can also refer to the combination of several figures of speech into an altogether 
new one. An example for metalepsis is the sentence “He has a lead foot.” The meaning, 
namely that “he drives fast” can be known only through an implied causal chain: Lead is 
heavy, a heavy foot would press down the accelerator which would then cause the car to 
speed up.
Angus Fletcher refers to metalepsis as a “mysterious” figure that “creates a magic 
effect in literature “because when a poet uses a word drawn from a previous poet, the 
second use is designed so that by evoking the first use, the repetition implies a magical 
anticipation.” It suggests a mysterious continuity, Fletcher claims, that is not linear and 
that “calls upon a primitive human understanding of synchronicity.”223
Hence, metalepsis works in a non-linear fashion and is based on the premise that 
parallel to genetic evolution, the human lineage added cultural evolution, and the two 
forms of evolution are linked, a phenomenon biologist Edward O. Wilson refers to as 
“gene-culture coevolution.”224 Wilson justifies this claim by pointing out that just as 
natural selection is the determining factor in genetic evolution, “certain cultural norms
also survive and reproduce better than competing norms, causing culture to evolve in a 
track parallel to and usually much faster than genetic evolution.”225 Language, religion, 
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myths, and art are all productive and therefore individually evolving components of the 
whole of that which we call “culture,” and represent the causal connection between 
semiotics and biology. 
3.4.3. Poetic Creation as Natural Phenomenon
As previously argued, Gottfried Benn also sees a connection between language 
and science. With his characterization of the poem as an experiment, Benn opens up new 
possibilities of poetic form as well as provides new topoi for the 20th century. Here 
again, Benn emphasizes the autopoetic character of the artistic process – hence, the act of 
creation itself becomes the topic/object of the poem – the poem refers to itself. Art, then, 
experiences itself as content. Benn explains:
Artistik ist der Versuch der Kunst, innerhalb des allgemeinen Verfalls der Inhalte 
sich selber als Inhalt zu erleben und aus diesem Erlebnis einen neuen Stil zu 
bilden, es ist der Versuch, gegen den allgemeinen Nihilismus der Werte eine neue 
Transzendenz zu setzen: die Transzendenz schoepferischer Lust.
[Artistry is art’s attempt to experience itself as content, within the general 
abasement of contents, and to create a new diction from this experience. It is the 
effort to counter the general nihilism of values with a new transcendence: the 
transcendence of creative lust.]226
This new way of interpreting reality naturally beckons the question what this reality is. In 
fact for Benn, reality, as could be expected, is positively named “Ausdruckswelt” (world 
of expressions) as opposed to “Scheinwelt” (world of appearances).227
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Poetry is thus a return of life over reflection: “Es ist wie ein Kreis, der sich 
schliesst: das Resultat millionenjähriger Entwicklungen, das Hirntier, das 
Zerebralgeschöpf, nun wird es wieder zurückgezogen zum Vegetativen, Pflanzlichen.” (it 
is like a circle that closes: the result of millions of years’ of development, the brain-
animal – the cerebral being – now it is drawn back into the vegetative.”) And he adds, 
emphasizing the idea of returning home: “zurückgezogen, zu allem, das anheimgegeben 
ist an Tag und Nacht und Glut und Frost; nun sitzt es da, wie nie aufgestört aus der 
Seligkeit gehirnloser Urahnen, wie heimgekehrt (drawn back to everything that is 
exposed to and dependent on day and night, on blazing heat and severe frost; there it is 
now, as if it had never been disturbed from its ancestors’ brainless bliss, as if returned 
home). 228 Returning home (“heimkehren”) is equivalent to seeing something in its purest 
form. 
Was heisst das denn eigentlich: Dichten, und um was handelt es sich, wenn man 
irgend etwas beschreiben will? Feiner, flüchtiger, und nie gesagter Dinge will 
man doch habhaft werden und sie so aufgewahren, dass sie den Schmelz nicht 
verlieren, den sie trugen, als sie zu uns kamen.
[What does it mean, really: to write poetry? What do you call it when you are 
trying to describe something? What you mean to capture are delicate, fleeting, and 
never before uttered things, that you must preserve in a way that they do not loose 
the nuances they carried when they came to us.]229
Writing at the same time as Benn, the American Modernist poet Wallace Stevens 
recognizes the need to excavate a new self, one that is stripped of what he refers to as 
“varnish and dirt.” He exemplifies this notion in the metaphor of restoring a painting: “If 
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you take the varnish and dirt of generations off a picture, you see it in its first idea.”230 In 
other words, the poem’s theory calls for the poem’s own destruction. In order to excavate 
the essence, i.e. the nucleus which contains the entire potential of meaning, said meaning 
– in the form of logical correspondence – must be destroyed before it can be constructed 
anew.
And we can be sure that it will be constructed anew, since our urge, our need 
indeed, to give form to what seems chaotic defines our life. This search for form, or 
rather, the need to introduce order to anything we are confronted with becomes 
astonishingly apparent in Noam Chomsky’s example of a meaningless sentence which 
nevertheless turned out to all the more meaningful: “Colorless green ideas sleep 
furiously.”231 Livingston points out:
It [the sentence] seems to suggest that some ideas that are lively but relatively 
new and untried (green) and apparently invisible or easy to ignore or emotionally 
neutral (colorless) nonetheless must struggle desperately or violently (furiously) 
to remain unconscious (sleep). Of course, what Chomsky seemed to mean was 
that the sentence is meaningless, and this is precisely the anxious disavowal that 
seems to underlie the blithe confidence of rationalist science; to disavow 
contradiction and metaphor is to “sleep furiously.”232
Obviously, then, a word put in a specific context can mean more than originally implied, 
and even a single word by itself will provoke an array of associations depending on the 
background and present state of the observing individual. Gottfried Benn exemplifies this 
concept in the English word “nevermore“:
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231 Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (The Hague/Paris: Mouton, 1957), p. 15.
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„nevermore“ mit seinen zwei kurzen verschlossenen Anfangssilben und dann dem 
dunklen strömenden „more“, in dem für uns „das Moor“ aufklingt und „la mort“, 
ist nicht „nimmermehr“ – „nevermore“ ist schöner. Worte schlagen mehr an als 
die Nachricht und den Inhalt, sie sind einerseits Geist, aber haben andererseits das 
Wesenhafte und Zweideutige der Dinge der Natur.
[‘nevermore’ with its two short, closed beginning syllables, followed by the dark, 
surging “more,” which for us “the moor” resound, and “la mort.” It is not 
[merely] “nimmermehr“ – “nevermore” is more beautiful. Words strike up more 
than message and content; they are spirit on the one hand, but, on the other hand, 
they possess the essential and ambiguous quality of things found in the natural 
world.]233
What is quite stunning in this quotation is the realization that while the term „nevermore” 
clearly has different connotations for different readers, the number of potential meanings 
is in this case increased by the fact that Gottfried Benn is not a native speaker of the 
English language. In fact, he could have derived “his” meaning of the word even without 
knowing the German equivalent of “nevermore,” indeed without even being familiar with 
the word’s English pronunciation. This suggests that we can create meaning even when 
we are not aware of the original intention of an author/ a word/ a poem. If we add to the 
phonetics the context, the word’s possible connotations are expanded even more. 
In the case of a poem, the number of contexts expands exponentially as well. As 
has been established, a word accrues meaning through the context it is presented in and at 
some point – through gene-culture co-evolution – it is seemingly “locked” into a certain 
meaning, which implies that it is static, or, to put it drastically, “dead.” In a poem, much 
more so than in prose, the structure of a word’s syntactical and semantic (i.e. traditional) 
context is dissolved. The technique of montage disengages existing connections; 
grammatical, syntactic as well as semantic associations within words are set free, called 
into question or perhaps even dissolved altogether. In that it produces fragments, montage 
                                                
233  Benn, “Probleme der Lyrik,” in Gesammelte Werke, I:511. My translation.
                                                                                                                      
117
interrupts a text’s linearity: words are liberated from their traditional frame of 
reference/usage. Hence, a montage-poem is not a traditional descriptive or narrative kind 
of poem but, rather, it reflects generally on itself by turning attention back to itself. There 
is constant movement, though not of the linear kind and it is precisely this movement that 
induces, forces in fact, the creative impetus; it creates entirely new connections between 
words and their associations.  
It is for this reason that in most cases, a montage-poem’s “structure” relies 
entirely on the moving, wave-like energy created by rhetorical, rhythmical, and phonetic 
strategies (such as anaphors, assonances, and alliterations) rather than on traditional 
poetic order, namely rhyme and meter. In other words, this surge of energy which Benn 
calls “Form” replaces traditional grammatical, syntactical, and logical order, or, as Edgar 
Lohner puts it: “Die grammatische Beziehungslosigkeit wird zum artistisch 
Beziehungsvollen,” (the lack of syntactical connections results in semantic 
associations).234
Benn likens this need for form which is most prominent in a poem (as opposed to
prose) to a natural concept. The impetus to structure and grow is a natural one, and is 
intrinsic to poetry. For this reason Benn asserts that all creation is a striving for form. 
Within this system, man is the „cry for expression,” and the only steps towards 
structuring our world and lives that we know of are the social structure of a state and art, 
(„Schöpfung ist das Verlangen nach Form, der Mensch ist der Schrei nach Ausdruck, der 
                                                
234 Edgar Lohner, Passion und Intellekt. Die Lyrik Gottfried Benns (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1961), p. 150. 
My translation.
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Staat ist der erste Schritt dahin, die Kunst der zweite, weitere Schritte kennen wir 
nicht”).235
In the search for and continuous re-creation of form, the art of poetic creation, 
then, proves to be a natural phenomenon. If we were to take Benn’s statement a step 
further and interpret his admittedly ambiguous choice of the word “Schöpfung” as 
“genesis” we could claim that the traditional belief of creation as a divine act can now be 
construed as a natural one. As part of the organic process of life, the author essentially 
creates another organism, an autopoietic system, in the form of a poem.
The continuous oscillation between imagination and reality, between abstraction 
and specificity and between indeterminacy and completion, constitutes the process of 
defining the nature of the relationship between self and world. Much like a compass, 
poetry can aid both the poet as well as the reader (who essentially becomes poet himself) 
in this quest for order, for meaning, and thus ultimately for self-definition, in that it can 
point to sporadic centers in an ongoing oscillation between poles.
                                                
235 Benn, Rede auf Stefan George (1934), StA, IV:108.
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CHAPTER IV
CONSTITUTING THE SELF: EMERSON AND NIETZSCHE
»Seht euch vor«, sagt Emerson, »wenn der große Gott einen 
Denker auf unsern Planeten kommen läßt. Alles ist dann in 
Gefahr. Es ist, wie wenn in einer großen Stadt eine 
Feuersbrunst ausgebrochen ist, wo keiner weiß, was eigentlich 
noch sicher ist und wo es enden wird. Da ist nichts in der 
Wissenschaft, was nicht morgen eine Umdrehung erfahren 
haben möchte [...]; alle Dinge, die dem Menschen zu dieser 
Stunde teuer und wert sind, sind dies nur auf Rechnung der 
Ideen, die an ihrem geistigen Horizonte aufgestiegen sind und 
welche die gegenwärtige Ordnung der Dinge ebenso 
verursachen, wie ein Baum seine Äpfel trägt. Ein neuer Grad 
der Kultur würde augenblicklich das ganze System 
menschlicher Bestrebungen einer Umwälzung unterwerfen.« 
– Friedrich Nietzsche, Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen.236
In previous chapters I have argued that in any system, be it a biological cell, an 
ant colony, human society, or the entire universe, it is not merely the different parts that 
make up the whole of the system, but the interactions between those parts. As Saussure 
demonstrated in the model of language, nothing can be defined in a vacuum because it is 
only by comparison that we can determine what we are looking at. In other words, to be 
able to analyze, to define a phenomenon, we need to view within its context or 
environment. 
                                                
236 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino 
Montinari, 15 vols., (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999), I: 426. The original quotation by 
Emerson can be found in „Circles“: “Beware when the great God lets loose a thinker on this planet. Then 
all things are at risk. It is as when a conflagration has broken out in a great city, and no man knows what is 
safe, or where it will end. There is not a piece of science, but its flank may be turned to-morrow; there is 
not any literary reputation, not the so-called eternal names of fame that may not be revised and condemned 
[…] The things which are dear to men at this hour are so on account of the ideas which have emerged on 
their mental horizon, and which cause the present order of things as a tree bears its apples. A new degree of 
culture would instantly revolutionize the entire system of human pursuits,” (Ralph Waldo Emerson, Alfred 
Riggs Ferguson, and Jean Ferguson Carr, The Collected Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 3 vols., (CW), 
[Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979], pp. 179-190. Here p. 183.  
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However, we have also seen that this context is constantly shifting; it is by no 
means stable ground. Hence, whatever has been determined in relation to its context must 
in fact be re-determined indeterminately. The need for re-contextualization can be 
considered a universal truth, since it is true on all scales in the biological as well as the 
social realm. Context is a construction, then, not a given. N. Katherine Hayles calls this 
phenomenon “denaturing,” as was explained in the previous chapter of this dissertation. 
Hayles defines postmodernism as the realization that what has always been thought of as 
the essential, unvarying components of human experience are not natural facts of life but 
social constructions.237 From this it follows that to define the self, one cannot depend on 
context of whatever ilk. However, nothing can be defined without taking context into 
account; instead of relying on a traditional reference point, one must create one’s own 
context.
If complexity theory is applicable to the human being’s neural system and to life 
itself, then it stands to reason that it is also applicable to human products such as 
literature and art, the purpose of which is to create, to breathe life into material artifacts. 
Both Ralph Waldo Emerson and Friedrich Nietzsche provide us with examples of this 
connection between the physical and the psychic spheres. Each asks how the findings of 
science shed new light on the human experience and the force behind creativity, whether 
in nature or art. 
In offering an overview of the tenor of the time, this chapter provides the grounds 
upon which Nietzsche’s “Wille zur Macht,” and other terms are to be redefined in the 
                                                
237 N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University press, 1990), p. 265. Consider also 
that if context can be constructed, then it can also be controlled. For the implications of context control, see 
Chaos Bound, p. 274ff. 
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context of complexity theory. Considering Nietzsche’s intense interest in Emerson’s 
writings and what can legitimately be called his appropriation of many Emersonian ideas, 
several of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s writings on nature, on the poet, on art, as well the 
question of how these topics relate to each other, will constitute an important backdrop 
for this new interpretation of creativity. This is especially enlightening considering the 
fact that while Nietzsche read Emerson in German translation, Emerson had – in turn –
been influenced by German thinkers and authors himself, namely Kant and Goethe, by 
way of Coleridge’s and Carlyle’s translations.238
Before looking at man’s creations, however, we must look at man himself. 
Consider again the changing context, and the premise that follows, namely that the 
meaning of life, of being human, must also be continually redefined. In an age in which 
human existence has been robbed of context, of stable ground, man must create his/her 
own ground to stand on. Both Emerson and Nietzsche deal with precisely this issue, in 
that they both believe in and insist on the power of self-reliance and of realizing one’s 
true potential. In other words, it is not a state of “being” that is the goal but rather, a 
process of becoming through continual self-creation.
4.1.   Drawing a New Circle: Ralph Waldo Emerson
He [man] is the compend of time; he is also the correlative of 
nature. His power consists in the multitude of his affinities, in 
the fact that his life is intertwined with the whole chain of 
organic and inorganic being.
                                                
238 Cf. Stanley Hubbard, “Nietzsche und Emerson,” Philosophische Forschungen, ed. by Karl Jaspers 
(Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft AG.,1958), p. 2. 
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– Ralph Waldo Emerson, “History,” (1841)239
Ralph Waldo Emerson was among the writers to influence Friedrich Nietzsche, 
preceding him by a generation, acknowledges the fluctuations that constitute life, as well 
as its organic form. Considered by many critics the most significant American writer and 
the wellspring of American modernism, Emerson forged an American Romanticism, 
namely transcendentalism that emphasized creativity as a channel for divine inspiration 
and stressed the visionary, prophetic voice and the organically evolving form. During his 
lifetime, he influenced major writers such as Henry David Thoreau, Margaret Fuller, 
Walt Whitman, and Emily Dickinson. Theodore Dreiser, Robert Frost, and Wallace 
Stevens are among the American writers who have testified to Emerson's influence on 
their art. 
Throughout his work, Emerson argues that the source of “power” is the divinity in 
man. With the publication of Nature in 1836, he first announced his credo of idealism 
and self-reliance. However, what Emerson calls “self-reliance” is actually premised on 
the transformation of the self into a conduit to the “Over-Soul,” or inner god. In general, 
Emerson stands for resistance against system building and for a radical openness to the 
promptings of one’s own native intelligence. Therefore, his project is deeply antipathetic 
to the tenor of much of contemporary theory because his writing argues for a human 
center, as later does Nietzsche’s.  In Nature Emerson breaks with tradition, complaining 
that “tradition characterizes the preaching of this country, that it comes out of the 
                                                
239 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Alfred Riggs Ferguson, and Jean Ferguson Carr, The Collected Works of Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, 3 vols., (CW), (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979), II:
20.
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memory, and not out of the soul.”240 This antithesis between “memory” and “soul” would 
later constitute the root of Nietzsche’s rejection of the traditional moral values postulated 
by the Christian church. 
Both Emerson and Nietzsche reacted to the scientific theories of their days.241
Concurrently with the industrial revolution and evolving capitalism there developed an 
intellectual and artistic hostility towards this industrialization of life which was embodied 
in the Romantic Movement. Its major exponents, such as Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth 
and Keats, had stressed the importance of nature in art and language, in contrast to a 
world of machines and factories. Emerson’s vision followed this Romantic tradition 
which claimed that while science hands to humanity the tools of thought, these tools 
eventually alienate humanity from nature. Thus, modern science launches social progress 
but prompts a crisis since materialism denigrates the human spirit. 
Emerson, however does embrace science as the most promising of the new 
alternatives to theology because – as he had said in his first lecture – “the greatest office 
of natural science (and one which as yet is only begun to be discharged)” was “to explain 
man himself, because knowledge of all the facts of nature will give man his true place in 
the system of being.”242 Emerson argues against a purely empirical “use” of nature, 
claiming that it would be a misunderstanding of research into nature to forget that there 
                                                
240 On October 28, 1832, Emerson’s deep antipathy to the “tyranny of the past” lead him to resign from the 
pastorate of Second Church in Boston and from the Unitarian ministry altogether. See introduction to the 
1985 edition of Nature by Jaroslav Pelikan  (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1985), p. 44.
241 Emerson was actually a contemporary of Darwin; they died just eight days apart. However, Emerson’s 
Nature appeared almost a quarter century before The Origin of Species of 1859, and any reciprocal 
influence is uncertain, (Pelikan, p. 6).
242 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Early Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1833-1842 (EL), ed. by Stephen 
E. Whicher,  Robert E. Spiller and Wallace E. Williams (3 vols). (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1959-71), I: 23.
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was not only “a relation of use” but also “a relation of beauty” between man and nature 
and that it was this latter connection as well that lead him to science.243 He is thus aiming 
to establish a connection between the sciences and the humanities and takes a stand 
against one-sided interpretations of both the natural as well as the spiritual life of man: 
In that deep force, the last fact behind which analysis cannot go, all things find 
their common origin. For, the sense of being which in calm hours rises, we know 
not how, in the soul, is not diverse from things, from space, from light, from time, 
from man, but one with them, and proceeds obviously from the same source 
whence their life and being also proceed.”244
From these comments it can be inferred that a reciprocal relationship exists between the 
design and beauty of nature and the eye of the beholder: “It is certain that the power to 
produce this delight, does not reside in nature, but in man, or in a harmony of both.” This 
notion of harmony, or, as he sometimes calls it, “proportion,” is both: a predicate of 
external nature, seen as beauty, as well as a predicate of human nature. It is the 
interaction of the two.245
Like Goethe, who claimed that all that can be found “outside” is also inside, 
Emerson seized on the Greek idea that the natural world, rightly studied, unlocks the 
soul, and that the soul, once opened, yields truths about the moral structure of the 
universe.246 “The ancient Greeks,” Emerson said, “called the world κοσμος [order], 
beauty.”247 In his dialogue Gorgias, Plato’s Socrates argues that the soul, like the world, 
                                                
243 Emerson, EL, I: 48.
244 Emerson, “Self Reliance,” CW, II: 27-51. Here p. 37.
245 Emerson, EL, I: 48.
246 Cf. Tantillo, pp. 91-92.
247 Emerson, Nature, CW, I: 8-45. Here p. 12.
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possesses its own cosmos, its own pattern of beauty and order.248 However, according to 
Emerson, we often become conscious of this interior order only when we are confronted 
with something in our everyday life that startles us into self-perception. Emerson 
believed that what is “outside” teaches us to understand and also how to make use of 
what is “inside.” Therefore, if a man thought hard enough about the natural architecture 
that awed and inspired him he would find that it impressed him precisely because it 
disclosed to him a corresponding architecture within himself.
Man must trust his instincts, rather than others’: “A man should learn to detect 
and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the 
lustre of the firmament of bards and sages.”249 Emerson insists that if one has the courage 
to trust oneself, one will come to credit the truth of one’s intuitions, and in doing so will 
catch a glimpse of something more, namely a connection. We would find that there is an 
idea of order at work both in the universe and our own soul. The wise man, according to 
Emerson, discovers, in his efforts to become better acquainted with himself, that he is not 
an accident of biology, a chance concatenation of atoms; but that he instead has a purpose 
and a destiny:
There is a time in every man's education when he arrives at the conviction that 
envy is ignorance; that imitation is suicide; that he must take himself for better, 
for worse, as his portion; that though the wide universe is full of good, no kernel 
of nourishing corn can come to him but through his toil bestowed on that plot of 
ground which is given to him to till. The power which resides in him is new in 
nature, and none but he knows what that is which he can do, nor does he know 
until he has tried.250
                                                
248 The Greek term “cosmos” [κόσμος] is in fact translated as order, arrangement, ornaments. A “cosmos” 
therefore, is an orderly or harmonious system. See The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, 
ed. by T. F. Hoad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Oxford Reference Online.
249 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 27.
250 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 27.
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Every individual’s purpose, then, is to strive to use their potential. This purpose 
then provides the strength to endure doubt and criticism (originating both internal and 
external), as it takes not only effort but also courage to counter a society that supports 
contradictory values. Nietzsche’s Genealogie der Moral clearly echoes Emerson’s 
reproach against a society that according to him is “in conspiracy against the manhood of 
every one of its members.” It becomes obvious in the following quotation that Emerson 
defines “manhood” in a very elementary, as well as elemental way: 
Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for the better 
securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture of 
the eater. The virtue in most request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It 
loves not realities and creators, but names and customs.251
In other words, nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of one’s own mind. The 
“sacredness of tradition,” must be identified for what it is, namely a historical evolution 
of customs, rather than a sacred entity. That these ideas helped inspire Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is quite obvious and becomes even more so in the following passage where 
Emerson very explicitly states that what we consider “good” or “bad” are relative terms: 
On my saying, What have I to do with the sacredness of traditions, if I live wholly 
from within? my friend suggested,— "But these impulses may be from below, not 
from above." I replied, "They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the Devil's 
child, I will live then from the Devil." No law can be sacred to me but that of my 
nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the 
only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it.252
                                                
251 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 29. 
252 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 30.
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The attributes “good” and “bad” are transferable because one is necessarily part of 
the other:  “every sweet hath its sour; every evil its good.”253 This same dualism underlies 
the nature and condition of man. Emerson’s reasoning for what might be called 
„perspectivism“ is based on his view of nature, where every one thing is based on its 
opposite:  “polarity, [original emphasis] or action and reaction, we meet in every part of 
nature; in darkness and light; in heat and cold; in the ebb and flow of waters; in male and 
female […] An inevitable dualism bisects nature, so that each thing is a half, and suggests 
another thing to make it whole.”254 However, Emerson is quick to add that what we might 
perceive as dualism is, in fact, a multitude of facets, each of which is contained in every 
other: 
Whilst the world is thus dual, so is every one of its parts. The entire system of 
things gets represented in every particle. There is somewhat that resembles the 
ebb and flow of the sea, day and night, man and woman, in a single needle of the 
pine, in a kernel of corn, in each individual of every animal tribe.255
Nature, then, is opposed to conformity and not only favors but also perpetuates diversity. 
Again, Emerson transfers his insights on nature to the human, social realm when he 
postulates: “I hope in these days we have heard the last of conformity and consistency.”
256
In speaking out against conformity and consistency in this way, Emerson propagates 
creating one’s own context, even if this means affronting and reprimanding “the smooth 
                                                
253 Emerson, “Compensation,” CW, II: 58.
254 Emerson, “Compensation,” CW, II: 57. 
255 Emerson, “Compensation,” CW, II: 57. The notion of every component of a system representing the 
whole of the system, and vice versa, is the principle behind the Mandelbrot set. Cf. Benoit B. Mandelbrot 
Fractals and Chaos: The Mandelbrot Set and Beyond: Selecta Volume C. (New York: Springer, 2004).
256  Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 35.
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mediocrity and squalid contentment of the times, and hurl in the face of custom, and 
trade, and office, the fact which is the upshot of all history, that there is a great 
responsible Thinker and Actor working wherever a man works.”257
Man must make the world his own, and in order to do so he must become aware 
his own potential before he can realize it. Civilization has lifted man in a sense; however, 
in the process, he has lost his grounding, that is, the basis to stand on: “The civilized man 
has built a coach, but has lost the use of his feet.”258 Man needs to be grounded in the 
present. In order to do so, however, he must overcome what is holding him back. 
Emerson claims that man “postpones or remembers,” he is living in either the future, or 
the past. Instead of living in the present, he “with reverted eye laments the past, or, 
heedless of the riches that surround him, stands on tiptoe to foresee the future. He cannot 
be happy and strong until he too lives with nature in the present, above time.259
Rather than being defined by his time, that is, generally speaking, the context, 
man is to tell time himself. The image that comes to mind here is that of a gnomon, that 
part of the sundial that tells time. Much like a gnomon then, man should be a kind of 
societal observer and commentator who (in interaction with the sun, that is, nature) 
determines “what time it is” culturally speaking.260
                                                
257 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 35. 
258 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 48. Cf. Nietzsche’s, Benn’s, and Wallace Stevens’ insistence on 
man’s connection to the earth on which I elaborate in the following chapters.
259 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 39.
260 Obviously, the notion of the gnomon in turn brings to mind Nietzsche’s Zarathustra-figure, who is 
societal observer and prophet in one. Cf. McCarthy’s interpretation of the gnome Oskar Matzerath (in G. 
Grass’ novel “The Tin Drum”), who marks time in an eternal present, (Remapping Reality, pp. 280-282 and 
316-318).
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In the vision that concludes Nature, the commanding eye learns to see not by 
observation but by its own creative light. Emerson in fact personifies the stoic, which 
Nietzsche later will embody in the figure of Zarathustra. Both are to “open the resources 
of man,” and to tell their contemporaries that “they are not leaning willows, but can and 
must detach themselves.”261 Much like a prophet himself, Emerson foresees (because he 
knows for himself) that with the exercise of self-trust, new powers will appear:
The objection to conforming to usages that have become dead to you is, that it 
scatters your force. It loses your time and blurs the impression of your character. 
If you maintain a dead church, contribute to a dead Bible-society, vote with a 
great party either for the government or against it, spread your table like base 
housekeepers, – under all these screens I have difficulty to detect the precise man 
you are. And, of course, so much force is withdrawn from your proper life.262
Interestingly, Emerson concludes his argument as follows: “that a man is the word made 
flesh, born to shed healing to the nations, that he should be ashamed of our 
compassion.”263 Nietzsche will later take up this outrage over misplaced compassion 
(“Mitleid”), mainly in the “Genealogie der Moral.” For Nietzsche, the notion of 
compassion, cultivated by Christianity, has tainted and effectively weakened mankind in 
that it runs counter to its natural impetus, namely the will to power. 
4.1.1. Poetry as Miniature Cosmos
                                                
261 Emerson, „Self-Reliance,“ CW, II: 43. Cf. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, who vehemently refuses being used 
as a crutch by his followers since they are supposed to learn to “walk” on their own: “Ich bin ein Geländer 
am Strome: fasse mich, wer mich fassen kann! Eure Krücke aber bin ich nicht,“ (Nietzsche, KSA, IV: 47).
262 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, II: 32. Nietzsche will, of course, take what Emerson refers to as the 
death of “church,” and personify the church in the figure of God Himself when he proclaims that “God is 
dead.”
263 Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” CW, I: 43-44.
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In his essay “Circles,” Emerson proposes to conceive of the natural world as “a 
system of concentric circles, and we now and then detect in nature slight dislocations, 
which apprize us that this surface on which we now stand is not fixed, but sliding.”264 He 
admits that “every thing looks permanent” but is quick to add “until its secret is known.” 
The secret can be summed up in his assertion that there are no absolutely no fixtures in 
nature. Rather, the universe is fluid and therefore volatile.265 In other words, Emerson is 
claims that everything has the same center but evolves outward from it, in a circular 
motion – clearly reminiscent of the discussion of the perfect symbol for growth, the 
spiral.
Any perceived permanence then, must necessarily be an illusion, and a fatal one 
at that: “Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit. People wish to be 
settled; only as far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them.”266 Instability and 
non-conformity (originality) are vital in nature as well for the growth of a human being, 
as Emerson relates in “Circles,” since “the soul's advances are not made by gradation, 
such as can be represented by motion in a straight line; but rather by ascension of state, 
such as can be represented by metamorphosis, – from the egg to the worm, from the 
worm to the fly.”267
There is a vital force that perpetuates this metamorphosis, both in nature as well 
as in the human being which is a part of nature and, in itself, also contains the whole of 
                                                
264 Emerson, “Circles,” CW, II: 186.
265 Emerson, “Circles,” CW, II: 179.
266 Emerson, “Circles,” CW, II: 189.
267 Emerson, “The Over-Soul,” CW, II: 163. 
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nature. This vital force, or “Kraft” (“power”) as Nietzsche calls it, is for Emerson the 
divine impulse, the soul: “With each divine impulse the mind rends the thin rinds of the 
visible and finite, and comes out into eternity, and inspires and expires its air. It 
converses with truths that have always been spoken in the world” [my emphasis].268
Yet words by themselves can do only so much to open up the mind: music, for 
Emerson, is as essential to poetry as language. He followed the Greeks in arguing that a 
poem, like the soul itself, resembles a living organism, a pattern of reason ordered by 
rhyme and rhythm. Like the Greeks, Emerson insisted that the music of poetry is itself a 
profound educational force. It “is not metres, but metre-making argument”– word and 
music together – “that makes a poem,” Emerson said: “a thought so passionate and alive, 
that, like the spirit of a plant or an animal, it has an architecture of its own, and adorns 
nature with a new thing.”269 Thus, the virtue of the classic poets lies in their patterns of 
words and rhythms which form a miniature cosmos, “an abstract or epitome of the 
world.”270 Because its structure resembles that of both the universe and the soul, poetry, 
as a work of art, “throws light upon the mystery of humanity.”271
When it comes to trying to find out the deeper order of the self which connects us 
to the universe, nothing, Emerson claims, beats poetry. This is because the poet is able to 
communicate his intimations of order with living words – words that “would bleed if you 
                                                
268 Emerson, “The Over-Soul,” CW, II: 163.
269 Emerson, “The Poet,” Essays, Second Series (1844).
270 Emerson, Nature, CW, I: 16.
271 Emerson, Nature, CW, I: 16.
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cut them.”272 Poetry, he argues, “unlocks our chains,” and the “poets are thus liberating 
gods.”273 A master poet like Shakespeare is a supreme “translator of things in your [own] 
consciousness.”274 The need to unlock our chains is a natural one: 
The one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, to be 
surprised out of our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory, and to do 
something without knowing how or why; in short, to draw a new circle. Nothing 
great was ever achieved without enthusiasm.275
However, this enthusiasm is not easy to attain or retain since one is abandoning the 
safeness of the shore in order to dive into some rather murky waters. The outcome of this 
journey is indeterminate: “Do not require a description of the countries towards which 
you sail.”276 Again, however, Emerson affirms that this is in fact what life is all about: the 
“way of life is wonderful: it is by abandonment.”277
Poetry thus unlocks our chains because it forces us to “think outside the box,” it 
forces us to purge ourselves from our past and thereby opens our mind, enabling it to 
make new connections, not in a vertical but in a lateral movement.
4.2. Between Science and Literature: Friedrich Nietzsche
                                                
272 Emerson, “Montaigne; or, the Sceptic,” in Representative Men (1850): “Cut these words, and they 
would bleed; they are vascular and alive” [original emphasis]. Cf. further Zarathustra’s postulate “Schreibe 
mit Blut!,” („Write with/in blood“), Nietzsche, KSA, IV: 48.
273 Emerson, “The Poet,” Essays: Second Series, CW, III: 17.
274 Emerson, “Intellect,” CW, II: 201. 
275 Emerson, “Circles,” CW II: 190. Nietzsche will echo this with his own, though very similar credo of 
life-affirmation when he encourages laughter and dance (see section 4.2.) 
276 Emerson, “The Over-Soul,” CW, II: 168.
277 Emerson, “Circles,” CW, II: 190.
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Emerson's trans-Atlantic impact on the German thinker Friedrich Nietzsche has 
long been acknowledged though not thoroughly explored. European scholarship in the 
first half of the twentieth century established to some extent the depth of Emerson’s 
influence throughout Nietzsche’s career.278 Stanley Hubbard’s 1958 publication was the 
first to take note of the affinities between the two. Nietzsche not only mentioned but 
praised Emerson in his journals and letters; his earliest philosophical essays, “Fatum und 
Geschichte” and “Willensfreiheit und Fatum,” were, as their titles suggest, syntheses of 
Emersonian topics and ideas. Nietzsche calls Emerson the “master of prose” (“Meister 
der Prosa”)279 in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft and, as Stanley Hubbard points out, also 
refers to him as “the gay one” (“der Heitere”), who simply does not know how old he 
already is and how young he will once be (“wie alt er schon ist und wie jung er noch sein 
wird”).280
The first in-depth study of the kinship between the American essayist and the 
German philosopher was tackled by George Stack in 1992.281 Stack traces the sources of 
ideas and theories that have long been considered the exclusive province of Nietzsche to 
the often surprisingly radical writings of the American, thus presenting a new perspective 
on Nietzsche’s philosophy. Stack depicts how the rich theoretical ideas and literary 
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images of Emerson entered directly into the existential element of Nietzsche’s thought 
and hence into the stream of what had been considered a distinctively European 
intellectual movement. 
David Mikics’ recent publication The Romance of Individualism in Emerson and 
Nietzsche (2003) constitutes the most up to date and perhaps most thorough investigation 
of important affinities between Emerson and Nietzsche.282 In his wide-ranging work the 
author first specifies and then investigates a number of important connections between 
Emerson and Nietzsche and outlines a dynamic relation in which Nietzsche struggles 
with Emerson’s influence and example in order to develop his own path. The central 
connection Mikics explores is their shared pursuit of individuality; a condition he argues 
they associate with freedom and originality as well as with a kind of integrity in one’s 
actions and beliefs, all the while remaining open to change and transformation.
Accordingly, he claims that for both Emerson and Nietzsche humans do not yet exist as 
“fully created.”283
4.2.1. Nietzsche and Biologism
During the later half of the nineteenth century there was a general interest in 
relating scientific methods to literary creation and criticism. Hippolyte Taine’s 
Philosophie de l’art (1865), a work which Nietzsche owned, constituted one of the first 
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post-Darwinian attempts to account for the artistic impulse and to describe and categorize 
art in terms of the influence of heredity and the environment on the human organism.284  
Similarly, Émile Zola roughly developed the analogy between literary creation and 
experimental method in the writing of his Roman Experimental, published in 1880. 
Appropriating many of the scientific discoveries of his age, Friedrich Nietzsche 
aimed at establishing a link between the biological and the social realms, the former 
supporting his ideas regarding the latter. It is for this reason that John McCarthy refers to 
Nietzsche’s “medial position – between the external and the internal, between science 
and literature, between myth and reality.”285 Nietzsche made his own the concept of the 
organism as a struggle of parts, and this forms part of what he calls the “physiology of 
power” – it constitutes his attempt to describe organic processes in terms of the activity 
of a “will to power” operating in nature.286
Gregory Moore, in a very thorough analysis of what he calls “Nietzsche’s 
biologism” suggests that Nietzsche probably first became aware of the debates 
surrounding the theory of evolution through Friedrich Lange’s Geschichte des 
Materialismus (History of Materialism), a work that exerted a considerable influence on 
Nietzsche’s thought.287 Containing a lengthy discussion of the theory of evolution, it most 
likely provided Nietzsche with his first introduction to the main issues in the 
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controversies surrounding Darwin’s ideas.288 It is, of course, important to remember, as 
that when Nietzsche speaks of evolution, he has in mind principally human evolution.289
Even more specifically the evolution of exceptional individuals, since he does not show 
interest in the future advancement of the entire species: “Daß es eine Entwicklung der 
ganzen Menscheit gebe, ist Unsinn: auch gar nicht zu wünschen,” (That there is an 
evolution of the whole of humanity, that is nonsense: and not even desirable).290
Evolution is neither progressive, nor is it a linear development. Rather, it is a 
movement which is random, conflicting, and, most of all, continually oscillating between 
synthesis and dissolution. Moore points out that one of the most consistent themes in 
Nietzsche’s writings on biology is his frequently repeated assertion that an organ’s 
present function cannot account for its development; he believes instead that form is 
anterior to function. This means that, since organic structures are in a perpetual state of 
flux and have passed through various intermediate stages of development, the function 
which those structures perform is also constantly evolving and changing. Function arises 
as a result of a provisional equilibrium between power structures, determined and re-
determined according to the changing hierarchical relationship between these rival 
centers of power. The apparent purposiveness of randomly arising variations is simply an 
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expression for an arrangement of spheres of power and their interplay: “ein Ausdruck für 
eine Ordnung von Machtsphären und deren Zusammenspiel.”291
That this same principle can be applied to the social realm, including human 
history, constitutes the main task of many of Nietzsche’s writings. He states quite 
explicitly:
„Entwicklung“ eines Dings, eines Brauchs, eines Organs ist demgemäss nichts 
weniger als sein progressus auf ein Ziel hin, noch weniger ein logischer und 
kürzester, mit dem kleinsten Aufwand von Kraft und Kosten erreichter 
progressus, sondern die Aufeinanderfolge von mehr oder minder tiefgehenden, 
mehr oder minder von einander unabhängigen, an ihm sich abspielenden 
Überwältigungsprozessen [...]  Die Form ist flüssig, der „Sinn“ ist es aber noch 
mehr…  Selbst innerhalb jedes einzelnen Organismus steht es nicht anders: mit 
jedem wesentlichen Wachsthum des Ganzen verschiebt sich auch der „Sinn“ der 
einzelnen Organe. 
[Development’ of a thing, a custom, an organ does not in the least resemble a 
progressus towards a goal, and even less the logical and shortest progressus, the 
most economical in terms of expenditure of force and cost. Rather, this 
development assumes the form of the succession of the more or less far-reaching, 
more or less independent processes of overcoming which affect it (…) The form 
is fluid, but the “meaning” even more so… Even within each individual organism 
the situation is no different: with each essential stage of growth of the whole, the 
“meaning” of the individual organs also changes.] 292
However, our intellect is strongly inclined to strive towards proving equilibrium, towards 
“being.” It is not designed to understand the notion of becoming: “Unser Intellekt ist 
nicht zum Begreifen des Werdens eingerichtet, er strebt die allgemeine Starrheit zu 
beweisen, Dank seiner Abkunft aus Bildern.“293 We are, in fact, living in an imaginary 
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world of stagnation because our senses can only conceive of a variety of images, forms, 
and substances in a linear manner, testament to our vertical way of thinking: 
Unsere Sinne zeigen uns nie ein Nebeneinander sondern stets ein Nacheinander. 
Der Raum und die menschlichen Gesetze des Raumes setzen die Realität von 
Bildern Formen Substanzen und deren Dauerhaftigkeit voraus, d.h. unser Raum 
gilt einer imaginären Welt. Vom Raum, der zum ewigen Fluß der Dinge
gehört, wissen wir nichts.
[Our senses never indicate to us anything in a side-by-side manner but always in 
succession. Space and human laws of space presuppose the reality of images, 
forms, substances and their permanence; that is, our space is applies to an 
imaginary world. Of space which is part of the eternal flow of things we know 
nothing.] 294
As a matter of fact, then, Nietzsche refers here to the coherence theory of truth, which is 
governed not by identical correspondence but by coherence and is not necessarily linear 
but allows contradiction.295 From this it follows that “true reality,” in that it represents 
life in its actual organic structure, must be non-linear and complex, because it is 
irreducible. We must therefore move from a mechanistic to a systemic approach: instead 
of reducing something to understand it, we must attempt to put it in a larger context. It is 
not reduction, then, that leads to understanding, but expansion.
4.2.2. Nietzsche’s Vitalism: the Will to Power
At the very heart of Nietzsche’s agenda lies the concept of the “will to power” a 
term which I would like to relate here to the formerly discussed idea of vitalism.  As 
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described earlier, vitalism refers to a vital force which produces life. Where, however, 
does this force originate? Fritjof Capra, in attempting to answer this question, can only 
reinforce that it cannot be explained by means of mechanical rules.296 Clearly, then, what 
is termed „vitalism“ produces and enhances life by means of a force which cannot be 
measured in traditional terms and at the very bottom of which lies an impulse that can be 
compared – if one were to speak of a conscious being – a will to live. However, what 
initiates this will, what is its impetus? The term “will” itself is the essence of self-
initiative and self-determination, meaning it presupposes existence, since what does not 
exist, cannot will („denn: was nicht ist, das kann nicht wollen“).297 In the second part of 
this statement, however, Nietzsche asserts that once life exists, it can no longer strive to 
live: „was aber im Dasein ist, wie könnte das noch zum Dasein wollen?“298
Thus, will is contingent upon life as life is contingent upon will. From this it 
follows that once an organism is alive, it no longer needs will to live but rather, to 
survive. As the German equivalent „Über-leben“ suggests, this drive must necessarily 
stem from a will to “rise above.“ Therefore, Nietzsche postulates that it is in fact always 
the will to power („Wille zur Macht“) that drives us; since only where there is life, there 
is also a will: but not will to live but – so I teach you – will to power („Nur, wo Leben ist, 
da ist auch Wille: aber nicht Wille zum Leben, sondern – so lehre ich’s dich – Wille zur 
Macht!“).299 He likens this force to a natural process:
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in der Natur herrscht nicht die Nothlage, sondern der Ueberfluss, die 
Verschwendung, sogar bis in's Unsinnige. Der Kampf um's Dasein ist nur eine 
Ausnahme, eine zeitweilige Restriktion des Lebenswillens; der grosse und kleine 
Kampf dreht sich allenthalben um's Übergewicht, um Wachsthum und 
Ausbreitung, um Macht, gemäss dem Willen zur Macht, der eben der Wille des 
Lebens ist.
[In nature it is not conditions of distress that are dominant but overflow and 
squandering, even to the point of absurdity. The struggle for existence is only an 
exception, a temporary restriction of the life-will. The great and small struggle 
always revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around power, 
in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life]. 300
To be absolutely clear, then, life itself is essentially the will to power [„Leben selbst ist 
Wille zur Macht“]301 because the basic impetus in nature is towards an increase in life 
(i.e. diversity) and this process never stops since no power in nature is ever stagnant: 
Ein labiles Gleichgewicht kommt in der Natur so wenig vor, wie zwei congruente 
Dreiecke.  Folglich auch kein Stillstand der Kraft überhaupt.  Wäre der Stillstand 
möglich, so wäre er eingetreten!
[An unstable equilibrium is as nonexistent in nature as two congruent triangles do 
not exist. Hence, there is absolutely no stasis of power. If stagnation were possible 
it would have occurred!]302
It is, of course, absolutely vital to nature that stagnation does not occur because it would 
necessarily mean death of the system.
Obviously, this will to power can be interpreted positively or negatively, 
depending on perspective, that is, whether one is exerting power or is being suppressed. 
In other words, no definite value can be attributed to this power; it is all a matter of 
perspective. From a position of power, one can influence one’s environment; however, if 
one is subordinate to a source of power, one is being determined from the outside. 
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Logically, then, the subordinate organism is not able to realize its full potential. In other 
words, one does not become what one is, “man wird“ nicht also nicht „was man ist,“ 
since one is not only subordinate but at the same time coordinated with other 
subordinates within a system. As part of a system, of course, the individual (if it can even 
be considered as such at this point) is now merely playing a teleologically determined 
role, the goal of which is to the wellbeing and growth of the system as a whole. It is 
important to note, however, that Nietzsche does assert that the commander, too, must do 
everything which ensures the survival of the obedient element, is consequently itself 
conditioned by its existence. For if a subordinate organ should atrophy, or a dominant one 
enjoy absolutely unrestrained growth, the entire organism would collapse. 303
4.2.3. Self-Reliance and Self-Organization
Considering further that the will to power – in the recipient’s case – is suppressed by such 
a system, the system itself is not considered by Nietzsche as conducive to life as such but 
rather an illness. Accordingly, Nietzsche argues in „Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der 
Historie für das Leben” that history is useful only if it enhances life, i.e. the past is to 
„strengthen“ the present and future: 
daß die Kenntnis der Vergangenheit zu allen Zeiten nur im Dienste der Zukunft 
und Gegenwart begehrt ist, nicht zur Schwächung der Gegenwart, nicht zur 
Entwurzelung einer lebenskräftigen Zukunft.304
[...]
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Das Übermaß von Historie hat die plastische Kraft des Lebens angegriffen, es 
versteht nicht mehr, sich der Vergangenheit wie einer kräftigen Nahrung zu 
bedienen.305
[the knowledge of the past is, at all times, desired only as a service to the future 
and the present and not as a means of weakening the present; not for uprooting a 
vital future.]
[…]
[The excess of history has offended the physical power of life; it no longer knows 
how to make use of history merely as a nourishing fare.]
This statement implies that history (the past) can neither be merely forgotten – Nietzsche 
calls this “unhistoric” („das Unhistorische“) – nor can it be preserved and looked up to in 
an uncritical manner – which he calls “overhistoric” (das „Überhistorische“). Rather, the 
past must be “kritisch verurteilt,” meaning that history must be critically examined and 
questioned. In other words, history must be actively appropriated, and not accepted or 
dismissed but interpreted. Interpretation is active reception, and since interpretation is 
dependent upon perspective, history as a constant entity cannot exist.
In an analogy to the ancient Greeks, Nietzsche lays out his agenda. He refers to 
German education and religion as a sort of „collective chaos of all foreign countries, of 
all of antiquity“ (“ein in sich kämpfendes Chaos des gesamten Auslandes, der gesamten 
Vorzeit”) which needs to be organized as the Greeks had done. This need for self-
organization he then claims, is in fact required of every individual: 
Dies ist ein Gleichnis für jeden einzelnen von uns: er muss das Chaos in sich 
organisieren, dadurch dass er sich auf seine echten Bedürfnisse zurückbesinnt.  
Seine Ehrlichkeit, sein tüchtiger und wahrhaftiger Charakter muss sich 
irgendwann einmal dagegen sträuben, dass immer nur nachgesprochen, 
nachgelernt, nachgeahmt werde. 
[This is a parable for every one of us: he must organize the chaos within him by 
recalling in himself his own real needs. His honesty, his proficient and genuine 
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character must at some point begin to resent the constant repetition, relearning, 
and imitation.]306
“Schreibe mit Blut,” “write with (your own) blood,” is Nietzsche’s postulation since only 
what is written in blood is essence: “Von allem Geschriebenen liebe ich nur Das, was 
Einer mit seinem Blute schreibt. Schreibe mit Blut: und du wirst erfahren, dass Blut Geist 
ist,” („of all that is written I love only what one has written with his own blood. Write 
with blood: and you will find that blood is spirit”).307
Nietzsche’s plea in favor of honesty corresponds to his charges against his 
contemporaries (as well as, presumably, his readers today) that the so-called „truths“ are 
in fact lies. He refers here to Christian religion and the value system it entails and with 
which we have been indoctrinated.  The antipodes „good“ and „evil,“ Nietzsche claims, 
need to be overcome since they do not constitute absolute values but are in fact relative; 
they are mutually dependent. Nietzsche expresses this concept in the metaphor of a tree, 
which grows not only in one direction (i.e. that which we can easily see), namely 
upwards, but also downwards. In fact, without growth of the roots, upward growth is not 
possible: „es ist mit dem Menschen wie mit dem Baume. Je mehr er hinauf in die Höhe 
und Helle will, um so stärker streben seine Wurzeln abwärts,“ („it is with man as with the 
tree. The more he seeks to reach hight and light, the more his roots strive 
downwards.”)308
Therefore, instead of relying on a transcendental belief system in the form of the 
soul (which, after „God’s death,“ is no longer available as a „crutch“), man is to believe 
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in his body, and thereby in the vital forces of life itself.309 This endeavor, as has been 
explained earlier, is dependent upon the will to power because it is the ultimate power 
behind all life and form. In relying on the earth instead of heaven, and on oneself rather 
than a spiritual liberator, man himself becomes creator; he (re-)creates himself; 
Euer Geist und eure Tugend diene dem Sinn der Erde, meine Brüder: und aller 
Dinge Werth werde neu von euch gesetzt! Darum sollt ihr Kämpfende sein!
Darum sollt ihr Schaffende sein!
[Let you spirit and your virtue be devoted to the meaning of the earth, my 
brothers; and the value of all things will be determined anew - by you! Therefore, 
you shall be fighters! Therefore you shall be creators!]310
4.2.4. Self-Creation, or: The Art of Interpretation 
Because everything is in flux, the phenomena we refer to as the world and the text 
are, in fact, equally indeterminate and need to constantly be reinterpreted. Nietzsche’s 
preferred style of writing, in the form of the aphorism, is a prime example for the need of 
interpretation. Simply reading an aphorism is not doing it justice, Nietzsche claims; only 
through the art of interpretation (“die Kunst der Auslegung”) can a text truly be 
understood.311
The same can be said for the individual human life determining itself within its 
boundaries. For Nietzsche, becoming who you are, in other words, realizing your 
potential is not only necessary, it is the essence of life. “How one becomes what one is,”  
in fact constitutes the subtitle of his intellectual autobiography, Ecce Homo (1888). This 
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laconic formulation reveals Nietzsche’s agenda. While human potential is existent within 
a person (“was man ist”), it must be cultivated in order for it to be actualized. The goal is 
not a particular state of being, but a process of continuously becoming. Thus, Nietzsche 
likens man to the act of going over, claiming that man is a bridge, not a purpose, man is 
like a rope tied between animal and overman.312 In Also sprach Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
formulates the steps through which one can become “Übermensch,” which literally 
means “beyond human.” Also translated as “superhuman” the German term coined by 
Nietzsche has often been misinterpreted. The most common misconception arises from 
the Nazis’ usurpation and distortion of his concept of Herrenvolk (“master race”). Some 
scholars therefore prefer the translation as “overman,” since the point of the Übermensch
is not that man is to strive to rise above others but that man needs to overcome himself.
The “overman” is contrasted by Nietzsche with the exemplar of the “last man” 
(der letzte Mensch), who is the antithesis of the Übermensch. A weak-willed individual, 
last man is tired of life, takes no risks, and seeks only comfort and security. Contrary to 
this passive mindset, the overman distinguishes himself not only by his awareness of the 
fact that any presumed state of achievement is self-deception, that he can never live up to 
his own aspirations, that he can never achieve permanent equilibrium but also by his firm 
belief in the force of life. The overman is incessantly moving forward as opposed to 
static. Stasis can be understood in the same sense as Watson had described the term for 
stasis or entropy: it is life-destroying rather than life-enhancing. Nietzsche explains: “Evil 
I call it and misanthropic, all this teaching of the one, the plentiful, of the static, the 
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satisfied and the immortal!”313 According to Nietzsche, man is destined to tap into his 
potential, a process that involves an ongoing battle with the last man within himself; 
namely that part of him inclined to ‘settle’ in a state of content and thereby – doom 
himself to stagnation. Fulfillment is not a state of being for Nietzsche but a process, 
namely an autopoietic one: „What is happiness to me! [...] I have long ceased to long for 
happiness, I long for my creation,” (“Was liegt am Glücke! […] ich trachte lange nicht 
mehr nach Glücke, ich trachte nach meinem Werke.”)314  
Man must accept that he will always be a “work in progress” – and that he himself 
is the artist, the creator, creating none other than himself.  Nietzsche illustrates this in the 
metaphor of bearing a child, symbolizing pure potential: For the creator himself to be the 
child that is newly born, he must be willing to be the bearer and her pain.“315  This 
process of self-creation is clearly a painful one, since to “creating” oneself anew is 
necessarily preceded by the destruction of the old in a process of overcoming: man is 
something that shall be overcome,” (“der Mensch ist etwas, das überwunden werden 
soll.”)316 Nietzsche captures this concept brilliantly in the image of the flame when he 
postulates that we must be willing to burn to death in our own flame in order to be 
reborn. Only if we become ash first we can be renewed, (“Verbrennen must du dich 
wollen in deiner eigenen Flamme: wie wolltest du neu werden, wenn du nicht erst Asche 
geworden bist!”)317
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The process of creation is thus preceded by an act of burning, of “purging.”  What 
is it which must be burned?  It is that which holds man back from becoming, the illusion 
of transcendence. God for Nietzsche is dead because people have ceased to believe in 
him, but he still exists as a shadow within people who hold true to the religious teaching, 
embodied in the traditional, Christian value system. Nietzsche claims that these are 
unconscious human habits that are not elements of human nature but rather, products of 
historical evolution. In his chapter “In the happy Isles” (“Auf den glückseligen Inseln”) 
Nietzsche, in the figure of Zarathustra, challenges the inhabitants, who are living in a 
kind of muffled bliss, to imagine living life without the protection and security provided 
by their traditional moral system: “God is a thought that makes all that is straight, 
crooked; and all that stands still, twirling. What? Time could be gone and immortailty 
would be but a lie?“318 God’s death, of course, puts man himself in charge of his own 
fate. Without transcendental belief to give his life meaning, man is now thrown back onto 
himself, in a rather crude awakening.  
At the bottom of this re-evaluation of values that Nietzsche calls for, lies his 
conviction, best summed up in the question he poses in Genealogie der Moral: 
Man nahm den Wert dieser “Werte” als gegeben, als tatsächlich, als jenseits jeder 
Fragestellung; man hat bisher nicht im entferntesten daran gezweifelt und 
geschwankt, “den Guten” für höherwertig als “den Bösen” anzusetzen, 
höherwertig im Sinne von Förderung, Nützlichkeit, Gedeihlichkeit in Hinsicht auf 
den Menschen überhaupt (die Zukunft des Menschen eingerechnet). 
[The value of these „values“ was taken for granted as an indisputable fact, which 
was beyond all question. No one has, up to the present, exhibited the faintest 
doubt or hesitation in judging the “good man” to be of a higher value than the 
“evil man,” of a higher value with regard specifically to human progress, utility, 
and prosperity generally, not forgetting the future.]319
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The “Mensch überhaupt”(man in general) is man in his totality. The path to excavating 
this totality can lie in neither one of the extremes, rather both ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are part of 
the whole, as Nietzsche exemplified in the image of the tree, cited earlier. He continues 
this particular statement elsewhere by asserting that the roots that are striving down 
wards and thus towards the earth, they are striving “towards evil,” (“in’s Böse”).320
However, Nietzsche envisages man not as made up of merely two opposing 
forces, but instead, of a multiplicity of “souls,” (“wahrlich, durch hundert Seelen gieng 
ich meinen Weg und durch hundert Wiegen und Geburtswehen”).321 The human being is 
for him a part of the plurality of living beings which, partly struggling with one another, 
partly adjusted and subordinated to one another, unintentionally affirm the totality by 
affirming their individual existence.322 Therefore, in order to discover oneself in one’s 
totality, the multiplicity of the self must be embraced because it is, in fact, a prerequisite 
for creativity: I tell you: you must still have chaos within you in order to give birth to a 
dancing star,” (“Ich sage euch: man muss noch Chaos in sich haben, um einen tanzenden 
Stern gebären zu können”)323 In other word, rather than about the quality of the actions 
themselves, Nietzsche is concerned with the question how all of one’s actions can be 
conciliated into one productive unity. 
                                                                                                                                                
320 Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, KSA, IV: 51.
321 Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, KSA, IV: 111.
322 Cf. Moore, who also points out that in formulating his model of the organism, Nietzsche drew heavily 
on the work of the embryologist Wilhelm Roux. See Wilhelm Roux, Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus 
(Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1881).
323 Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, KSA, IV: 19. My translation. 
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This unity of the self, which constitutes true identity, is not something given but 
something that must be achieved; it is not a state of being but a continual process of 
integrating one’s facets with one another, as opposed to someone who is preconditioned 
and merely playing a role. While success consists in having the minimum level of discord 
among the maximum number of diverse tendencies, Nietzsche emphasizes the dynamic 
nature of this process of becoming:  
Alles geht, alles kommt zurück; ewig rollt das Rad des Seins. Alles stirbt, alles 
blüht wieder auf, ewig läuft das Jahr des Seins. Alles bricht, alles wird neu gefügt; 
ewig baut sich das gleiche Haus des Seins. Alles scheidet, alles grüßt sich wieder; 
ewig bleibt sich treu der Ring des Seins. In jedem Nu beginnt das Sein; um jedes 
Hier rollt sich die Kugel Dort. Die Mitte ist überall.
[Everything goes, everything returns; eternally rolls the wheel of being. 
Everything dies, everything blossoms again; eternally the year of being runs. 
Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally the same house of being 
builds itself. Everything parts, everything greets every other thing again; eternally 
the ring of being remains faithful to itself. In every Now, being begins; around 
every Here rolls the sphere There. The center is everywhere.]324
Clearly then, arriving at an absolute center state cannot possibly be the desired goal since 
it would mean death of the system. The act of burning, creating anew, burning, creating, 
etc. is ongoing, it is a struggle; therefore the middle cannot be constant but rather, it is 
constantly in flux: it is everywhere. In other words, what are perceived as centers are 
merely periodic instances that are neither constant nor definite. Much like a Phoenix, man 
is to die in his own flame only to recreate himself, again and again.  What he must burn is 
that which has alienated him from his own instincts, which has, in effect, denatured him, 
in Hayles’ sense of the word.
Therefore, the only way to find identity in the sense of excavating the true self is 
to not only accept but embrace multiplicity. Like Nietzsche proposed, this process of 
                                                
324 Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, KSA, IV: 272-273. My translation. 
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rebirth requires a form of purging. Thus, the answer lies in acceptance of one’s 
multiplicity and in expansion of the soul, moving outward and forward, rather than 
inward and backward. The locus of this continual innovation is an “in-between-space,” as 
McCarthy pointedly remarks:
The best interpreter, therefore, is the one who suffers a thousand burdens and 
struggles to gain insight. Zarathustra (1882-85) and Beyond Good and Evil
(1886) force us by their very style to see things in an unaccustomed way. It is not 
simply a matter of adopting a perspective proffered by Nietzsche, but rather of 
finding a medial perspective between the positions of author and reader. That in-
between-space is the site of innovation. And that space is constantly shifting.”325
4.2.5. Nietzsche’s Aesthetics
In Nietzsche Contra Wagner, Nietzsche claims that aesthetics is nothing but 
applied physiology.326 In an extremely revealing note written between summer 1871 and 
the beginning of 1872, he writes, more explicitly: “Aesthetics only has meaning as 
natural science: like the Apollonian and the Dionysian,” (“Aesthetik hat nur Sinn als 
Naturwissenschaft: wie das Apollinische und das Dionysische”).327
In Die Geburt der Tragödie, Nietzsche elaborates his conception of a 
“Kunsttrieb” operating in nature, and beyond the realm of human agency.328 Moore traces 
the origin of the term “Kunstrieb” back to one whom he calls “perhaps the most 
                                                
325 McCarthy, Remapping Reality, p. 120.
326 Cf. The following statement by Nietzsche, which implies that he was planning on writing a „physiology 
of aesthetics“: „Auf diesen Gesichtspunkt werde ich ein andres Mal zurückkommen, im Zusammenhang 
mit noch delikateren Problemen der bisher so unberührten, so unaufgeschlossnen Physiologie der 
Ästhetik,“ Zur Genealogie der Moral, KSA, V: 356.
327 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente Herbst 1869 bis Herbst 1872, KSA, VII: 395. My translation.
328 Cf. Moore, p. 89.
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important and influential nineteenth-century figure to advance a system of evolutionary 
aesthetics,” the German biologist Ernst Haeckel. His monistic philosophy, an 
idiosyncratic blend of Naturphilosophie and Darwinism, seeks to account not only for the 
existence of “natural beauty” – that is, the awe-inspiring symmetry and order of living 
structures produced by the processes of evolution – but also for the origin of human 
invention. Both, Haeckel claims, are the visible manifestation of an intrinsic creative 
force operating throughout the universe: the Kunsttrieb. Moore adds, however, that the 
concept of the Kunsttrieb was originally coined by the natural theologian Hermann 
Samuel Reimarus in his Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere, 
hauptsächlich über ihre Kunst-Triebe (1760). In this context, it explained certain 
spontaneously creative behavior observable in animals, referring for example to those 
instincts which prompt a bird to build its nest or the beaver its dam. The latter is in fact 
the sense in which Schopenhauer employs the term in his chapter entitled “Vom Instinkt 
und Kunsttrieb” in the second volume of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Moore 
points out that gradually, the term began to be applied by eighteenth-century aestheticians 
such as Friedrich Schiller to man’s impulse to produce fine art.329
As Moore saliently comments, the Apollonian and Dionysian Kunsttriebe are thus 
to be understood “scientifically;” they are intended as poetic symbols of natural 
processes: 
Even in the published text, the ‘Apollonian’ and ‘Dionysian’ Birth of Tragedy 
retains the conceptual ambiguity of Kunsttrieb, which, in the nineteenth century, 
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had currency in both metaphysics and biology, and slips easily between the two
semantic fields. 330
Both aesthetic states, Nietzsche explicitly declares, are accompanied by physiological 
phenomena, by dream and intoxication. 
The Dionysian Kunsttrieb, is a kind of sublimation of the libidinous, primal urges 
of man, the panhetaeric animality celebrated by primitive cults. Because such art 
originates in an unleashing of the lower drives, it is able to reveal and simultaneously to 
transfigure our shared experience and bestial origins. It achieves this through the 
transference of the original dreams and states of intoxication experienced by the artist. 
This process provides the basis for an account of how aesthetic judgments are formed by 
the receiver of art. These judgments are not the products of conscious reflection, but arise 
as a result of the ‘arousal of the artistic capacity’ in the spectator by means of transferal: 
Die unbewußte formenbildende Kraft zeigt sich bei der Zeugung: hier doch ein 
Kunsttrieb thätig. Es scheint der gleiche Kunsttrieb zu sein, der den Künstler zum 
Idealisiren der Natur zwingt und der jeden Menschen zum bildlichen Anschauen 
seiner selbst und der Natur zwingt.
[The force that unwittingly creates form is apparent in procreation; here, the 
Kunsttrieb (urge to create) is active. It seems to be the same “Kunsttrieb” which 
compels the artist to idealize nature, and compels every man to look upon himself 
and nature.] 331
In other words, the spectator becomes artist: the work of art exerts a direct influence on 
the physiology of the receiver, in much the same way as Nietzsche envisages the effects 
of rhythm on the human body, and in the same way the wave picks up water molecules. 
Wir leben allerdings durch die Oberflächlichkeit unseres Intellekts in einer 
fortwährenden Illusion: wir brauchen, um zu leben, in jedem Augenblicke die 
Kunst. Unser Auge hält uns an den Formen fest. Wenn wir es aber selbst sind, die 
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allmählich uns dies Auge anerzogen haben, so sehen wir in uns selbst eine 
Kunstkraft walten. Wir sehen also in der Natur selbst Mechanismen gegen das 
absolute Wissen.“
[However, by means of the superficiality of our intellect we live in a perpetual 
illusion: we need art at every moment in order to live. Our eye holds us close to 
the forms. But if it is ourselves who have over time cultivated this eye, then we 
see an artistic force at work within ourselves. Thus, we see mechanisms against 
absolute knowledge in nature itself.]332
From this can be inferred that perception is itself a creative process. All physical stimuli 
from the surrounding environment are interpreted and understood in a subjective manner; 
the outside world, namely time, space, motion, for any organism is created by that 
organism for that organism. And each organism (each atom of each molecule) is co-
mingling with all others in an interpretive artistic exchange. Creation and re-creation 
occurs everywhere, all the time, and guided by nothing besides the will to power. The 
most complex schemes supervene upon even more complex schemes involving the 
simplest of components, engaged with each other and affecting the various levels, driven 
by ongoing conflict and struggles of will. 
In “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne,” Nietzsche refers to the 
drive to produce metaphors as an absolutely fundamental one: “that fundamental human 
impulse to create metaphors, which cannot be left out of consideration for even a second 
because this would mean leaving out human beings themselves,” (“Jener Trieb zur 
Metapherbildung, jener Fundamentaltrieb des Menschen, den man keinen Augenblick 
wegrechnen kann, weil man damit den Menschen selbst wegrechnen würde.”)333 This 
drive, this instinct, as one might call it, is the biological basis for the creativity which 
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Nietzsche sees manifested not only in the metaphors arising from linguistic invention, but 
those involved in cognition as well.
Nietzsche employs the concept of metaphor in the original, non-allegorical sense 
of metapherein, of transference.334 The mental representations generated from these 
nervous impulses represent the first step in a two-stage process of metaphorical 
transference. Language arises as the second step, when the mental image is transmuted 
into a sound or utterance:
Die Aneignung eines fremden Eindrucks durch Metaphern.
Reiz   Erinnerungsbild durch Metapher (Analogieschluß) verbunden.
Resultat: es werden Ähnlichkeiten entdeckt und neu belebt. An einem 
Erinnerungsbilde spielt sich der wiederholte Reiz noch einmal ab. Reiz percipirt   
jetzt wiederholt, in vielen Metaphern, wobei verwandte Bilder, aus den 
verschiedenen Rubriken, herbeiströmen. Jede Perception erzielt eine vielfache 
Nachahmung des Reizes, doch mit Übertragung auf verschiedene Gebiete.
[The acquisition of foreign impressions through metaphors.
Stimulus  Memory-image connected through metaphor (analogy).
Result:  similarities are discovered and revived. The repeated stimulus recurs, 
again, in a memory-image. Attraction now perceives again, in many metaphors –
by witnessing related images, from different categories stream towards it. Every 
perception achieves a multiple imitation of the original stimulus, but transferred 
onto different realms.]335
For Nietzsche, the activity of the Kunst- or Metaphertrieb is not characterized by freedom 
at all; it is, rather, a force of nature. While it appears on the surface to be a conscious, 
nondeterministic aspect of human freedom in the manner in which Kant imagines it, the 
artistic or cognitive process springs rather from the unseen, unfelt ‘endless activity’ deep 
within the human organism; the artistic process is physiologically absolutely determined 
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and necessary: “The artistic process is entirely specific and necessary, physiologically” 
(“Der künstlerische Prozeß ist physiologisch absolut bestimmt und nothwendig.“336
The activity of the Metaphertrieb establishes an aesthetic way of relating the 
artistically creative subject and the world, a kind of stammering translation into a 
different language. In other words, thought does not adequately represent the world; we 
are left with stimuli, not complete cognitions. Language, as the physical expression of 
thought, is a system of arbitrary symbols – representing sensory phenomena. But these 
symbols represent subjective modifications of our sensory modalities rather than any 
object in the external world, and do not coincide with the original stimulus, which is 
inaccessible to us and, ultimately, indefinable by us. This notion, namely that the original 
idea, the original meaning, the absolute essence therefore, can never be known in its 
totality, was laid out in detail in previous chapters.
4.3. Art as a Life Process
Nietzsche’s concept of art extends far beyond the notion of only humans as artists, 
and art in the literal sense. The human artist is only one part, one reflection of a greater 
system in which not only humans, but all things exist in symbiotic exchange, living 
through creative interpretations, forming illusions, construing their world, their reality. 
Through cycles of self-organization and self-reorganization, through a Phoenix-like 
process of death and rebirth, the artist exists in a symbiotic exchange with all existence. 
Thus, the world is a work of art that gives birth to itself.
                                                
336 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente Sommer 1872 bis Ende 1874, KSA, VII: 446. My translation.
                                                                                                                      
156
Art is a means of creating meaning for life, and since meaning is preceded by 
form, and form by life, art in fact creates life. In much the same way, the creativity of the 
Kunsttrieb, which is manifested in the development of new organic structures, in new 
forms of life, and, at the highest point of evolution, in the autopoietic organs of (human) 
perception and cognition, is a means of attaining a kind of metaphysical redemption. In 
autopoietic manner, form is able to create its own organs:
Das Erwachen des Kunsttriebs differenzirt die animalischen Geschöpfe. Daß wir 
die Natur so sehen, so künstlerisch sehen, theilen wir mit keinem Thier. Aber es 
giebt auch eine künstlerische Gradation der Thiere. Die Formen zu sehen ist das 
Mittel, über das fortwährende Leiden des Triebes hinauszukommen. Es schafft 
sich Organe.
[The awakening of the „Kunsttrieb“ is what differentiates animalistic creatures. 
The fact that we perceive nature, perceive it artistically, we do not share with any 
animal. But there is also an artistic gradation among the animals. To be able to 
perceive forms is the means of overcoming the incessant suffering of the drive. It 
creates organs for itself.]337
Thus, “with the organic the artistic also begins.”338 In other words, Nietzsche views 
evolution as an artistic process, and vice versa. He interprets evolutionary history as one 
aspect of a universal, cosmic becoming, as the unfolding of certain creative forces 
immanent in nature, as a kind of endogenous propelling organisms towards ever higher 
levels of structural complexity. Art, such as poetry, constitutes not only major but 
necessary parts of human consciousness. 
The same is true for rhythm, since it is fundamental to the processes of life. 
Physiologically, life is a continual rhythmic motion of the cells. Therefore the influence 
of rhythm from the outside of a body may be seen as a minute modification of that 
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rhythmic motion. This notion is clearly reminiscent of the solitary wave, the soliton, in 
that both have the power to affect a body directly by momentarily (but perpetually) 
disrupting and re-determining the various internal cellular rhythms of the organism. In 
fact, Nietzsche himself even relates rhythm to waves when he talks about the waves of 
rhythm (“Wellenschlag des Rhythmus“).339 As “acting out of rhythm,” dance is therefore 
the expression of one’s own and newly determined rhythm; evolved from the interaction 
between internal (man’s) and external (nature’s) heartbeat. For this reason, Zarathustra 
postulates that he would only believe in a God who knew how to dance („Ich würde nur 
an einen Gott glauben, der zu tanzen verstünde“).340
The ensuing symbiosis is one of continuous productivity and potential, manifested 
in a creative and self-determined mind Nietzsche refers to as the “free spirit:”
wäre eine Lust und Kraft der Selbstbestimmung eine Freiheit des Willens 
denkbar, bei der ein Geist jedem Glauben jedem Wunsch nach Gewißheit den 
Abschied gibt, geübt, wie er ist, auf leichten Seilen und Möglichkeiten sich halten 
zu können und selbst an Abgründen noch zu tanzen. Ein solcher Geist wäre der 
freie Geist par excellence.
[if we were to imagine a zest and force of self-determination, a freedom of will, 
based on which a spirit would dismisse any belief and wish for certainty; 
practiced, as he is, in keeping his balance on thin ropes and unlikely possibilities, 
and to dance, even by the abyss. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par 
excellence.]341
What Nietzsche provides here are what he perceives to be characteristic traits of a 
maximally creative personality. Interestingly, Nietzsche’s observations are right on 
target; it is quite stunning to take a look at this point at the characteristics of both creative 
artists and scientists, compiled by Frank Barron. Among others, he lists “freedom from 
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convention, independence of judgment, interest in contradictions, disorder, and 
imbalance, profound commitment to the search for aesthetic and philosophic meaning in 
all experience, the courage to burn bridges, to strike into new territory with no hope of 
going back, and last but not least, a spirit of zest and appreciation, however somber the 
vision or doomed the voyage.”342 What both Emerson and Nietzsche claim, then, is that 
every one of us has the potential to create one’s own context, namely by questioning the 
prevailing one. The goal is to be a constant seeker, as Emerson claimed himself to be: “I 
unsettle all things. No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an 
endless seeker, with no Past at my back.”343
                                                
342 Frank Barron, “Bisociates: Artist and Scientist in ‘The Act of Creation’,” Astride the Two Cultures. 
Arthur Koestler at 70, ed. by Harold Harris (New York: Random House, 1976), pp. 37-49. 
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CHAPTER V
SELF AND WORLD IN FRAGMENTS: GOTTFRIED BENN
   Die Dinge dringen kalt in die Geschichte
      und reiβen sich der alten Bindung fort,
      es gibt nur ein Begegnen: im Gedichte
         die Dinge mystisch bannen durch das Wort.
(Reality, turn loose from its foundation,
thrusts coldly forth, demanding to be heard:
there is but one – the poem’s – confrontation
that bans reality with mystic word.) 
– Benn, „Gedichte“344
At the turn to the twentieth century, under the Wilhelminean regime, the 
atmosphere was one of tension and transition in Germany. In contrast to the politically 
complacent attitude at the beginning of the century, several discoveries in the sciences, as 
well as in psychology served to question deeply held beliefs. For example, in his 
“Mutationstheorie” (1901), Hugo de Vries had taken Darwin’s evolutionary theory a step 
further, proving that species do not only develop in small, gradual steps but that new 
species could in fact arise in single jumps (saltationism). In physics, Ernest Rutherford 
discovered that atoms could be split, Max Planck learned that their rays were not steady 
but acted in jolts in his Quantentheorie (1900), and Albert Einstein developed his special 
relativity theory (1905) that redefined space, time, mass, and energy.345
                                                
344 Gottfried Benn, “Gedichte,” Sämtliche Werke, Stuttgarter Ausgabe (StA), in Verbindung mit Ilse Benn, 
ed. by Gerhard Schuster, 7 vols., (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986-2003), I:186, ll. 5-8. Translation by Karl F. 
Ross, Gottfried Benn. Prose, Essays, Poems, ed. by Volkmar Sander (New York: Continuum, 1987), p. 
219.
345 Cf. Roy Porter, The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 5: The Modern Physical and Mathematical 
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), specifically pp. 331-360. 
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The new terminology (evolution, jumps, jolts, relativity) is testament to the shift 
from what had been thought of as firm laws of established patterns to models and 
hypotheses of mutable dynamics. While these changes affected man’s environment, 
Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis soon debunked the firm belief that man – at least –
knew him/herself. With his “Theory of Dreams” (1900), Freud revealed, for instance, that 
there are areas of the human being that were beyond his/her control but that nevertheless 
influence him/her. Hence, like de Vries, Rutherford, Planck and Einstein, Freud pointed 
to areas and possibilities that had previously remained unacknowledged and difficult to 
hear because they undermined traditional beliefs.
Even if the general public was most likely unaware of these specific discoveries, 
it nevertheless shared in the sense of exploration, nervous tension, and the need for new 
answers. Friedrich Nietzsche was one of the first to attempt to provide new answers, by 
calling for a revaluation of values, as was exemplified in the previous chapter. His claim 
that any judgment depends on the observer’s perspective gave way to a new 
individualism that finds its way into art as well. In opposition to classical aesthetics’ 
ideals of beauty and harmony, which no longer seemed applicable to reality and had 
therefore become rather stale, there developed an aesthetic of the ugly, of disharmony, 
and negativity.  
Topics and themes which had been taboo provided provocation and were treated 
as such, in un-aesthetical manner. While the French symbolists, especially Rimbaud and 
Mallarmé, had already publicized an aesthetic of the ugly, their depictions of death and 
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decay still have an air of beauty and melancholy.346 During early German Expressionism, 
however, all the shocking, revolting details of human life and death were exposed. This 
“dethroning” of the human being went hand in hand with the negation of metaphysical 
transcendence. The actual question, namely what a human being actually is, is posed 
implicitly. 
Not surprisingly, Gottfried Benn’s first volume of poems, Morgue, published in 
1912, triggered an outrage. Critics were appalled by what they considered a sick, 
perverted, and disrespectful treatment of the human being.347 At the same time, it seems 
the approach Benn took to depicting the human being was a natural outcome, an 
extension in fact, of his professional occupation as a doctor. Benn was raised as the son 
of a Lutheran minister in the German village of Mansfeld, an area which is now part of 
Poland. He was educated privately and in the Gymnasium in Frankfurt an der Oder. In 
1903, following his father's wishes, he entered the University of Marburg to study 
theology and philosophy. But he soon switched to medicine at the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Akademie, a part of the University of Berlin, and upon graduating focused on the study 
of venereal diseases and dermatology as a medical doctor until the end of World War I.348
After his graduation from medical school in 1912, Benn was called to active 
military duty. After his discharge from the military he was employed as an assistant at the 
Pathological Institute of the Berlin West-End Hospital, where he performed hundreds of 
                                                
346 Cf. Anton Kaes, “Vom Expressionismus zum Exil,” Geschichte der deutschen Literatur, ed. by Ehrhard 
Bahr, (3 vols.), 2nd ed. (Tübingen und Basel: Francke, 1998), III: 257. 
347 Cf. Kaes, “Vom Expressionismus zum Exil,” III: 258.
348 Cf. Douglas Messerli, ed., The PIP Anthology of World Poetry of the 20th Century, vol. 2 (Los Angeles: 
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autopsies.349 The impressions of this employment are reflected in his poetry, especially in 
the poems of Morgue which he wrote during this time.
Benn’s third collection of poetry after Morgue and Söhne (Sons, dedicated to Else 
Lasker-Schüler), Fleisch (Flesh), was published in 1917. This book continued his 
prevailing deep sense of cynical melancholy. Over the next several years, his poetry 
continued to appear in expressionist journals as he came to be recognized as a major 
avant-garde writer. During this time he continually moved toward Nietzschean ideas that 
interpreted art as a counterweight to nihilism.
The influence of Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy on Benn’s aesthetics has been 
discussed in various studies. For Benn, Nietzsche was the beginning of a new era in 
German literature.350 Gerhard Loose published a collection of quotations which examined 
(though in quantitative manner) Benn’s reception of Friedrich Nietzsche in an initial 
investigation of the connection in 1961.351 Bruno Hillebrand offered a detailed discussion 
of the artistic and metaphysical aesthetics of both Benn and Nietzsche in 1966, and Theo 
Meyer contributed to Nietzsche’s vitalism Benn’s statically regressive outlook in 1971.352
More recent analyses of Nietzsche’s influence on Benn include Alexander 
Daboul’s investigation of artistic nihilism (1995), and Bruno Hillebrand’s discussion of 
                                                
349 Cf. the discovery of Benn’s autopsy protocols discussed in chapter three.
350 Cf. Benn’s comments about Heinrich and Thomas Mann: „Ahnen hatten sie hierzulande nur einen, der 
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Nietzsche’s general reception among German writers, with a chapter on his European 
reception (2000).
This study of Benn examines closely three of his poems, each of which represents 
a different stage in a mediation of destruction and recreation. Since Benn’s poems are 
often programmatic texts closely related to his essayistic work, his essays provide both a 
matrix for interpreting his poems as well as an elucidation of connections between 
Benn’s artistry and Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
5.1.   “Karyatide”: The Nietzschean Intertext
Benn appears to have always been very fond of the poem “Karyatide” which 
appeared in 1915. In Lebensweg eines Intellektualisten, he comments on its emergence as 
symptomatic of the eruptive process of creation to which he attributed his early poetry:353
Karyatide
Entrücke dich dem Stein! Zerbirst 
die Höhle, die dich knechtet! Rausche
doch in die Flur! Verhöhne die Gesimse –
sieh: Durch den Bart des trunkenen Silen
aus seinem ewig überrauschten
lauten einmaligen durchdröhnten Blut
träuft Wein in seine Scham!
Bespei die Säulensucht: Toderschlagene
                                                
353 See Benn, Lebensweg eines Intellektualisten: „An ein anderes Vorkommnis erinner ich mich aus 
Brüssel. Ein Septembertag ich war Oberarzt am Gouvernement und mit einem Auftrag zu einer anderen 
Behörde geschickt. Die Straβe zu gehen war kurz, doch von den Horizonten brach das Dionysische, die 
Stunde war zerstückt und bronzen, Verbranntes überall, auf ihrer Kuppe hatte ein Feuer gewütet, Jahr und 
Leben hinüber, das Vorspiel war aus, das Ende nahte, das Opfer, aber man muβte sich fassen -: nur einen 
Blick noch aus diesem Licht, einen Atem noch aus dieser Stunde – und:“Sieh dieses Sommers letzten 
blauen Hauch/auf Astermeeren an die fernen/baumbraunen Ufer treiben; tagen/sieh diese letzte Glück-
Lügenstunde/unserer Südlichkeit/hochgewölbt –,“ StA 4:178.
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greisige Hände bebten sie
verhangenen Himmeln zu. Stürze
die Tempel vor die Sehnsucht deines Knies,
in dem der Tanz begehrt!
Breite dich hin, zerblühe dich, oh, blute
dein weiches Beet aus grossen Wunden hin:
sieh, Venus mit den Tauben gürtet
sich Rosen um der Hüften Liebestor –
sieh des Sommers letzten blauen Hauch
auf Astermeeren an die fernen 
baumbraunen Ufer treiben; tagen
sieh diese letzte Glück–Lügenstunde
unserer Südlichkeit
hochgewölbt.354
The poem is a beseeching appeal to the Caryatid, a female statue that is one of several 
that together hold up a roof-like structure. Caryatids were popular in the architecture of 
the Gründerzeit which might explain why they caught Benn’s attention. The best-known 
example of the use of Caryatids in Greek antiquity was the south porch of the 
Erechtheion in Athens (421–407 B.C.), where six figures supported its roof.355
The urgent nature of the appeal to the Caryatid is evident in the accumulation of 
forceful imperatives forms of the verbs throughout the three stanzas of the poem: 
“entrücke,”  “zerbirst” (1), “rausche” (2), “verhöhne” (3) in the first stanza; “bespei” (8), 
“stürze” (10) in the second, and again in the last: “Breite dich hin, zerblühe dich, oh 
blute” (13). Considering that Benn openly favored nouns over verbs due to their superior 
ability to “carry meaning,” this amassing of verbs certainly merits a closer look.356
                                                
354 Gottfried Benn, StA, I: 38. For complete translations poems discussed in this chapter see appendix. 
Whenever I cite merely excerpts, the translation is provided within the text.
355 Cf. „Karyatides“ in Pauly’s Real-Enzyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. by August 
Friedrich von Pauly, Georg Wissowa, and Wilhelm Kroll, 24 vols (Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller Verlag,
1894-1978), here vol. X: 2 (1919).
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Demonstrating the kind of prophetic incantation Nietzsche’s Zarathustra projects, the 
speaker in this poem is urging the stone figure to move, to break away from its current 
static position. As a matter of fact, then, the speaker is attempting to breathe life into the 
marble statue, to release it from its binds, from the weight of the roof. What becomes 
apparent when we imagine the stone figure stepping out from underneath the “roof” is 
that it is only a roof because it is being held up by the Caryatid. This implies that it is less 
shelter, even though it is at first perceived that way, than it is a burden that can and 
should be cast off. 
Silens are described as the imaginary male inhabitants of the wild that are half 
man, half animal and display an unrestrained desire for sex and wine, represent a sort of 
primordial vitalism. It is for this reason that they are generally depicted naked but 
perhaps also because they purportedly conducted mystic initiation rituals (depicted, for 
example, in Plato’s Leges) into a community of both this world and the next. In addition, 
Silenus is reported to be the educator of Dionysus.357 As such, he is even described being 
endowed with wisdom that enables him to see through the vanities and pettiness of 
human life.358 The silen is about to initiate the Caryatid into a new form of life, a baptism 
that is complete with wine instead of holy water. At the same time, the wine is 
                                                                                                                                                
356 Cf. Probleme der Lyrik, and especially Epilog und lyrisches Ich (1921/27): “Worte, Worte –
Substantive! Sie brauchen nur die Schwingen zu öffnen und Jahrtausende entfallen ihrem Flug,“ StA, III: 
133.
357Cf. Richard A. S. Seaford’s article on “satyrs and silens,” The Oxford Companion to Classical 
Civilization, ed. by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
Oxford Reference Online.
358 Cf. „Silenos und Satyros,“ in Pauly’s Real-Enzyclopädie, vol. III: A,1(1927). 
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reminiscent of the Eucharist, which is also fitting since it is traditionally held 
transcendent beliefs that are to be laid to rest.
The statue is urged to spit on the “column mania” (“Bespei die Säulensucht”), on 
the obsession, the addiction (“Sucht”), to uphold traditional beliefs and to thereby put 
them – literally and metaphorically – on a pedestal, even though they have no validity 
and were put in place a long time ago by old and seemingly doomed hands. The builders 
of this shrine cannot be anything but doomed of course because the temple they raised 
reaches out to “impenetrable, cloudy skies” that offer neither solace nor salvation, an 
echo of Nietzsche’s proclamation that “God is dead.”
Caryatids are generally depicted with one knee bent and the foot turned outward, 
as in movement. Benn emphasizes this fact here as the Caryatid’s knee longing to dance 
which implies that the knee is by nature meant for movement, not for stasis, and 
definitely not for kneeling in adoration. Considering the speaker’s message to the 
Caryatid it may seem surprising that the poem is not in free verse but demonstrates a 
certain metric regularity. However, the large number of verbs and especially the 
enjambments add considerable dynamic to the poem.359 Beginning with the colon in line 
four and parallel to the depiction of the silen, the meter changes, thus imitating the 
rhythm of the silen’s dance.
It is thus the antagonism between the traditional metric form and the free form 
which expresses the speaker’s appeal to the Caryatid (and the reader) to break free from 
                                                
359 Steinhagen counts 15 enjambments in twentytwo verses. Cf. Harald Steinhagen, “Aufstand gegen 
Apoll” in Interpretationen. Gedichte von Gottfried Benn, ed. by Harald Steinhagen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1997), pp. 30-43. Here p. 34. 
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its architecture, both metaphorically as well as literally, and to partake in an intoxicated 
dance. The antagonism is detectable on more than the level described; it is also applicable 
to what many contemporaries conceived of as the Wilhelmine stasis in both art and social 
life. On yet another level, the Caryatid as a static column on the one hand and as ecstatic 
dancer on the other, also represent the Apollonian and the Dionysian spheres that 
Nietzsche had elaborated on in his Geburt der Tragödie and elsewhere. The appeal to the 
Caryatid to break out of established patterns and to recognize and re-establish its original 
essence, namely dance, are mirrored rhythmically in that the iambic meter is replaced by 
a self-contained, dynamic, and erratic rhythm that imitates the Caryatid’s dance. In 
following this interpretation we can determine that the poem rejects the Apollonian 
notion of a “principium individuationis” and with it an entirely rational, predictable, and 
therefore static understanding of life.  Favored is instead the Dionysian notion of exuding 
the self in a sort of irrational, spontaneous combustion.
Vital in this process are both wine and blood; the wine in fact springs from the 
silen’s blood. Both are inextricably linked to sexuality (“Scham”) and the body, as 
representatives of an intense, all-encompassing, and original form of living (l. 6). The 
image of wine dripping into the silen’s sex organ also seems to allude to a sort of cerebral 
fertility or richness which can be attained only in a state of intoxification or during and 
after reconciliation with the body. At the same time, the reference to blood also evokes 
associations with the blood thirst of the maenads and thus reconciles both the life 
enhancing and life destroying aspects of life.
 Stepping out from underneath the shelter (whether real or imagined) is a 
frightening prospect and it requires sacrifice: the Caryatid must be willing to bleed, to 
                                                                                                                      
168
spread out, to “bloom to death,” (“ausbreiten, zerblühen, bluten”). “Zerblühen” is of 
course a neologism with a more radical connotation than the common word “verblühen.” 
What comes to mind is another German word with the prefix “zer-“: “zerstören” (to 
destroy). The Caryatid must be willing to destroy itself, to “loose” itself in order to 
actually find its authentic self. 
We have seen in the last chapter that Emerson affirms that this process is in fact 
what life is all about: the “way of life is wonderful: it is by abandonment.”360 The same is 
true for Nietzsche, who reinforces this view when he claims that “creating” oneself anew 
is necessarily preceded by the destruction of the old in a process of overcoming: “der 
Mensch ist etwas, das überwunden werden soll.”361 Nietzsche conjures up the image of 
the flame to capture this concept: “Verbrennen must du dich wollen in deiner eigenen 
Flamme: wie wolltest du neu werden, wenn du nicht erst Asche geworden bist!”362
Just as Emerson argued that poetry unlocks our chains, so the speaker in Benn’s 
poem is unlocking the Caryatid’s chains, urging it to purge itself from the restraints of the 
traditional architecture it is still upholding. The same is true, of course, for the reader: 
thinking “outside the box” opens our mind, enables us to make new connections, in a 
manner that could be described as centrifugal and that is again reminiscent of the spiral-
shape. Real “life,” then, is attainable not through transcendental beliefs, imaginable as a 
vertical line (depicted in the building of the temple towards the sky), but in a “spreading 
out” and thus a lateral motion.
                                                
360 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles,” p. 190.
361 Nietzsche, „Also sprach Zarathustra,“ IV: 14.
362 Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, KSA IV: 82.
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As already argued, “spreading oneself out” (“sich-Hinbreiten”), opening oneself 
in this way, carries with it increased vulnerability. That is why the Caryatid is referred to 
as “soft” and “full of wounds” (“weiches Beet aus groβen Wunden”). The speaker 
projects several images in the following lines that all seem to point to the Caryatid’s 
newly gained fertility, both on a physical as well as a mental level (Venus and her doves). 
While the rose is typically a symbol of love and fertility and in this context also 
symbolizes rebirth, an idea that is fortified by the images of changing seasons that are 
introduced with the word “summer.” The notion of the body’s close association with the 
earth is reinforced in the movement of the “blue haze” (“blauer Hauch”) that finally drifts 
to the “fall-foliage-colored shores,” rather than upwards, as would traditionally be the 
case.
A new day dawns (“tagen,” l. 19), elucidating Benn’s reversal of the traditional 
light/darkness imagery, since the irrational is associated here with liberation and light. In 
contrast, the rational sphere is coupled with stasis and darkness at the beginning of the 
poem. While the skies were cloud-covered earlier in the poem, the imagery of summer 
(“Sommer,” “blau,” “Südlichkeit”) is now re-enforced through the accumulation of 
Umlauts in the last three lines which establish a distinct atmosphere of levity. Bernhard 
Sorg encourages this interpretation, claiming that in Benn’s poems the „gravity of a 
complex and cerebral imagery“ is contrasted with the „southern“ imagery, manifest in a 
„dreamlike correspondence of the I and the world.“363
                                                
363 Bernhard Sorg, „In Benns Gedichten wird dieser Schwere einer komplexen und zerebralen die 
‚südliche’ Bildlichkeit kontrastiert, eine erträumte Übereinstimmung von Ich und Welt,“ Das Lyrische Ich: 
Untersuchungen zu deutschen Gedichten von Gryphius bis Benn (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1984), p. 186.
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Of course, if we take into consideration that what is dawning is the “last happy 
hour of lying” (“die letzte Glück-Lügenstunde”) of this “southerness,” we are inclined to 
think of the last image as a mere vision, rather than reality. Indeed, Steinhagen interprets 
the poem “Karyatide” as the aesthetic expression of a utopian vision of reality. As such, 
Steinhagen adds, the poem is not propagating an actual solution to the dilemma of 
modern society but, rather, offers a rather gloomy and disillusioned ending.364
The speaker’s frustration is, admittedly, easily detectable, both in the imagery of 
the last stanza as well as in the vehemence of the speaker’s appeals to the marble statue. 
However, the “Südlichkeit” remains “ours” (“unsere”) and is “vaulted high.” Considering 
further that the possessive pronoun “our” (indicating a connection between Venus, the 
Goddess of love and fertility, as well as a representative of the world of myth) in 
combination with “southernness” and “vaulted high” can be read as distinct markers of 
fertility and pregnancy, I propose to interpret the ending of “Karyatide” more positively 
than Steinhagen. 
While the speaker has become aware that regression is not the answer, the images 
of pregnancy indicate hope, namely for the potential that lies in the future, not in the past. 
Read through this lens, the poem depicts the speaker’s realization that looking to the past 
is of no use for the present; the Caryatid must be freed from the constraints of history and 
tradition that have bound it. The true nature of the Caryatid is dance rather than 
stagnation, and it is this movement that offers promise in the last line.
5.2.   “Das späte Ich“ and the Dilemma of Modern Man
                                                
364 Cf. Steinhagen, p. 42.
                                                                                                                      
171
The poem „Das späte Ich“ was originally published in February of 1922 in 
Gesammelte Schriften, under the title „Der späte Mensch.“ Maria Fancelli points out that 
the title “Das späte Ich” is based on a second publication (1927) in Gesammelte Gedichte. 
In comparing the two versions Fancelli ascertains that only the section containing the first 
two stanzas remained the same.365 Based on her evaluations of both versions, she 
proposes to view the poem “Das späte Ich” as a mediator between the “expressionist-
dionysian phase” and the “adventure of the static and apollonian poetry.”366
Das späte Ich
I
O du, sieh an: Levkoienwelle,
der schon das Auge übergeht,
Abgänger, Eigen-Immortelle,
es ist schon spät.
Bei Rosenletztem, da die Fabel
des Sommers längst die Flur verlieβ –
moi haïssable,
noch so mänadisch analys.
II
Im Anfang war die Flut. Ein Floβ Lemuren
schiebt Elch, das Vieh, ihn schwängerte ein Stein.
Aus Totenreich, Erinnern, Tiertorturen
Steigt Gott hinein.
Alle die groβen Tiere: Adler der Kohorten,
Tauben aus Golgathal –
Alle die groβen Städte: Palm- und Purpurborden –
Blumen der Wüste, Traum des Baal.
                                                
365 Cf. Maria Fancelli, „Das späte Ich,“ Interpretationen. Gedichte von Gottfried Benn, ed. by Harald 
Steinhagen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997), pp. 61-72. 
366 Fancelli, p. 70. My translation.
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Ost-Gerölle, Marmara-Fähre,
Rom, gib die Pferde des Lysippus her –
letztes Blut des weiβen Stiers über die schweigenden Altäre
und der Amphitrite letztes Meer –
Schutt. Bacchanalien. Propheturen.
Barkarolen. Schweinerein.
Im Anfang war die Flut. Ein Floβ Lemuren
Schiebt in die letzten Meere ein.
III
O Seele, um und um verweste,
kaum lebst du noch und noch zuviel,
da doch kein Staub aus keinen Feldern,
da doch kein Laub aus keinen Wäldern
nicht schwer durch deine Schatten fiel.
Die Felsen glühn, der Tartarus ist blau,
der Hades steigt in Oleanderfarben 
dem Schlaf ins Lid und brennt zu Garben
mythischen Glücks die Totenschau.
Der Gummibaum, der Bambusquoll,
der See verwäscht die Inkaplatten,
das Mondchâteau: Geröll und Schatten
uralte blaue Mauern voll.
Welch Bruderglück um Kain und Abel,
für die Gott durch die Wolken strich –
kausalgenetisch, haïssable:
das späte Ich.
In three sections, “Das späte Ich” provides us with a dissection of the subject, regarding 
both the content as well as the form of the poem. Even though the speaker addresses a 
“du,” the poem appears like a dramatic monologue as opposed to a dialogue, possibly 
because the “du” is never identified. The “du,” and with that the reader, is asked to 
perceive three different kinds of flowers within the first section; first a “wave of 
gillyflowers,”367 This image, as well as that of the peculiar neo-logism “Eigen-
                                                
367 „Levkoie“ is another word for „Weiβveilchen,“ a flower stemming from the Mediterranean area that was 
introduced in Germany around the sixteenth century, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache: 
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Immortelle,” and as that of the last roses (“Rosenletztem”) all evoke the notion of life 
past its prime which is then summed up in “es ist schon spät” (4). As its name suggests, 
the “Immortelle” is a flower that keeps its petals eternally and for this reason is a favorite 
in graveyards. In the context of this poem, and in combination with “Eigen-,“ the image 
that is evoked is a somewhat cynical one perhaps: though the (“modern”) “I” conceived 
of itself as immortal it is forced to accept that it is going to die. The word “Abgänger” 
adds another dimension to death by indicating that something was, in fact, never born and 
never fulfilled expectations. 
Rather than focusing on the withering of autumn and the desire for the plentitude 
of summer, Benn “undercuts the potential for sentimentality by limiting the perspective 
to the over-ripeness and decay associated with late summer.”368 Instead, Benn seems to 
analyze what brought about this failure to even be born. “Moi haïssable,” taken from 
Pascal’s Pensées, gives a first hint of the contempt that seems to be directed back at the 
speaker. The “late I,” then, is the object of scorn; it could not reach its potential and is 
doomed to die because it was and still is “so mänadisch analys.“369 Because it is “wildly” 
analytical, overly rational perhaps, “das späte Ich” has deteriorated and is now wallowing 
in its own juice, “nur sich selbst erlebend.” In this regard, Benn’s comment in a letter to 
Edgar Lohner is significant:
                                                                                                                                                
Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, ed. by Friedrich Kluge and Elmar Seebold (Berlin and 
New York, De Gruyter, 1995), p. 573.
368 Matthew Lee Kaplan, The Rhetoric of Subjectivity: Studies in the Poetry of Gottfried Benn and Wallace 
Stevens. Doctoral Dissertation (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1993), p. 24.
369 Sander translates „das späte Ich“ as „the late Ego.“ I prefer to translate it as “I” because it of its relative 
neutrality.
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das späte Ich ist ein einsames Ich, auf sich selbst gestellt und nur sich selbst 
erlebend [...] In dieselbe Richtung zielt der reichlich unpassende Ausdruck 
„Abgänger“ in der gleichen Strophe, d.h. der Mensch ist ein Samenerguβ ohne 
Befruchtungswillen und Befruchtungsmöglichkeit, er geht in die Nacht, aus dem 
Traum, ins Nichts und kennt keine Gemeinschaft, auch keine geschlechtliche 
mehr [...] Der Extreme in seiner Finallage gibt auch die Liebe nicht mehr ab, er 
behält sie für sich selbst.
[the late I is a lonely I, answering to itself and experiencing only itself […] It is 
this same direction in which the thoroughly inappropriate term ‘drop-out’ in the 
same stanza is aimed. It means that man is an ejaculation of seed without the will 
or the means to fertilize. He goes into the night, from a dream, into nothingness 
and knows nothing of co-existence, not even the sexual kind […]. The most 
extreme case in its final stage does not even share love but keeps it for himself.]370
In its ability to analyze reductionalistically, “Das späte Ich” dissects the world in order to 
find answers to its existence and relationship to the world. By breaking apart the 
connections between itself and the other, it has disengaged previous links to the other 
objects and is inherently isolated.371 Consider Benn’s view of the history of the “ich” for 
an explanation, which he lays out in his essay “Das moderne Ich” (1919):
Der Veränderung des Weltbildes, ausgehend von der durchauspluralistischen 
Weltauffassung des Animismus: die Welt zerklüftet in unzählige objective 
Einzelexistenzen, unter denen das Ich, ein Einzelwesen wie jene, keine irgendwie 
ausgezeichnete Stellung einnimmt, über des Polythesismus allmählich sich 
verschärfende Trennung [...] bis zu des Monotheismus Einheitsidee: der Welt von 
einem Willen, einem Gesetz geregelt, von einem Prinzip des Lebens geseelt, geht 
eine Entwicklung des Lebensgefühls des Menschen parallel, indem das Ich Zug 
für Zug jenen Gedanken des Subjektivismus in sich bildet, daβ die ganze äuβere 
Welt als ein inneres Erlebnis ihm gegeben ist.
[The alteration in worldview that begins with the completely pluralist outlook of 
animism: the world, shattered into numerous objective single-existences, among 
which the I, a single being like every other, occupies no particular position, then 
onto the increasing divide of polytheism […] and to monotheism’s idea of unity: 
the world of one will, ruled by one law, spirited by one principle of life. All this 
                                                
370 Benn, in a letter to Lohner, dated 19. February, 1952, Gottfried Benn, Ausgewählte Briefe. Mit einem 
Nachwort von Max Rycher (Wiesbaden: Limes, 1957), pp. 226ff. My translation. See also Benn, Zur 
Problematik des Dichterischen,  StA, III: 243.
371 Cf. Prigogine and Stengers’ claim that reductionism isolated man from nature.
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runs parallel to the development of a human attitude that allows the I, step by 
step, to create the idea of subjectivism within itself, proffering that the whole 
external world is given to him as an inner experience].372
The whole universe, Benn claims, is mirrored within man. Throughout his writings, Benn 
deals with this development of the conscious and the relationship between the I and the 
world. The place of its origin is pre-classical Greece, where the animistic soul of the 
primitives is first associated with the rise of the rationalist principle.373 The “Ich” is 
“late,” then, because it belongs to the last phase of human existence.374 In the first two 
stanzas of this poem, Benn provides is a diagnosis of the constitutive elements of this 
period of modernity. The “Ich” is in utter isolation after a fall from earlier periods in 
which it existed not as a separate entity (which Benn claims makes it non-existent) but as 
an integral part of the system of nature. In the following excerpt, he sheds light on the 
interconnectedness of the I and the world that has been lost:
Das Ich ist eine späte Stimmung der Natur und sogar eine flüchtige, Innen und 
Auβen erst spät geschieden [...] Das Ich gehört nicht zu den überwältigenden 
klaren und primären Tatsachen, mit denen die Menschheit begann, es gehört zu 
den bedingten Tatsächlichkeiten, die Geschichte haben, es tritt hinzu, es tritt auf 
innerhalb eines Früheren.
[The I is a late mood/mode of nature, a fleeting one at that, with the Outside and 
Inside divided up only late (...) The I is not one of the overwhelming, clear, and 
primary facts with which man began. Instead it is part of the contingent actualities 
that have a history – it is added, it emerges within an earlier form].375
                                                
372 Benn, Das moderne Ich (1919), StA, III: 104. My translation.
373 Cf. Benn, Der Garten von Arles (1920), StA, III: 110-119.
374 I should point out that in German, the term „late,“ in connection with a name, does not indicate that 
person’s demise. 
375 Benn, Zur Problematik des Dichterischen (1930), StA, III: 242. My translation.
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Hence, the first section of “Das späte Ich” is an example of precisely what it ironizes –
packaged in a parody, rather than an elegy. We could say with Kaplan that it is a 
depiction of “the result of subjectivity pushed to its limits.”376 The I has divorced itself 
from its context, and is now dissecting itself in the same manner it has torn the world 
apart in a search for scientific truths. As a result, “we end up with a persona that is one 
part surgeon, one part audience and one part specimen.”377
Section two with its four stanzas gives a sketch of the development of the “Ich” 
within various mythological systems that gave shape to it. Benn starts off with the 
Christian faith: “Im Anfang war die Flut.” Curiously, he references the deluge of the Old 
Testament rather than the Word in the gospel according to John.378 From an evolutionary 
point of view, of course, water is the beginning of all life. On this water a raft of lemurs is 
pushing off from the shore. Lemurs are spirits of the dead, caught between this world and 
the afterlife, and are therefore also considered to be a sort of midway point between apes 
and men.379
But the image of the flood is not restricted to the Bible: Ovid, for example, tells 
the story of Deucalion and Pyrrha in the Metamorphoses. They also make a new 
beginning after a deluge by planting stones that metamorphose into a new race of men, 
                                                
376 Kaplan, p. 27
377 Kaplan, p. 27
378 Kaplan reminds us that “Im Anfang war die Flut” could also refer to Goethe’s Faust, which contains the 
sequence “Im Anfang war das Wort,” “Im Anfang war der Sinn,” and, finally, “Im Anfang war die Tat.” 
(Kaplan, p. 34).
379 “lemur,” The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, ed. by M.C. Howatson and Ian 
Chilvers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Oxford Reference Online. Ovid gives an account of the 
ritual of exorcizing the ghosts in Fasti.
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which is what Benn seems to be alluding to when he mentions the Elk that was 
impregnated by a stone. Next, God enters what seems like another version of Noah’s ark, 
and with him embark all that are important (“alle die groβen Tiere,” II, 5), namely the 
eagle and the dove. Fancelli suggests that these opposites (predator and prey) most likely 
represent the two opposing powers of the Roman Empire and Christianity.380
As if we were on the float as well, we then take in the panorama of the big cities 
on the shore, “Palm- und Purpurborden – Blumen der Wüste (…) Marmara-Fähre,”
allusions to the resurrection of Jesus Christ and to hope in an arid wasteland. It seems that 
we are eastwardbound, or moving backward in history on a raft engulfed by a stygian 
flood. The allusion to the “Marmara-Fähre” is again reminiscent of an in-between state, 
first in the image of the ferry, which oscillates between poles, and also between two 
worlds and cultures, since the Sea of Marmara is the sea that separates Asia and Europe. 
What we pass on the raft are various manifestations of human belief systems – but 
their altars are silent (II,11). Baal, the Babylonian deity which was often represented as a 
steer (“letztes Blut des weiβen Stiers,” II, 11) could also be taken as a metaphor for a 
kind of eternal recurrence, or a new beginning.381 The notion of renewed life is also 
                                                
380 Fancelli, p. 67. Let me add that “die groβen Tiere” is in German a very common (and often slightly 
sarcastic) term for an important person. “Ein groβes Tier” is thus the equivalent of a VIP. Interpreted in this 
way, Benn is expressing his contempt for these “important” religions. 
381 Baal’s greatest battle was with Death (Mot) who at one point seems to have defeated him. Baal is 
condemned to descend to the depths of Death's throat, taking the rains, clouds, and other storm god 
characteristics with him. The result in the world was horrendous drought and devastation until Baal’s sister 
Anat descended, split him in two, ground him up, and sowed him as seed. This in turn brought about the 
resurrection of Baal and the return of life to the earth. However, the defeat of death and periods of 
prosperity and fertility are never permanent, and in time Mot would challenge and probably defeat Baal 
again. Hence, the Baal cycle is a continuous story of life, death, and rebirth. Cf. The Oxford Companion to 
World Mythology, ed. by David Leeming (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Oxford Reference 
Online.
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evident in the dove, both in an allusion to the Old Testament (the dove bringing an olive 
branch) as well as to the New Testament, where it is the traditional symbol of the Holy 
Spirit, the incarnation of Christ and mediator between God and men. Benn’s alteration of 
Golgatha, the location of Christ’s crucifixion, is startling but could be interpreted as a 
juxtaposition of opposite poles as well: by fusing the word with the German term “Tal” 
(valley), Benn contradicts historical facts, namely that Golgatha is a hill, not a valley and 
thereby produces a certain tension between spheres, that of the human and that of the 
deity.
David Kaplan makes an interesting and valuable point regarding the line “Rom, 
gib die Pferde des Lysippus her-“. The works of Lysippus survived Rome only in marble 
copies of the bronze originals, a fact which makes Kaplan believe that Benn is 
emphasizing the “inauthenticity of the surviving copies and using Rome as the 
interlocutor.”382 In doing so, Benn punctuates the literariness of the whole second section, 
in which he evokes an array of mythical contexts, all of which oppose the anthropocentric 
view of the modern world. And again we find a kind of bridge, a mediator here since 
Lysippus is credited with radically transforming Greek sculpture’s central genre, the male 
nude. At the same time, however, Lysippus’ commitment to the subjective severely 
compromised any shared artistic values that existed and, in effect, undermined the arts’ 
social foundations.383
                                                
382 Kaplan, p. 29.
383 Cf. Andrew F. Stewart, “sculpture, Greek,” The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization, ed. by  
Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Oxford Reference 
Online.
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All that is left of the catalogue of religions and myths is a pile of debris, made up 
of the images just depicted. They are now merely “Schutt. Bacchanalien. 
Propheturen./Barkarolen. Schweinerein” (II,13-14), a collage of satirized nouns that 
clearly indicate the author’s contempt. We can assume with Kaplan that “Schweinerein,” 
which means not only filth but also indecency, could imply that the rubble of the 
mythologies is “an off-color joke […] played on humanity.”384 “Barkarole” is the song of 
a gondoliere, and is most likely an indication that we are traveling on the river Styx.385
“Propheturen” might refer to the oracle’s loss of self during the time god speaks 
through her, a notion on which Benn himself sheds some light:
Wir tragen die frühen Völker in unserer Seele, und wenn die späte Ratio sich
lockert, in Traum und Rausch, steigen sie empor mit ihren Riten, ihrer 
prälogischen Geistesart und vergeben eine Stunde der mythischen Partizipation.
[We carry in our soul the early peoples, and whenever the late ratio is loosened, 
during dream and intoxication, they rise with their rites, their pre-logical spirit, 
and offer an hour of mythical participation].386
The “Ich” that is present in this second section of the poem is one that is reflecting the 
myth of a collective unconscious, a repository of images that is present in all people. 
Present in their minds, as well as in their bodies because man registers all of these 
changes in his memory, in his myths, sagas and epics, while the body summarizes the 
changes in its rudiments:“[die Persönlichkeit] verzeichnet alle diese Wendungen: geistig 
                                                
384 Kaplan, p. 39.
385 Cf. “barcarolle,” The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Music, ed. by Michael Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1996), Oxford Reference Online.
386 Benn, Der Aufbau der Persönlichkeit (1930), StA, III: 271. My translation.
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im Gedächtnis der Menschheit, den Urmythen, Ursagen, Urepen und der Körper 
summiert sie in seinen Rudimenten“]. 387
What Benn seems to be claiming is that science, which has accompanied Western 
thought for centuries, cannot provide answers for what R. W. Emerson had labeled the 
“over-soul.” Instead, Benn appears to favor a theory that is based on an organic cycle of 
emergence and destruction of succeeding epochs, each of which has left traces in human 
memory.388 Access to past generations liberates the unconscious, and reunifies the body 
with nature. In his essays, Benn denounces the attempt to separate the intellect from the 
body as an idea of the Enlightenment that modern science adopted. Instead, Benn claims
that body and soul cannot be separated, a notion he discusses in detail in Der Aufbau der 
Persönlichkeit. In this essay he draws attention to the importance of the entire organism 
since the body reconnects us to what we otherwise can only sense, namely our affinity 
with the universe:
Die biologische Grundlage der Persönlichkeit ist nicht wie eine frühere 
wissenschaftliche Periode annahm, das Groβhirn, sondern der ganze Organismus 
[...] Der Körper ist der letzte Zwang und die Tiefe der Notwendigkeit, er trägt die 
Ahnung, er träumt den Traum [...] Es gibt [...] nur eine Ananke: den Körper.“
[the biological basis of the development of a personality is not, as was assumed 
by a former era, the cerebrum, but the entire organism (...) the body is the last 
force and the depth of necessity, it carries the foreboding, it dreams the dream 
(…) there is only one ananke: the body].389
                                                
387 Benn, Der Aufbau der Persönlichkeit, StA, III: 266. Cf. Edward O. Wilson’s ideas on gene-culture co-
evolution, which I discuss in chapter three.
388 Cf. Benn, Der Aufbau der Persönlichkeit, especially pp. 265-269.
389 Benn, Zur Problematik des Dichterischen, StA, III: 246. My translation.
                                                                                                                      
181
It is only through the body, then, in a state of dream or intoxication (or death) that we can 
tap into the totality of being. This locus provides the soul with a certain wholeness, in that 
it connects it with the organic circle of life. The soul, Benn asserts, longs for something 
more profound and deeper than recognition, something that provides it with wholeness 
and perfection. Only this wholeness allows us to tap into the spheres of an “ancient 
totality,” where thought becomes part of what Benn calls “the dark circle of 
organicism”.390
On this journey, presumably on the river Styx, the soul appears like a being 
between life and death, though closer to death. The author addresses the soul (III,1), 
lamenting rather cynically its total state of decay, barely alive and still too much.391
Fancelli notes how the poem’s lines at the beginning of section three formally correspond 
to its message: by establishing a completely enclosed hermetic space for the soul (III, 3-
4) the notion of nothingness is reflected in the repetitive words as well as in the fourfold 
negation.392
If we expected this “soul” to arrive to a dismal welcome at Tartarus, however, we 
are surprised as merely the fanfares are missing: (III, 6). Fancelli remarks that Benn is 
evoking the colors of the south here (“blue,” and “glowing”).393 Indeed, in “Probleme der 
Lyrik,” Benn refers to the color blue as “the ultimate south-word” (“das Südwort 
                                                
390 Benn, Zur Problematik des Dichterischen, StA, III: 242. My translation.
391 As Kaplan rightly points out, however, “there is no pretence of a dialogue; this is obviously a dramatic 
monologue,” (p. 41). 
392 Fancelli, pp. 67 and 69.
393 Cf. Fancelli, p. 68.
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schlechthin”) and, more importantly, as the main means for “breaking through and 
disrupting context after which self-ignition begins,” (“das Hauptmittel zur 
‚Zusammenhangsdurchstoβung’, nach der die Selbstentzündung beginnt“).394 Perhaps we 
can apply the image of self-ignition directly to the second stanza of section three; we 
have thus allusions to a purgatory fire and dream and of course to death (“Hades,” 
“Totenschau,” and “Oleander,” a poisonous plant). Kaplan interprets these lines, as 
asserting that the mythic world could not be recreated, the persona cannot fully accept 
death for that would mean silence. In other words, though the subject is split by self-
analysis (section I) or revealed as a trope (section II), Benn cannot fully destroy it since 
that would mean the end of creation and of poetry. For this reason Kaplan insists that the 
images of death are sublimated as the visions of a dream (“steigt dem Schlaf ins Lid”) 
and – as the play on words ‘Lid/Lied makes clear – as art.395 The “I” expresses itself 
artfully in the dreams of sleep.
While this stanza might inspire some hope, irony and cynicism are again 
prevalent in the last two stanzas. Stanza three underscores the impossibility of recreating 
the lost world described in the second section; it is even mocking the fact that of the 
formerly grandiose château only rubble and shadows remain. The term “Bruderglück” is 
a somewhat unexpected term for describing the murderous relationship of Cain and Abel. 
In this context, however, it makes us all the more aware of a time before the break, before 
Cain killed his brother and became an outcast. Man is Cain, then, who is now exiled from 
                                                
394 Benn, “Probleme der Lyrik,” GW, p. 512. The image of self-ignition brings to mind Nietzsche’s 
aphorism of the flame („Verbrennen muβt du dich wollen in deiner Flamme“). My translation.
395 Kaplan, p. 44.
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the myth-centered collective and thoroughly isolated.396 All that is left for “das späte Ich” 
is to continue playing its role in full consciousness that everthing is in vain and 
ephemeral. 
In both form and content, “das späte Ich” is an attempt to expose the fracturing of 
the “Ich” both diachronically and synchronically. The poem is self-referential. It reflects 
on itself by conjuring up associations that evoke in the reader sense of the “common 
soul,” the loss of which the poem itself laments.397 Yet, the very conscioiusness of that 
loss enhances the value of the “I” because it is now capable of constructing a genuine 
sense of the interconnectedness of everything.
5.3. Into Nothingness 
„Singen – das heiβt Sätze bilden, Ausdruck finden, Artist sein,” (to sing means to 
form sentences, to find expression, to be artist”), Benn claimed.398 Of course, even 
without his definition of the term, we can safely assume that he is invoking the traditional 
poet of the pre-modern era, who knows nothing of the painful partition between the 
subject and the world that the modern poet experiences. Instead, he “sings” of their unity. 
In “Der Sänger,“ first published in 1925, Benn attempts to re-establish the connection 
between subject and object/world, which makes it a programmatic text, perhaps even, as 
                                                
396 Cf. Fancelli, p. 68 and Kaplan, p. 44.
397 It is, presumably, also for this reason that Benn initially welcomed National Socialism as a vitalistic 
attack on European intellectualism and on the effete civilization rooted in it. 
398 Benn, Kunst und Drittes Reich (1941), StA, IV: 266-287. Here pp. 277, 278. My translation.
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Marco Meli claims, “Benn’s most important statement concerning art theory” during the 
nineteen twenties, an aesthetic manifesto399:
Der Sänger
Keime, Begriffsgenesen,
Broadways, Azimut,
Turf- und Nebelwesen
mischt der Sänger im Blut,
immer in Gestaltung,
immer dem Worte zu
nach Vergessen der Spaltung zwischen ich und du.
Neurogene Leier,
fahle Hyperanämien,
Blutdruckschleier
mittels Koffein,
keiner kann ermessen
dies: dem einen zu,
ewig dem Vergessen
zwischen ich und du.
Wenn es einst der Sänger dualistisch trieb,
heute ist er Zersprenger
mittels Gehirnprinzip,
stündlich webt er im Ganzen
drängend zum Traum des Gedichts
seine schweren Substanzen
selten und langsam ins Nichts.400
Oskar Sahlberg proposes to view this poem together with Benn’s other poems 
written during the twenties as a transition in the sense that the author is seeking an 
intermediary position between what Sahlberg calls “regression and intellect,” an 
oscillation between Dionysian and Apollonian tendencies.401 On top of that, we get the 
                                                
399 Cf. Marco Meli, „Das Manifest eines modernen Lyrikers,“ Interpretationen, pp. 88-99. Here p. 89.
400 Benn, StA, I: 55.
401 Oskar Sahlberg, „Benns Ekstasen,“ Gottfried Benn 1886-1956. Referate des Essener Colloquiums, ed. 
by Horst Albert Glaser (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1989) pp. 213-228. Here p. 213. 
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impression that the pre-logical existence the speaker is yearning for in “Der Sänger” is 
attainable only through ecstasy which in turn is provoked by drugs (“Koffein”) and goes 
hand in hand with the subject’s dissipation and destruction of the self. The Drunkenness 
or “Rausch,” implied in the second stanza, aids in breaking down the rational exterior of 
the human brain in order to allow access to the primitive residue of the collective 
unconscious.402 Early in his career, in Gespräch (1910), Benn himself emphasized the 
circular, organic notion that is prevalent in the poem, namely in the terms “Keime” and 
“Begriffsgenesen.” Recall at this point also Benn’s own comment that life is like a 
closing cycle, returning to the vegetative and organic. Es ist wie ein Kreis der sich 
schlieβt (...) nun wird es zurückgezogen zum Vegetativen, Pflanzlichen,” Clearly, the 
emphasis in describing the world in this poem is on the organic principle of life, on the 
cycle of destruction and rebirth.403
Next among the accumulation of nouns in the first three lines is modern America 
(“Broadways”) and “Azimut,” which seems to suggest a change in direction (that in turn 
rhymes with the poet’s vital “blood”.404 The singer-poet blends these various aspects of 
modern life with “creatures of turf and fog,” which are most likely a reference to 
mythology. He blends all these ingredients in and thereby with his blood, always 
“forming” (“immer in Gestaltung,”) towards the word, towards new meaning. 
                                                
402 Cf. “Zersprengtes Ich” in the poem “Kokain” (Benn GW, III: 52, l. 13)
403 Benn, Gespräch, StA 7/1:163-171. Here especially pp. 166-169.
404 Cf. Else Buddeberg, „Der Gebrauch des Verbums in der Gedichtgruppe ‚Spaltung’“ in Else Buddeberg, 
Studien zur lyrischen Sprache Gottfried Benns (Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag, 1964) pp. 43-60. Here 
p. 47.
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I should mention that the expression Benn uses “immer in Gestaltung” is quite 
ambiguous in the German; it can indicate that the poet is both shaping something (that is, 
the poem) as well as that he himself is being formed. Had Benn wanted to avoid this 
ambiguity he would have most likely used the gerund of the verb, “gestaltend” 
(“forming”). Since he did not do so, we can assume that he is in fact implying that not 
only the poem but the poet, the creator, is also being continually reshaped towards new 
meaning. Blood, often a metaphor for the “elemental life” in Benn’s poems – is not only 
elevated to the status of “fermenting medium for artistic activity,” as Theo Meyer 
suggests, but the product of this concoction, namely the poem, will necessarily be an 
insoluble mixture of all ingredients of which the poet himself is one.405
Through the medium of poetry, the poet aims to mend the split between the I and 
the world that emanated from the rationalist thinking of Socrates, through Enlightenment 
rationalism to the modern ruptured I. Meli draws the connection between content and 
form when he proposes that the dualistic structure between subject and object, which had 
been synthesized harmoniously, is now expressed in the structure of the monologue.406
Benn himself refers to this development as depersonalization, or “Entfremdung der 
Wahrnehmungswelt” (“alienation of the perceptional world”), which he claims has led to 
a disease: “Nervenschwäche, Ermüdbarkeit, Psychasthenie” (“neurasthenia, easy tiring, 
psychasthenia”).407 This diagnosis attributes the loss of self to the same “disease” N. 
Katherine Hayles refers to as the denaturing of the human being.
                                                
405 Theo Meyer, Kunstproblematik und Wortkombinatorik bei Gottfried Benn (Köln: Böhlau, 1971), p. 227.
406 Cf. Mario Meli, “Das Manifest eines Modernen Lyrikers,” Interpretationen, pp. 88-99. Here p. 92. 
407 Benn, Epilog und Lyrisches Ich, StA, III: 129. My translation. 
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The prerequisite for achieving the former totality in the aesthetical product, the 
poem, is the forgetting of the split between I and you: “Das Vergessen der 
Spaltung/zwischen ich und du.” Clearly, this state of oblivion is equivalent to a state of 
inebriation that is provoked by caffeine, as Benn depicts in the second stanza, especially 
in “Blutdruckschleier/mittels Koffein.” Nietzsche readily comes to mind, who had 
already attributed to art the power of making man forget. Nietzsche is also Benn’s model 
for his „monological art.“ Distinguishing between referential art (art before witnesses) 
and monological art, Nietzsche claimed that only the latter enables the poet to forget the 
world because it is directed only at the poet himself. Monological art, then, and in our 
case poetry, is the means to both forget the division between I and world as well as to 
overcome it by creating totality anew. Writing poetry thus becomes a metaphysical 
activity, which Nietzsche had already declared in 1871; art, he claimed, was the highest 
task and the “intrinsic metaphysical activity” in life.408
The importance of the body is emphasized in the second stanza, which Benn 
draws attention to throughout his works, especially so in Der Aufbau der Persönlichkeit 
and Zur Problematik des Dichterischen:
Der Körper ist der letzte Zwang und die Tiefe der Notwendigkeit, er trägt die 
Ahnung, er träumt den Traum. Der Schwellungscharakter der Schöpfung ganz 
evident: in ihm erschuf sie ihre Korrelate und fordert in den Räuschen nach 
Gestalt. Alles gestaltet sich aus seiner Hieroglyphe: Stil und Erkenntnis, alles gibt 
er: Tod und Lust. 
[The body is the last constraint as well as the depth of necessity; it carries 
intuition, it dreams the dream. Creation’s tumescent nature utterly evident: in the 
body, creation fashions its correlates and, in fits of ecstasy, demands form. 
                                                
408 Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie, KSA, I: 24. My translation.
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Everything shapes itself from the body’s hieroglyph: diction and insight, the body 
provides everything: death and lust].409
The body is the one and only medium that enables us to at least experience memories of 
our former holistic existence in dream and ecstasy. From the body everything else 
emerges. In it life begins and ends. The body “provides” both death and the hunger for 
life and is thus the basis for all growth. It is the smallest common denominator that at the 
same time contains the code (“Hieroglyphe”) for all of creation; it is irreducible and 
random, that is: maximally complex.410
The awareness of the division between subject and object is abolished in stanza 
two, and perhaps for this reason the world “Spaltung” is not repeated in the last two lines 
of the second stanza. Meli refers to the dual goals of poetic totalization as being 
“sammelnde Vision” (“an all encompassing vision”) which he takes from Benn himself. 
It is the theme in the last stanza.411 Here, Benn juxtaposes the traditional dualistic poet 
and the modern poet, who shatters and dissolves traditional contents and forms and then 
assembles them into a completely new whole in a dream.412 Paradoxically, he does so by 
means of his brain, “mittels Gehirnprinzip” which got him into the dilemma in the first 
place. However, we must not forget that the mind is now helpful only under the influence 
of stimulants such as caffeine. Benn thus fuses the body and the mind into what he calls 
                                                
409 Benn, StA, III: 246. My translation.
410 Cf. my discussion of irreducibility in chapter three.
411 Cf. Benn’s poem „Meer- und Wandersagen,“ StA, I:62. Cf. Meli, p. 95.
412  Angelika Manyoni proposes to view the reference to the traditional poet, as well as Benn’s title of this 
poem to Goethe’s ballad “Der Sänger.” This is a surely a valid claim especially when we take into 
consideration the first version of this poem, which read “Einstmals sang der Sänger / über Lerchen lieb” (ll. 
17,18) cf. Angelika Manyoni, Consistency of Phenotype. A Study of Gottfried Benn’s Views of Lyric Poetry 
(New York: Lang, 1983), pp. 154-156.
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“cerebral principle“ (“Gehirnprinzip”), which Meyer describes as the “symbiosis of 
biological substrate and pre-rational life.”413
The “Traum des Gedichts,” the primal vision if you will, invites recalling the 
previously cited passage that describes the mythical participation in dream and 
intoxication: The poet weaves together parts of the whole in a dream in another analogy 
for the body. The term “schwer” (heavy) connotes something more than the physical; the 
adjective also evokes a sense of what the poet weaves into the picture is profound and 
dark. The ambiguity of the word evokes an array of meanings that affect readers 
differently and at different times.
I have thus tried to establish in what way “forgetting” enables the self to not only 
capture but to be reincorporated into the sphere of totality, to reinstitute the unity of self 
and world, which Benn also refers to as “primacy of the whole,” namely hen kai pan, the 
presocratic philosophy.414 Thus, the ending of “Der Sänger” can be read as a forward 
movement, which the word “ins” (into) clearly indicates. In a spiraling motion, the poet is 
weaving towards “nothingness” (“ins Nichts”).415 While the ending of this poem seems 
once again to be ruled by disillusionment, we do well to recall that form evolves from 
chaos. In order for form to be realized anew, it must first dissipate:
Regressionstendenzen, Zerlösung des Ich! Regressionstendenzen mit Hilfe des 
Worts [...] das ist der Grundvorgang, der alles interpretiert: Jedes Es das ist der 
Untergang [...], jedes Du ist der Untergang, die Vermischlichkeit der Formen. 
‚Komm, alle Skalen tosen Spuk, Entformungsgefühl’ –
                                                
413 Meyer, p. 277.
414 Cf. Benn, Epilog und lyrisches Ich, StA, III: 128.
415 Cf. Meli (p. 96), and Reiniger,(p. 161) who argue that the poem ends on a regressive note.
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[Regressional tendencies, dissipation of the self! Regressional tendencies 
supported by the word […] that is the basic process that interpretes everything: 
Every It is demise […], every You is demise, the diffusion of different forms. 
‘Come, all scales are roaring chaos, unforging’- ]416
Benn renders a picture of utter chaos. The dissipation of the self is admittedly ”ghostly” 
(“alle Skalen tosen Spuk”): but at the same time, this chaos represents pure potential. 
Thus, the term “Nichts“ is again ambiguous as it implies at the same time its own 
opposite: everything. For this reason Meli speaks of Benn’s “active nihilism” (“aktiver 
Nihilismus”).417 Benn himself speaks of the power of nothingness which creates form 
through words, words that dissolve and coalesce (“schwer erklärbare Macht des Wortes, 
das löst und fügt. Fremdartige Macht der Stunde, aus der Gebilde drängen unter der 
formfordernden Gewalt des Nichts“).418
The word allows for the experience of regression into the pre-logical and ecstatic 
sphere. Benn describes just this process in his poem „Ein Wort,“ (1941): 
Ein Wort, ein Satz―: aus Chiffern steigen
Erkanntes Leben, jäher Sinn,
die Sonne steht, die Sphären schweigen
und alles ballt sich zu ihm hin.
[A word, a phrase―: from Cyphers rise
Life recognized, a sudden sense,
The sun stands still, mute are the skies,
And all compacts it, stark and dense].419
                                                
416 Benn, Epilog und Lyrisches Ich, StA, III: 133. My translation.
417 Meli, p. 97. 
418 Benn, „Probleme der Lyrik,“ GW, p. 513. My translation.
419 Benn, “Ein Wort,” StA, I: 198. Translation by Richard Exner, Prose, Essays, Poems, p. 221.
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Clearly, there is a sense of recognition, coupled with a sense of familiarity of the state of 
pre-rational holism. All we are left with now, however, is a shattered sense of self, at the 
bottom of which lies its disease: over-individualization, („à bas die Kränke: 
Individuell”).420
The self is “forsaken.” Hence the title of Benn’s poem “Verlorenes Ich” 
(“Forsaken I”), published in 1943 in the collection Statische Gedichte. The following 
excerpts from the poem starkly elucidate the self’s fragmentation, reflected in the web of 
scientific and historical terms and images, as well as the unnatural and alienating 
punctuation throughout the poem:
Verlorenes Ich, zersprengt von Stratosphären,
Opfer des Ion―: Gamma-Strahlen-Lamm―
Teilchen und Feld―: Unendlichkeitsschimären
auf deinem grauen Stein von Notre-Dame.
Die Tage gehn dir ohne Nacht und Morgen,
die Jahre halten ohne Schnee und Frucht
bedrohend das Unendliche verborgen―
die Welt als Flucht.
[...]
Die Welt zerdacht. Und Raum und Zeiten
und was die Menschheit wob und wog,
Funktion nur von Unendlichkeiten―
die Mythe log.
[...]
Ach, als sich alle einer Mitte neigten [...]
Und alle rannen aus der einen Wunde,
brachen das Brot, das jeglicher genoβ―
o ferne zwingende erfüllte Stunde,
die einst auch das verlorne Ich umschloβ.
[Forsaken I, in rout from stratospheres,
The ion’s victim―: radiation’s sacrificial lamb―
                                                
420 Benn, „Chaos,“ StA, I: 79-80.
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Particle and field―: infinity’s chimeras
On those grey stones of your new Notre Dame.
Your days go by without a night or morning, 
The years conceal, no snow, no fruit in sight,
The infinite’s dark threatening warning―
The world as flight.
[…]
World thought to bits. Space and the ages,
And what mankind groped for as guide,
Infinities are now their gauges―
The myth has lied.
[…]
Oh, when all wholely to one center tended […]
And all mankind from that one wound seemed welling,
Breaking the bread that each one might partake―
Oh distant hour, fulfilling and compelling,
That even the forsaken did not forsake].421
The central theme in this poem is, again, the self is lost in time and space, which leaves it 
without Christianity as a reference point; the myth was a lie. Without the promise of 
redemption, it is no longer part of a holistic community, represented in the image of the 
last supper. The self has thought the world pieces and has failed in replacing Christianity 
with Science: rationally analyzing the remnants of the process of “Zerdenken” (to think 
apart) did not provide answers. The solution Benn proposes is to view the “particles” 
within their context, in their natural totality. 
An especially curious and ambiguous term Benn uses in this poem is the chimera, 
typically interpreted as an individual composed of a mixture of genetically different cells;  
a supreme hybrid, so to speak.422 However, it has been argued that, that precisely because 
                                                
421 Benn, „Verlorenes Ich“ in StA, I:205-206. Translation by Robert M. Browning, Prose, Essays, Poems, 
pp. 225-227.
422 The mythological figure of the chimera has a triple bodily nature, namely the head of a lion, the mid-
section of a goat and the hindquarters of a dragon. Cf. Helen King, “chimera,” The Oxford Companion to 
the Body, ed. by Colin Blakemore and Sheila Jennett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Oxford 
Reference Online.
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of the uncertainty of her form, the chimera can also be interpreted as a creature of 
language, thus representing the power of the imagination, of fantasy and illusion. Read in 
this way, Benn’s use of the word suggests his underlying belief in the power of art to 
achieve a new kind transcendence. The chimera is thus a metaphor for the poet’s power 
of imagination and, ultimately, for poetry itself, which provides connectivity and 
continually creates periodic centers and thus identity, in a world of chaotic flux.
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CHAPTER VI
THE BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER: WALLACE STEVENS
Wallace Stevens (1879-1955) finds his place as one of the most important 
American poets of the twentieth century, but it should be noted that he was also a very 
successful insurance executive. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that in his work he 
investigates and questions the relation between imagination and reality, which places him 
in the tradition of Ralph Waldo Emerson.423
Stevens was born in Reading, Pennsylvania, on October 2, 1879. He attended 
Harvard College where he wrote for, and for some time also edited, the Advocate. While 
at Harvard, he read Latin and Greek, besides studying the works and ideas of Darwin, 
Schopenhauer, Freud, Marx, as well Whitman and the Romantic poets. Without fully 
earning a degree, Stevens left Harvard in 1900 and moved to New York to work as a 
journalist. During this time, he returned to his home town frequently to reinvigorate his 
spirit on the wooded trails and among the fields that were growing increasingly sacred to 
him. The value of and the yearning for this landscape grew and would appear in 
numerous transformations in his poetry. At the same time he started feeling increasingly 
alienated from his family and their religious provincialism.424
                                                
423 For a short but detailed biography of Wallace Stevens, see Wallace Stevens, edited and with an 
introduction by Harold Bloom (Pennsylvania: Chelsea House Publishers, 2003), pp. 14-19.
424 Cf. Bloom, Wallace Stevens, p. 15.
                                                                                                                      
195
In 1901, Stevens followed his father’s practical advice and enrolled in law school, 
passing the New York Bar exam in 1904. He worked as a law clerk for several different 
firms and finally took a position with the American Bonding Company in 1908. During 
these years, he absorbed New York’s cultural offerings, attending musicals and theater 
productions as well as writing plays which he hoped to see staged.425
Stevens took a position as resident vice president with the Equitable Surety 
Company in 1913. Around the same time, he began sending his literary work to various 
editors. He was then writing regularly the poems which are now found in Harmonium but 
did not publish the collection until 1923. He pursued friendships with people in the art 
world but generally avoided the New York literary world of the time, though he did 
maintain long-lasting friendships with William Carlos Williams and Marianne Moore.
Even though Harmonium received mixed reactions – the New York Times review 
described the volume as “a glittering edifice of icicles” that “fails to affect the mind” or 
“arouse emotion” – the criticism mattered little to Stevens.426 His career with the 
insurance company became both increasingly demanding and financially rewarding and 
he now had a wife and daughter, all of which changed his rhythm. He did not publish his 
                                                
425 Cf. Bloom, Wallace Stevens, p. 16.
426 In his review, entitled “Pure Poetry and Mr. Wallace Stevens,” literary critic Percy Hutchison makes the 
prediction that “the very remarkable work of Wallace Stevens cannot endure. The verses which go to make 
up the volume Harmonium are as close to ‘pure poetry’ as one could expect to come. And so far as rhythms 
and vowels and consonants may be substituted for musical notes, the volume is an achievement. But the 
achievement is not poetry, it is a tour de force, a ‘stunt’ in the fantastic and the bizarre. From one end of the 
book to the other there is not an idea that can vitally affect the mind, there is not a word that can arouse 
emotion.” Of the poem “Hibiscus on the Sleeping Shores,” Hutchinson claims that “it is not actually music 
that one has here, but an imitation of music. And if there is a mood conveyed, the mood could have been 
equally as well conveyed by other lines equally languid of rhythm.” He concludes that there is “no doubt 
the theorists in poetry have enriched their craft, but at a disservice to themselves. Wallace Stevens is a 
martyr to a lost cause.” (cf. article by Percy Hutchison, The New York Times, Aug. 9, 1931).
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next collection of poems, Ideas of Order, until 1935. Even though the volume was 
considered to be lacking the “cynicism and abrasive humor of Stevens’ debut,” Stevens’ 
reputation was fully solidified after the next three releases (all by Knopf): The Man with 
the Blue Guitar, and Other Poems (1937), Parts of a World (1942), and Transport to 
Summer (1947).427 He received numerous awards for his poetry, including the National 
Book Award in both 1950 and 1954, and the Pulitzer Prize a year later.
Even more so than the above mentioned poets and much like Gottfried Benn, 
Stevens made his work a locus in which to theorize about the art of poetry. Both Benn’s 
and Stevens’ poetry displays a skeptical view of language based on the notion that 
language itself is arbitrary. Thus, the problem of metaphor is central to Stevens’ work: 
how can we possibly know reality when the language we use to describe and name it 
already mediates us from it?
This kind of reasoning, or rather persistent doubting is apparent in the self-
reflective poetry of Benn too. Poetic self-reflexivity, even though we tend to think of in 
terms of a circle, provides hermeneutical openness, a kind of sliding of signification 
among words that are exploited for their etymological riches.428
Not surprisingly, there is an array of studies that take into account Emerson’s 
impact on Stevens. However, Nietzsche’s influence on the poet, though its existence is 
not controversial, has not received much attention. B.J. Leggett gives perhaps the most 
comprehensive examination of Nietzsche’s influence on the American poet in Early 
                                                
427 Bloom, Wallace Stevens, p. 18.
428 Cf. my discussion of the ourobos and self-reference in Chapter three. See also Gottfried Benn’s 
statement on the etymological riches of the noun.
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Stevens. The Nietzschean Intertext (1992). Of other Stevens’ readers who are also in 
some way affiliated with Nietzsche’s thought, Harold Bloom has placed the German in 
Stevens’ canon.429 Especially in Stevens’ poem “Esthétique du Mal” Nietzsche’s 
presence is universally noted.430 Leggett specifically points out four books published 
since 1985 that “suggest that a Nietzschean heritage has now entered the authorized 
canon of Stevens criticism;” namely Rajeev Patke’s Long Poems of Wallace Stevens
(1985), Milton Bates’ Wallace Stevens: A Mythology of Self (1985), Robert Rehder’s The 
Poetry of Wallace Stevens (1988), and J.S. Leonard and C.E. Wharton’s The Fluent 
Mundo: Wallace Stevens and the Structure of Reality (1988).431
Of the four, Leonard and Wharton’s study stands out in that they claim that 
Nietzsche was not only a philosophical influence but “a poetic precursor.” They 
demonstrate the same general pattern in Stevens’ poetry that underlies the section “Von 
den drei Verwandlungen” (“three metamorphoses of the spirit”) in Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra.432 Since the publication of Leggett’s study in 1992, a few unpublished 
                                                
429 Bloom discusses Nietzsche’s influence in the context of his own theory of reading, of which, Bloom 
claims, Nietzsche and Freud are the principal precursors; cf. Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence; a
theory of poetry (Princeton, N.J.: Recording for the Blind & Dyslexic, 2005), p. 8-9.
430 See for example Bloom, Poems of our Climate, pp. 228-238, as well as Leggett’s comments in Early 
Stevens, p. 12.
431 Leggett, pp. 10-31.
432 J.S. Leonard and C.E. Wharton, The Fluent Mundo. Wallace Stevens and the Structure of Reality 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), p. 122. Leonard and Wharton actually assert that “no poet has 
dealt with these Nietzschean figures [death of God, solar images, three metamorphoses, and the eternal 
return] as explicitly, persistently, and insightfully as Stevens,” pp. 103-104.  
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dissertations have dealt with the German philosopher’s influence on Stevens, although 
that is not their main focus.433
Stevens himself mentions Nietzsche explicitly in his letters, most frequently in a 
dialogue initiated by Stevens’ friend Henry Church in 1942, and continued intermittently 
for the following five years.434 However, since the validity of Stevens’ statements about 
Nietzsche is questionable, and since their content has no direct bearing on the topic of 
this investigation, I am not making use of them here.435
In this chapter I will outline some fundamental similarities in the philosophies of 
Emerson, Nietzsche and Benn as they relate to Stevens’ work. Next, the most important 
issue must be discussed, namely how a philosophy that eliminates the old scaffolding of 
belief systems can become a source of consolation rather than despair. Further, I attempt 
to demonstrate how Stevens’ work can be read through the filter of complexity theory. I 
am driven by the belief that Stevens rightly earns the title “connoisseur of chaos.”436
 “Sunday Morning”: The Process of Overcoming437
                                                
433 John Marvin, “Nietzsche and Transmodernism: Art and Science beyond the Modern in Joyce, Stevens, 
Pynchon, and Kubrick,” (thesis, Ph.D.), State University of New York at Buffalo, 2004; Darlene L.Bird  
“(Extra)Ordinary evenings in New H(e)aven: the Religious Element in the Poetics of Wallace Stevens,”
(thesis, Ph. D.), University of Glasgow, 2003; Wesley H. North, “Stevens, Santayana, and Nietzsche: 
Narcissus as the Mirror with a Voice” (thesis, Ph.D.), Texas A&M University, 1995; Glenn A. Kurz, “Of 
Being Numerous: Multiplicity and Form in Nietzsche, Freud, Wallace Stevens, and William Carlos 
Williams” (thesis, Ph.D.), Stanford University, 1995;
434 Leggett provides a discussion of the letters between Stevens and Church, (pp. 34-41).
435 Cf. Leggett, p. 33, and Bloom, who argues convincingly that Stevens is not to be trusted when he talks 
of his reading Nietzsche (Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens : the Poems of our Climate [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1977], p. 252).
436 Cf. the title to Stevens’ poem “Connoisseur of Chaos,” CPP, p. 194.
437 All poems discussed in this chapter are printed in their entirety in the appendix.
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“Sunday Morning,” first published in Harriet Monroe’s Poetry in 1915 and again 
in Stevens’ first collection of poems, Harmonium (1923), offers a substitute for the 
traditional Christian belief system. In its stead, the poem proposes a sort of paganism, or 
natural religion.438 Janet McCann points to a note from 1928 in which Stevens himself 
asserts “the poem is simply an expression of paganism,” as well as to his indication (in 
1944) that the assumption that the poem suggests “a naturalistic religion as a substitute 
for supernaturalism” was correct.439
In contrast to its theme is the poem’s traditional form; “Sunday Morning” consists 
of eight blank-verse stanzas of varying lengths. The poem develops in a kind of inner 
dialogue between a woman enjoying a peaceful Sunday morning, and her inner voice 
telling her to abandon her traditional belief system which, as she is aware, has become 
“complacent”:
Complacencies of the peignoir, and late
Coffee and oranges in a sunny chair, 
And the green freedom of a cockatoo
Upon a rug mingle to dissipate
The holy hush of ancient sacrifice.
She dreams a little, and she feels the dark
Encroachment of that old catastrophe,
As a calm darkens among water-lights.
The pungent oranges and bright, green wings
Seem things in some procession of the dead,
                                                                                                                                                
438 John Timberman Newcomb discusses Harriett Monroe’s reasons for “editorial butchery” in regards to 
“Sunday Morning.” I will discuss the impetus of this change later in this chapter. See J. T. Newcomb, 
Wallace Stevens and literary canons (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1992). 
439 Cf. Janet McCann, Wallace Stevens Revisited: “The Celestial Possible.” (New York: Twayne 
Publishers, 1995), p. 8; Wallace Stevens and Holly Stevens, ed., The Letters of Wallace Stevens (New 
York: A.A. Knopf. 1966), pp. 250 and 464. 
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Winding across wide water, without sound.
The day is like wide water, without sound, 
Stilled for the passing of her dreaming feet
Over the seas, to silent Palestine,
Dominion of the blood and sepulcher. (stanza I)
The first stanza makes clear the woman’s understanding that the very life she is so 
thoroughly enjoying is transient. Stevens reflects the two opposing forces (life and death), 
as well as the two opposing voices (the woman’s and her inner voice) in contrasts of 
bright and dark colors (“sunny,” “bright-green” versus “dark” and “darkens”), and smells 
and sounds (“pungent oranges,” “without sound”). Everything alive seems to her like “in 
some procession of the dead.” Appropriately then, the sphere of death is associated with a 
creeping motion (“winding across wide water”), an allusion to a snake that is traveling 
very close to the earth. Life, including the belief of its transcendence, is depicted in the 
image of a bird, flying on “bright, green wings.” Her recognition of life’s transience leads 
the woman to remember what Sundays are all about, namely church. The “old 
catastrophe” with all its indoctrinated imagery (“blood and sepulchre”) now encroaches 
upon her peaceful morning and fills it with guilt and fear, the two main powers in 
Christian faith.440
The second stanza picks up on the woman’s doubt which has arisen from her 
musing over life and death. 
Why should she give her bounty to the dead?
                                                
440 While there surely exists in this poem, as Dennis Donoghue suggest, an underlying sense of loss for the 
poet’s own religious beliefs, Donoghue’s view seems somewhat myopic: “At an early age he (Stevens) 
ceased to be a Christian, but he retained a deeply religious sensibility and spent a lifetime trying to console 
it for its loss […] The loss, the heartbreak, come in phrases like “the holy hush of ancient sacrifice” and “ 
The tomb in Palestine / Is not the porch of spirits lingering. / It is the grave of Jesus where he lay.”  
Donoghue does see the consolation that is offered in “Sunday Morning” as “one’s own imagination, 
liaisons, between the self and its environment,” but insists that “the loss remains.” Cf. Dennis Donoghue, 
Connoisseurs of Chaos. Ideas of Order in Modern American Poetry (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 
191-192.
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What is divinity if it can come
Only in silent shadows and in dreams?
Shall she not find in comforts of the sun,
In pungent fruit and bright, green wings, or else
In any balm or beauty of the earth, 
Things to be cherished like the thought of heaven? (stanza II).
“Why should she give her bounty to the dead?”; in other words: why believe in an 
afterlife that is uncertain, that comes “only in silent shadows and in dreams?” Could she 
not attempt to find enjoyment, fulfillment and comfort in this life? (“comforts of the 
sun”)? Again, Stevens mentions the “pungent” fruit, the “bright, green wings” but this 
time they are connected to the earth (“in any balm or beauty of the earth”). Why not 
attempt to embrace her own divinity?:
Divinity must live within herself:
Passions of rain, or moods in falling snow;
Grievings in loneliness, or unsubdued
Elations when the forest blooms; gusty
Emotions on wet roads on autumn nights;
All pleasures and all pains, remembering
The bough of summer and the winter branch.
These are the measures destined for her soul. (stanza II).
Still, however, the pleasures she envisions are accompanied by their counterparts: 
“passions” and “elations” are contrasted with “grievings in loneliness,” and are reflected 
in the seasons as well (“the bough of summer and the winter branch”). If indeed, “these 
are the measures destined for her soul,” and death is just as real as life is, then the thought 
of abandoning safe grounds render her doubtful. But, as both Emerson and Nietzsche 
affirmed, rebirth requires sacrifice.441 Stevens thus asserts the necessity of always 
                                                
441 Cf. Emerson’s claim that “The way of life is wonderful: it is by abandonment,” (Circles), and 
Nietzsche’s insistence that one must be willing to burn in one’s own flame in order to be reborn: 
“Verbrennen musst du dich wollen in deiner eignen Flamme: wie wolltest du neu werden, wenn du nicht 
erst Asche geworden bist!,” (Zarathustra); cf. my elaborations in chapter four. See also my discussion of 
Gottfried Benn’s poem “Karyatide” in chapter five.
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beginning anew, of always reinventing those figures that allowed the ones of the past to 
live. 
In this way, Stevens, like Emerson, Nietzsche, and Benn, is profoundly skeptical 
of history, and at the same time very much invested in the renewing powers of language. 
Hence, he proclaims in Notes toward a Supreme Fiction (1942), “if you take the varnish 
and dirt of generations off a picture, you see it in its first idea.”442 The poem thus aims to 
removing all of the dead accumulations of history in order to give us the the essence.
As Gottfried Benn does in “Das späte Ich,” Stevens goes on, in stanza three, to 
trace the history of divinity:
Jove in the clouds had his inhuman birth.
No mother suckled him, no sweet land gave 
Large-mannered motions to his mythy mind.
He moved among us, as a muttering king,
Magnificent, would move among his hinds,
Until our blood, commingling, virginal,
With heaven, brought such requital to desire 
The very hinds discerned it, in a star. 
Shall our blood fail? Or shall it come to be
The blood of paradise? And shall the earth
Seem all of paradise that we shall know?
The sky will be much friendlier then than now,
A part of labor and a part of pain,
And next in glory to enduring love,
Not this dividing and indifferent blue. (stanza III).
Stevens moves from the completely inhuman Jove (“inhuman birth, / no mother suckled 
him”) to the half-human and half-divine Jesus (“our blood, commingling, virginal, / with 
heaven”), and finally to a god that is fully human, represented by the elements of earth 
and blood, of nature and man. Such a god will make earth into paradise, and the sky “will 
                                                
442 Stevens, Letters, pp. 426-427.
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be much friendlier than now” because it will be ours, not the god’s.443 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Stevens mentions the essence of the human body, “blood” (rather than 
“soul”), three times throughout this stanza and thus reestablishes the connection to the 
elementary and to the earth. If “our blood” were indeed to become the “the blood of 
paradise,” and “the earth” became “all of paradise that we shall know,” then we ourselves 
would be both the created and the creator.444
Stevens’ extensive use of colors, especially of green and blue, has always been 
subject to speculation. In the nineteen seventies, early critics such as Veena R. Prasad 
proposed a rigid color scheme, which Helen Vendler, roughly ten years later, referred to 
as “commentary of extraordinary banality.”445 What seems clear nevertheless is that 
Stevens does show a strong tendency to attribute the color blue to unattainable 
abstractions, such as the “dividing and indifferent blue” of the sky in “Sunday Morning,” 
and “blue-shadowed silk” of Peter Quince’s muse Susanna, who is entirely unattainable 
to him.446 In contrast, the color green tends to be associated with a promise of a 
permanence that is vibrant, physical, and attainable even though it is anything but 
stagnant. It is embodied, for instance, “in pungent fruit and bright, green wings, or else / 
In any balm or beauty of the earth” as in “Sunday Morning,” (stanza II). 
                                                
443 Cf. McCann, p. 9.
444 Cf. Emerson’s, Nietzsche’s and Benn’s references to the earth and to blood in chapters four and five, 
respectively.
445 Veena Rani Prasad, Wallace Stevens: the Symbolic Dimensions of his Poetry (New Delhi: Arnold-
Heinemann. 1987). Cf. Helen Vendler, Words Chosen out of Desire (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1984), p. 53.
446 See Stevens, “Peter Quince at the Clavier,” CPP, pp. 72-74.
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In stanza four it becomes clear that the woman is not quite ready to let go of her 
transcendental beliefs because she realizes that the paradise offered to her is not 
permanent:
She says,” I am content when wakened birds,
Before they fly, test the reality
Of misty fields, by their sweet questionings;
But when the birds are gone, and their warm fields
Return no more, where, then is paradise?” (Stanza IV)
Her inner voice, however – we might call it her “Dionysian side” – assures her 
that there is in fact a kind of permanence:
There is not any haunt of prophesy,
Nor any old chimera of the grave,
Neither the golden underground, […]
nor cloudy palm
Remote on heaven’s hill, that has endured
As April’s green endures; or will endure
Like her remembrance of awakened birds,
Or her desire for June and evening, tipped
By the consummation of the swallow’s wings. (stanza IV) 
The permanence promised here is not of the traditional kind (“there is not any haunt of 
prophecy, / Nor any old chimera of the grave” etc.). Instead, the kind of eternal life that is 
promised here is depicted entirely in images of interactivity between human and natural 
life (“her remembrance of awakened birds;” “her desire for June,” “consummation of the 
swallow’s wings”). However, Stevens makes clear that the objects in the physical 
environment only have permanence if they are mediated by the woman, if they are 
“remembered, desired, consummated” by her. The promised permanence is thus created 
through the interaction of subject and object and it is clear that they are only moments of 
permanence, sporadic centers of balance and fulfillment.
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In regards to the fact that nothing will outlast the memory’s images of the earthly 
paradise, Bloom makes the incisive observation that “nothing lasts as does the 
imagination of heaven, and thus only the imagination of heaven is paradise.”447
According to Stevens, permanence, and with it a life of becoming – as opposed to being –
can only be attained by reconciling ourselves with the earth.448 Janet McCann affirms this 
interpretation and adds that “one with nature, she (the woman) should not try to separate 
herself from it and redefine herself as something unnatural or supernatural.”449
Stevens thus suspects, as do Emerson, Nietzsche, and Benn that what has always 
been thought of as “the essential, unvarying components of human experience are not 
natural facts of life but social constructions.”450 What we have lost, then is what Benn 
referred to as “mythical participation” (“mythische Partizipation”) with of collective 
unconscious that we can reconnect with only through our body – through blood and 
earth.451
                                                
447 Bloom, Wallace Stevens, p. 22.
448 Reconciliation with the earth is, of course, also a vital component, a prerequisite in fact, for “becoming 
who you are,” (“wie man wird was man ist,” Nietzsche’s subtitle to Ecce Homo) as I have argued in 
previous chapters. See also B.J. Leggett’s examination of the influence of Nietzschean philosophy in 
Stevens work. He argues that “Sunday Morning” is the best example of a clear intertextual reading: B.J. 
Leggett, Early Stevens: The Nietzschean Intertext (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), especially 
pp. 88-89, and 119-122.
449 McCann, pp. 8 and 9. See also A. Walton Litz’s Introspective Voyager: The Poetic Development of 
Wallace Stevens (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); Litz shows the parallel between the thesis of 
“Sunday Morning” and William James’ comment that “the earth of things, long thrown into shadow by the 
glories of the upper ether, must resume its rights,” (p. 44).
450 N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 265-295. Here p. 265 (see also my comments on “denaturing” in 
chapter four). Guy Rotella provides an interpretation of “Sunday Morning” that points to the emergence of
nature as the religion or spirituality, as a result of the philosophical upheavals of the age of science and the 
end of the nineteenth century (Guy Rotella, Reading and Writing Nature [Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1991], pp. 114-116).
451 Benn, Der Aufbau der Persönlichkeit (1930), StA, III:271. My translation.
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In stanza five, the woman’s fear of death indicates that she needs individual 
continuity, not the kind of collective transience that is offered to her: “But in contentment 
I still feel / The need for some imperishable bliss” (stanza V). Her consolation is that she 
can be part of the organic cycle of nature. In this cycle, death is not to be feared but 
instead, 
Death is the mother of beauty452; hence from her,
Alone, shall come fulfillment to our dreams
And our desires. Although she strews the leaves 
Of sure obliteration on our paths, […]
She makes the willow shiver in the sun
For maidens who were wont to sit and gaze
Upon the grass, relinquished to their feet.
She causes boys to pile new plums and pears
On disregarded plate. The maidens taste
And stray impassioned in the littering leaves. (stanza V).
Although the woman is certainly going to die (“although she strews the leaves / Of sure 
obliteration on our paths”), death is merely a stage in the cycle of ripening, fruition, and 
decay (“maidens who were wont to sit and gaze / upon the grass, relinquished to their 
feet. / She causes boys to pile new plums and pears”).
Stanza six explains in greater detail the stunning revelation that death is 
considered the mother of beauty. The stanza conjures up a “what-if-scenario”: 
Is there no change of death in paradise?
Does ripe fruit never fall? Or do the boughs
Hang always heavy in that perfect sky,
Unchanging, yet so like our perishing earth,
With rivers like our own that seek for seas
They never find, the same receding shores
That never touch with inarticulate pang?
Why set the pear upon those river-banks
                                                                                                                                                
452 The fact that Stevens’ “death” is feminine (“she”) strengthens his interpretation of life and death as an 
organic and recurring cycle since life is generally depicted as being a “mother,” as is the earth, gaia.
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Or spice the shores with odors of the plum?
Alas, that they should wear our colors there,
The silken weavings of our afternoons, 
And pick the strings of our insipid lutes!
Death is the mother of beauty, mystical,
Within whose burning bosom we devise
Our earthly mothers waiting, sleeplessly. (stanza VI).
What if there were a heavenly paradise; “is there no change of death,” and “does ripe 
fruit never fall?” What Stevens depicts in this so-called paradise is a world of utter 
stagnation, frozen in life, perfection, and ripeness – “unchanging.” It becomes startlingly 
apparent that without death, life has no meaning; it is for this reason Stevens asks: “why 
set the pear upon those river-banks / Or spice the shores with odors of the plum?” There 
would be no wonder, no fear, no question, and no quest (no color or scent) – and 
therefore, Stevens claims, also no beauty.453
Thus, “death is the mother of beauty” in that death provides the impetus for life 
and change. It is both end and new beginning in one.  Stasis ceases to be mystical, 
sublime, or beautiful; so ultimately, death is the bearer of beauty, namely of life and 
diversity. The static nature of the heavenly paradise is thus contrasted with the dynamic 
nature of life on earth. Stevens makes very clear that we are already a part of the world of 
beauty. He uses the possessive “our” no less than six times in the fifteen lines of stanza 
VI, indicating that we both possess the earth and are at the same time possessed by it. The 
poet makes the same point in the poem “Peter Quince at the Clavier,” where he asserts 
that “beauty is momentary in the mind - / The fitful tracing of a portal; / But in the flesh it 
is immortal.” He continues, in the same section of the poem, to compare the flow of 
                                                
453 Bloom suggests that the “earthly mothers waiting, sleeplessly” are perhaps meant to oppose the 
complacency of the opening scene, (p. 23).
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nature to that of a wave: “The body dies; the body’s beauty lives. / So evenings die, in 
their green going, / A wave, indeterminably flowing.”454
The aspect of life’s brute but vital force is evoked in the seventh stanza; in 
contrast to the complacent attitude of the poem’s opening, which portrays a Dionysian 
orgy:
Supple and turbulent, a ring of men
Shall chant in orgy on a summer morn
Their boisterous devotion to the sun,
Not as god, but as a god might be,
Naked among them, like a savage source. (stanza VII).
Stevens’ depiction of the men’s “boisterous devotion to the sun” is suggestive of not only 
Nietzsche’s cult of Dionysus but also of Benn’s Satyrs (silen) in his poem “Karyatide.”455
In their actions, the men are “as a god might be,” which implies the god Stevens is 
envisioning would be as sensual, corporeal, and exulting as the men because they are 
aware that life is fleeting.456
The last stanza makes the argument that Jesus’ tomb in Jerusalem is not the sacred 
site of the resurrection, but merely the place where “he lay.” The statement seems to 
imply, as Bloom opines, that Jesus’ remains are in fact still lying there since he is mortal 
as we all are:457
She hears, upon that water without sound,
                                                
454 Stevens, “Peter Quince at the Clavier,” CPP, pp. 72-74. Here p. 74 (stanza IV).
455 Cf. my discussion of Benn’s poem in the previous chapter.
456 Cf. Bloom, who he points out the Biblical imagery in this stanza, stating that “the scene’s evocation of 
serafin echoes Isaiah’s version of the throne of God (…) The trees are likened to angels, the hills are a 
choir, and their journey, their fleeting attainment of paradise will only be in (…) their shared knowledge of 
their mortality and that the life they live here is the only life they will have,” (pp. 23-24).
457 Cf. Bloom, p. 24.
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A voice that cries, “The tomb in Palestine
Is not the porch of spirits lingering.
It is the grave of Jesus, where he lay.” (stanza VIII) 
Rather than living in a world ordered by a transcendental sphere, Stevens 
proposes, “we live in an old chaos of the sun.” What may seem like nature’s chaos, 
however, is actually a womb of possibilities. There are certainties that impose a 
sanctifying order and we know that change is the only constant.458 This order of change is 
based not on a system imposed by man but by nature itself:
We live in an old chaos of the sun,
Or old dependency of day and night,
Or island solitude, unsponsored, free,
Of that wide water, inescapable.
Deer walk upon our mountains, and the quail
Whistle about us their spontaneous cries;
Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness;
And, in the isolation of the sky,
At evening, casual flocks of pigeons make 
Ambiguous undulations as they sink,
Downward to darkness, on extended wings. (stanza VIII).
At last then, “at evening,” and “in the isolation of the sky” from which the woman is now 
removed since she has accepted the alternative to Christianity, she is ready to take the 
leap of faith in herself. The pigeons, in their spiraling journey of “ambiguous undulations 
as they sink / downward to darkness” embody what Bloom pointedly refers to as “the 
noble tragedy of our journey.”459 However, even though we are no different from the 
“causal flocks of pigeons” our journey, as is their flight, is not patterned but random 
                                                
458 See also Emerson’s and Nietzsche’s proclamations that only change offers permanence which I discuss 
in chapter four.
459 Bloom, p. 24. Cf. my elaborations on the significance of the spiral shape/movement in previous 
chapters.
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(“casual”), and their undecipherable movements are nevertheless a kind of self-definition 
that is not superimposed but natural.460
And though we might be missing some of the ecstatic, life affirming attitude that 
Emerson and Nietzsche had purveyed, we must take into consideration the fact that when 
it was published in Poetry, the poem had ended with what is now recognized as the 
seventh stanza. Instead it concluded with the ecstasy of human feeling as the only 
divinity that would be perpetually recreated and sustained by the course of nature. 
Since the poem’s first publication in Monroe’s journal, the seventh stanza seems 
to have been something of a problem. Harriett Monroe apparently felt that its tone did not 
fit with the rest of the poem.461 Interestingly, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar have 
argued that it is precisely the stanza’s incongruity, namely the fact that “both logically 
and grammatically, this segment of ‘Sunday Morning’ does not quite ‘fit’ into the text’s 
elegant chain of reasoning” that marks the stanza’s “crucial importance.”462 I am inclined 
to agree with Gilbert and Gubar’s reasoning. However, I believe that the last stanza of the 
poem as we now know it (stanza VIII) can be seen as a different rendering of the theme 
that is elaborated in the seventh stanza. “We live in an old chaos of the sun” seems to me 
to be indicating all of the characteristics of natural life that are depicted in the fictitious 
scene (“a ring of men shall chant in orgy” – my emphasis) in stanza VII. 
                                                
460 Cf. McCann, p. 10.
461 Cf. Stevens, LWS, p. 183.
462 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, “The Man on the Dump versus the United Dames of America; or, 
What Does Frank Lentricchia Want?” Critical Inquiry, 14 (1988): pp. 386-406. Here p. 393.
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Read in this way, the poem as a whole – that is the stanzas with their nuanced
endings – are testament to the poet’s own struggle to come to terms with human life that
does not provide definite answers. While we might conclude that at this point, a simple 
identification with the natural cycles does not offer transcendence, I propose that Stevens 
does not categorically choose “elegy over energy,” as McCann suggests.463 In fact, as we 
shall see, testaments to his belief in energy and flux can be found throughout his work. 
“Sunday Morning” captures the oscillations between doubt and faith in a new kind of 
transcendence in precisely our “ambiguous undulations.” On extended wings, we cannot 
but sink downwards since that is simply the nature of life on earth: we are drawn 
downward by the earth’s force of gravity, and only by incessant beating of our wings can
we literally stay aloft.
“The Snow Man”: De-creation and Nothingness 
In this section, rather than offer a step-by-step interpretation of the poem “The 
Snowman,” which has been done many times, I will focus on what we might call the 
speaker’s meditation on “the nothing that is,” as well as the step leading up to it, namely 
Stevens’ process of decreation.464
                                                
463 McCann, p. 10.
464 Stevens, “The Snow Man,” CPP, p. 8.  Eda Lou Walton, in her review of Ideas of order (1936) refers to 
Stevens as “the poet of meditation,” herself citing the late prominent critic R.P. Blackmur who had coined 
this description of Wallace Stevens in his first volume of essays, The Double Agent: essays in craft and 
elucidation (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1962, ©1935). 
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In a single sentence “The Snow Man” turns the mind’s attention from the world 
created by the self to the larger universe, thus embodying Stevens’ central theme of the 
relation between imagination and reality. Or, in other words, in the course of fifteen lines 
of tercets, we witness the “evolution of ‘one’ to ‘no one,’” in a process of decreation.465
The viewer’s gaze is redirected – through a change in perspective – from the particular, 
subjective point of view of an interpreting beholder to what we might, for now, call an 
objective and universal viewpoint:   
One must have a mind of winter
To regard the frost and the boughs
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow;
And have been cold a long time
To behold the junipers shagged with ice,
The spruces rough in the distant glitter
Of the January sun; and not to think
Of any misery in the sound of the wind,
In the sound of a few leaves,
Which is the sound of the land
Full of the same wind
That is blowing in the same bare place
For the listenener, who listens in the snow,
And, nothing himself, beholds
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.466
What is perhaps especially striking is the fact that the poem does not in fact describe but 
merely invokes a snowman, namely by mentioning him in the title. Thereafter, the 
                                                
465 George S. Lensing, Wallace Stevens and the Seasons (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2001), p. 144.
466 Stevens, “The Snow Man,” CPP, p. 8.
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snowman is involved in the poem only as “a metaphor of a metaphor.”467 The snowman 
is a metaphor not only for the state of a “mind of winter” which, as it becomes clear in 
the course of the poem, is a mind that entertains “nothingness.”
Bloom already offered Nietzsche as an inspiration for “The Snow Man” in 1977.  
He quotes a passage from Nietzsche’s Genealogie der Moral which he claims is echoed 
in Stevens’ poem.468 Nietzsche had pronounced what he called the “horror vacui” as the 
basic trait of human will, which expressed itself in the fact that man is always willing and 
that “man will wish Nothingness rather than not wish at all” (“eher will er noch das 
Nichts wollen als nicht wollen”).469 Whether we agree with Bloom or not, it will be both 
interesting and valuable to compare Nietzsche’s and Stevens’ notions of nothingness.
There have been many propositions as to its nature; J. Hillis Miller identified the 
poem’s “nothing” with “being” and argued that nothingness for Stevens is the underlying 
reality, “the source and end of everything.”470 In Paul Bové’s Heideggerian reading the 
poem is said to record the process by which its speaker sees “the primordiality of Being-
in-the-World” and learns that he is “ontologically identical with the other insofar as they 
are both part of ‘what-is’ existing in and by virtue of ‘nothing.’”471 Against Miller and 
                                                
467 See David Perkins, A History of Modern Poetry: From the 1890s to the High Modernist Mode 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), especially pp. 542-544. Here 543.
468 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1977), pp. 54-61.
469 Note that Nietzsche’s concept parallels the pigeons’ need to fight gravity in “Sunday Morning.” Cf. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral, KSA V:339 and 412. Translation by Horace B. Samuel, 
The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York: The Modern Library, 1954). 
470Joseph Hillis Miller, “Wallace Stevens’ Poetry of Being,” English Literary History (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, March 1964, 31: 86-105. Here p. 155.
471 Paul A. Bové, Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modern American Poetry (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980), p. 191.
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Bové, I argue with Leggett that the “nothing” of the poem may be read as Nietzsche’s 
notion of becoming.
“After one has abandoned a belief in god, poetry is that essence which takes its 
place as life’s redemption” Stevens claimed. 472 If one no longer believes in God as truth, 
there are only two entities left: man and nature, that is subject and object. The final unity 
towards which Stevens’ as well as Benn’s poetry leans is a blending of subject and 
object, of self and other. Thus, although this dissolving of the self is in one way the end 
of everything, it is at the same time the beginning of a new unity and as such represents 
pure potential; a potential that can be realized – temporarily – in poetry: reality is the 
product of the imagination as it shapes the world. Because it is constantly changing as we 
attempt to find imaginatively satisfying ways to perceive the world, reality is in fact not 
static but an activity. We approach reality by putting together parts of the world in an 
attempt to make it seem coherent. The effort is analogous to seeking temporary 
redemption from uncertainty.
In order to do so, we must pronounce God dead. In The Necessary Angel, Stevens 
comments on French philosopher and mystic Simone Weil’s coinage of the term 
“decreation,” which is somewhat reminiscent of Hayles’ notion of “denaturing”:
She [Simone Weil] says that decreation is making pass from the created to the 
uncreated, but that destruction is making pass from the created to nothingness. 
Modern reality is a reality decreation, in which our revelations are not the 
revelations of belief, but the precious portents of our own powers. The greatest 
truth we could hope to discover, in whatever field we discovered it, is that man’s 
truth is the final resolution of everything.473
                                                                                                                                                
472 Stevens, CPP, p. 901.
473 Stevens, The Necessary Angel, CPP, pp. 643-751. Here p. 750.
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Thus, Stevens relates (through poetry) a destruction of traditional reality leading to a 
realization that the meaning of a poem is not truth, always recognizing that the poem is 
the poets’ perception of reality.  This perception of reality is based on experience, 
historical context, and poetic skill, that the “imagination is the power of the mind over the 
possibility of things,” he declares in “Imagination as Value;” “it is the source not of a 
certain single value but of as many values as reside in the possibilities of things.”474 For 
the imagination to be the source of values, however, its primary function must be to 
invest what man perceives in the flux of particulars with an order, a truth:
We cannot very well speak of spheres of value and the transmission of a value, 
commonly considered appropriate to one sphere, to another, and allude to the 
peculiarity of roles, as the poet’s role, without reminding ourselves that we are 
speaking of a thing in continual flux.475
Fluctuations to Stevens reflect the effects of poetic energy; “for where there are 
no fluctuations, poetic energy is absent.”476 The new truths may then be altered by the 
endless profusion of new particulars. But the particulars within the flux already consist of 
the order and truth that the past have imbued them with. These previous systems prevent 
us from accurately perceiving the flux. Therefore, the imagination must first eliminate the 
old ideas, in order to discover new ones; decreation must precede creation.477
Futhermore, since the imagination manifests itself in words that are merely 
metaphors of the real world, though as close as we can get to it, the inevitable conclusion 
                                                
474 Stevens, Necessary Angel, CPP, p. 726.
475 Stevens, Necessary Angel, CPP, p. 735.
476 Stevens, The Irrational Element in Poetry, CPP, pp. 781-792. Here p. 792.
477 Cf. David La Guardia, Advance on Chaos. The Sanctifying Imagination of Wallace Stevens (Hanover, 
New England: Brown University Press, 1983), p.15.
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is that the order and truth in the pluralistic universe can never be anything other than 
transient. Although the habit of language deceives man into thinking that the sounds he 
uses for objects are the objects themselves, they are not. Thus, words are always 
distinctly separate from the reality they describe and it is precisely this in-between-space 
where the action happens. We encounter perpetual re-creation.
“The Snow Man” presents a meditation of the mind on its incessant self-
reflexivity rather than a description of a snowman. In a single train of thought, the poem 
illustrates the mind’s inherent dynamism and therefore its autopoietic power to “proceed 
on its own impulse.”478 By inverting the visionary process in a meditative manner, the 
poem comes to the realization of an essential unity.479 Writing in a world in which the old 
social, religious, and political hierarchical systems have crumbled and in which 
consequently, dependence on them is no longer possible, Stevens offers a wholeness that 
is furnished by the activity of the imagination. The poet is no longer to be “a man on the 
dump,” sitting on a pile of rubble made up of previous descriptions and interpretations of 
the world and which no longer have any poetic authenticity.480 The imagination must 
reject old structures and avoid becoming locked into any other rigid system of thought. 
The consolation and freedom that surface in this view of a fluid universe relate
Stevens to Emerson, Nietzsche and Benn, With God dethroned from the top link in the 
                                                
478 Perkins, p. 544.
479 Cf. my interpretation of Gottfried Benn’s “Nichts” (nothingness) in the previous chapter.
480 See Stevens’ poem “Man on the Dump,” CPP, p. 184. Cf. Gottfried Benn’s terms for the accumulation 
of old values in his poem “Das späte Ich” (“The late Ego”): “Schutt. Bacchanalien. Propheturen. / 
Barkarolen. Schweinerein” (Rubble. And bacchanalia. Prophetcraft. / Barcarolles. And filthy stuff). 
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great chain of being, the chain itself dissolves into individual links.481 Rather than placing 
the subject outside the world, Stevens proposes that essence resides in the interactive 
dynamic of self and world.
6.3. Melodic Interludes of Order
To this point I have argued that for Stevens poetry is “the statement of a relation 
between a man and the world” and “constantly requires a new relation.”482 His poem 
“The Idea of Order at Key West,” published in 1935 and giving the collection Ideas of 
Order its title, is perhaps the best illustration of poetry creating temporary “order,” and 
thus periodic self-definition.  The poem opens with the opposite of what McCann calls 
the “universal intercourse” between man and world, namely with the assertion of the 
division between mind and external reality.483 But the gulf between self and external 
world is bridged twice; first by the singer who, through her art 
was the single artificer of the world 
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea, 
Whatever self it had, became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker.484
Through her act of imagination, the artist unites self and other into a new, third reality. 
What is truly astonishing and remarkable, however, is the fact that the other two figures 
                                                
481 Cf. La Guardia, p. 13.
482 Stevens, CPP, pp. 910 and 914.
483 McCann, p. 43.
484 Stevens, CPP, p. 106.
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in the poem, who walk back towards the town, are suddenly seeing the harbor and its 
boats in new and intensified way. In a second bridging of self and other, the speaker 
addresses Ramon Fernandez, asking him how the artist has literally enchanted the 
night:485
Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know,
Why, when the singing ended and we turned
Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights, 
The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there,
As the night descended, tilting in the air,
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea,
Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles,
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.
Not surprisingly, the poem’s final third is generally read as an avowal of the romantic 
doctrine of the mind’s ultimate superiority over nature.486 The mastery of the 
metamorphosis of landscape that the two onlookers are witnessing is attributed solely to 
“the single artificer.” As this mastery persists after the singing itself stops, the presence of 
a spiritual force greater than the water and wind or the singer are implied.
Interestingly, it is not the critic Fernandez but the perceiver/speaker who provides 
the answer to his own question.487 He attributes the reordering of nature to a desire that is 
so intense that he refers to it as rage:
Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon, 
                                                
485 Even though Stevens insisted that “Ramon Fernandez” was no one in particular, James Longenbach 
points out that Fernandez was a critic familiar to Stevens. His criticism, which Stevens read in Nouvelle 
Revue Française, the Partisan Review, and the Criterion (where he was translated by T.S. Eliot) involves 
theories of perception as well as commentary on the relationship between poetry and social reality (James 
Longenbach, Wallace Stevens: The Plain Sense of Things [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], pp. 
161-162.)
486 See especially Leonard and Wharton, who argue that Stevens’ meditation on the singer’s voice ordering 
the natural world is both an extension as well as a theoretical treatment of a similar theme in Wordsworth 
and Coleridge, (Fluent Mundo, pp. 43-44).
487 McCann, p. 32.
                                                                                                                      
219
The maker’s rage to order words of the sea, 
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred, 
And of ourselves and of our origins, 
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds.488
The above lines imply an intrinsic urge, an instinct in fact, to impose order on our 
surroundings, and thus to make sense of the world. The rage for order is the impulse 
behind the intense, pure poetry (“keener sounds”) of “ourselves and our origins.” We 
have merely a vague understanding of our origin and even an even less definite idea of 
where we are going. The portals to these realms are thus barely discernible (“dimly 
starred”) but yet full of promise (“fragrant”). The blessed rage, our intense need to create 
meaning drives towards their articulation and definition (“ghostlier demarcations”).489
To make sense of the world is to construct a worldview through an active exercise of the 
imagination. The “demarcations,” however, are there; they must only be re-discovered, to 
which the “blessed rage leads.” The searching motion is therefore no dry philosophical 
activity, but a passionate engagement in creating order and meaning. 
Thus, Stevens suggests that we live in the tension between the shapes we assume 
when the world acts upon us and the ideas of order that our imagination imposes upon the 
world. The imagination can only conceive of a world for a moment – a particular time, 
place and culture – and so it must continually revise its conception to align itself with the 
changing context.”490
                                                
488 Stevens, CPP, p.106.
489 Cf. Gottfried Benn’s postulate: “Come, all scales are roaring chaos, unforging” (“Komm, alle Skalen 
tosen Spuk, Entformungsgefühl”), Benn, Epilog und Lyrisches Ich, StA 3:133. My translation.
490 Cf. Joseph Hillis Miller, who also shows that universal fluctuation is a constant theme throughout 
Stevens poetry and “many of Stevens’ poems show an object or group of objects in aimless oscillation or 
circling movement.” (“Wallace Stevens,” in Poets of Reality: Six Twentieth-Century Writers [Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1966], pp. 217-284. Here p. 226).
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The supreme fiction is that conceptualization of reality that seems to move from 
rigidity to fluidity. In an ever changing universe, only the supreme fiction is able to create 
periodic centers of truth:
I am the necessary angel of earth, 
Since, in my sight, you see the earth again, 
Cleared of its stiff and stubborn, man-locked set, 
And, in my hearing, you hear its tragic drone 
Rise liquidly in liquid lingerings, 
Like watery words awash. 491
Hence, nothingness is in fact “somethingness,” a faint idea of order, as Stevens 
proclaims in “Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour”: “Here, now, we forget each
other and ourselves. / We feel the obscurity of an order, a whole, a knowledge.”492 The 
poet as well as his creation are part of this whole. Poetry is not about life and the self, it is
a part of life, and a part of the self, as he claims in “An ordinary evening in New Haven”: 
“The poem is the cry of its occasion, / Part of the res itself and not about it. / The poet 
speaks the poem as it is.”493
The words that are to be ordered are “of the sea” of ourselves and our origins, “all 
of which refer the poem back to our very beginnings, our coming into being and entry 
into the world.”494 Stevens showed his uncanny suspicion about flow, how it repeated 
                                                                                                                                                
491 Stevens, “Angel Surrounded by Paysans,” in CPP, p. 423.
492 Stevens, CPP, p. 444 (fourth tercet). See also Charles Berger’s essay where he discusses the idea of 
nothingness in Stevens’ “The Snow Man,” “The Course of a Particular,” and other late poems (Charles 
Berger, Forms of Farewell: The Late Poetry of Wallace Stevens [Madison, Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1985], pp. 158-161).
493 Stevens, CPP, p. 404
494 Robert Rehder, The Poetry of Wallace Stevens (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1988), p. 144.
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itself but was never the same in many poems but captures it most formidably (as 
Heraclitus and Pindar had done) in the image of the river, in “This Solitude for 
Cataracts”:
He never felt twice about the flecked river,
Which kept flowing and never the same way twice, flowing
Through many places, as if it stood still in one.495
At the same time, Stevens conveys a certain faith in the invisible forms that order 
takes in nature. In his poem “Final Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour,” Stevens refers to 
this “whole,” which he claims is sensed, in the following way: “We feel the obscurity of 
an order, a whole, / A knowledge, that which arranged the rendezvous.”496 Our 
knowledge of this past totality, Rehder notes, is “like the shining of a far-away star, as 
elusive and ineffable as a fragrance, but ineluctably there, the memory of a voice, an 
underlying inner music, a residuum.”497 The poet discovers the nature of the self in the 
interrelation between person and world, an interrelation that has always existed but has 
been neglected, in favor of religious or scientific interpretations of the world and our role 
in it. Our deep need for reestablishing the connection, and thus understanding life, is a 
passion that becomes a “blessed rage” because the desire for complete order – an absolute 
understanding of the self and the world, of why we are, and who we are – can never be 
                                                
495 Stevens, CPP, p. 366. See also Gleick, p. 196. It is not surprising, then, that literary critic and 
complexity theorist N. Katherine Hayles should mention Stevens’ poem “Connoisseur of Chaos,” in which 
the poet asserts that order and disorder are interchangeable: “A. A violent order is disorder; and / B. A great 
disorder is an order. These / Two things are one,” (CPP, p. 194).
     
496 Stevens, CPP, p. 444 (stanza four). 
497 Rehder, p. 144. Cf. my discussion of the impact and importance of music within the process of locating 
the self, in chapter four.
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fully satisfied. If it was, all motion would end, and with it the creative impulse. Thus, 
there can be only temporary order – periodic centers, in which we get are able to conjure 
up patterns and shapes in a seemingly chaotic universe.498
In 1942, against a backdrop of a world at war, Stevens had dramatized the 
discovery of order in poetry. He proposed his Notes toward a Supreme Fiction as “an 
antidote to chaos in the public realm,” Daniel R. Schwarz claims.499 I contend, however,
that imposing order on chaos is not a task that will end just as the river will continue to 
flow. Stevens himself had acknowledged that poems and poetry are to be seen as process, 
not product.500 Frank Lentriccia perhaps said it best when he emphasized the “work-in-
process” nature of Stevens’ poetry:
The effect of later Stevens, […] is of someone discoursing on some tremendous 
urgency, the thing most needed – poetry, the poem, a supreme fiction: but not a 
person – without ever being able to make it clear what the thing is, though getting 
close, without ever experiencing the fulfillment that the thing might bring, though 
getting tantalizingly close….What he is writing is a kind of pre-poetry, a tentative 
approach to the poem, an enactment of desire not as a state of mind, with all the 
inert implications of the phrase ‘state of mind,’ but as a movement, and not a 
movement in a straight line, as if he could see the end of the journey, but a 
meandering sort of motion: desire as improvisational action which gives us a 
sense of starting, stopping, changing direction, revising the phrase, refining the 
language, drafting the poem and keeping the process of drafting all there as the 
final thing because the finished thing can’t be had.501
                                                
498 In his popular book Making of a New Science, James Gleick refers to Stevens as a vates and precursor of 
chaos and complexity theory, (p. 196).
499 Daniel R. Schwarz, Narrative and Representation in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 149.
500 See Stevens, Letters, pp. 435 and 443. Rajeev S. Patke argues convincingly that for this reason, the 
Notes are “neither ‘of’ nor ‘about’ but only ‘toward’, a preposition which is a proposition of arrival, not a 
statement, even less an assertion. It concedes not a necessary arrival but only the recession of a theoretical 
possibility, always toward, toward, but never finally there,” Rajeev S. Patke, The Long Poems of Wallace 
Stevens: An Interpretative Study (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 118.
501  Frank Lentricchia, Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, William James, Wallace Stevens (Madison, 
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 202.
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According to Lentriccia, Stevens dramatizes the meandering of his mind, 
vacillating between imagination and reality, abstraction and specificity, indeterminacy 
and completion, in its process of seeking to define the nature of the relationship between 
self and world. Poetry can aid in the quest for order, meaning, and thus self-definition, in 
that it can point to sporadic centers in an ongoing oscillation between poles. William 
Burney commented in 1968 that for Stevens, the only order worth looking for was the 
order of chaos itself.502 That the poet’s appeal thus lies in the inexhaustibility of his 
theme should come as no surprise; each reader approaches Stevens with his own search 
and finds his or her own process and sporadic centers, or momentary answers in his 
poetry.
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CONCLUSION
THE POEM AS PERIODIC CENTER
In the course of this dissertation I have attempted to elucidate the affinities 
between the humanities and the sciences, and thus between the micro- and macrocosmic 
workings of nature and those of language, literature, and more specifically, lyric poetry. 
I have argued that the science of complexity theory can help us gain a deeper 
understanding of how the creative impuls functions in poetry. Let us recapitulate the main 
characteristics of complex systems and relate them to what has transpired throughout this 
investigation: 
A complex system is essentially comprised of a network of interrelated parts that 
have a “history,” and that are incessantly interacting with each other. The system contains 
feedback loops: signals – both positive and negative to varying degrees – that provide 
internal information to adjust the. These so-called feedback loops cause an oscillating 
motion, which in turn makes the system “open” because it is generally far from energetic 
equilibrium. Because it is open and in continuous flux, the boundaries of the system are 
difficult to determine. Finally, the dynamic nature of a complex system enhances 
diversity in that it exhibits emergent behaviors. In simpler terms, the system – because it 
is characterized by its interactions and not merely its parts – is too complex to be reduced 
and at the same time it produces new components that are often unexpected. When a 
“phase transition” takes place as the result of some perturbation of a complex system, it 
causes new emergent properties and behaviors. Complexity theory can thus be applied to 
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explain emergent phenomena in nature,  in society, to language, and to literary texts. I 
apply its findings to what I call the “poetic system.”
The continuous oscillation between imagination and reality, between abstraction 
and specificity, and between indeterminacy and completion constitutes the process of 
defining the relationship between self and world. Just as we cannot define the workings
of a human brain by analyzing an isolated brain cell we cannot interpret a work of art 
unless we take into consideration the dynamics between the elements that comprise it, as 
is the current trend in neuroscience.
In literature, especially in poetry, the dynamics appear in such techniques as 
symbol, metaphor, motif, irony, and pun – essentially in any linguistic device that forces 
us to understand and experience one thing in terms of another. Thus, the poem itself can 
be considered an autopoietic system due to the self-moving nature of its subsystems 
(words), which generate various and ever-changing meanings depending on their context, 
together with the reader’s expectations.
And since these contexts themselves are forever changing, the whole universe is 
in fact in fluid, as Heraclitus already suggested, and the only constant in this system is 
continuous change. On precisely this state of affairs Nietzsche bases his notion of 
perspectivism. He claims that as self-reflective human beings we need to reevaluate the 
record of thought that has shaped the world around us and still shapes our minds 
everyday – and thus constitutes the context for our lives. How can we possibly determine 
anything if the ground we are standing on is constantly shifting? 
The importance of context in regards to creation and definition of the self in its 
relationship to the world was my focus in chapter four. Pertinent writings by Ralph 
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Waldo Emerson and Friedrich Nietzsche elucidate the importance of the body in 
establishing self-reliance, self-organization, and self-definition.
By applying the findings of complexity theory to the works of Gottfried Benn and 
Wallace Stevens in chapters five and six, I propose to view mimesis as a complex process 
of not only re-presentation but re-creation. In the course of this process, new creations 
come into being through the continuous de- and reconstruction of the poem, or poetic 
system. As such, the poem constitutes a subsystem – as does the human being – in the 
system of nature itself.
All four authors I discussed in this dissertation provide variations on a theme. 
They call upon us to create our own truths in attempting to create temporary order. Order, 
then, is just another word for “meaning.” By refusing to be passive recipients of handed-
down presuppositions and approaches, whether they promote a transcendental faith or a 
purely scientific explanation of the world, we can avoid becoming locked into a specific 
system of thought. Only if we actively engage in a process of re-discovery can we find 
answers, answers that are not based on external - namely society-imposed - reference 
points. Like the sundial I mention in chapter four, man himself must be the gnomon and –
in interaction with nature (the sun) – is thereby enabled to “tell the time,” that is to locate 
the self within a particular space in time.
Much like such a sundial, poetry can aid both the poet as well as the reader (who 
in fact becomes poet himself) in this quest to “tell time,” to create order, meaning, and 
thus ultimately self-definition, in that it can point to periodic centers in an ongoing 
oscillation between poles. Consequently, art can serve as a guide towards reconnecting 
with our essence: our body and our instincts, none of which are determined or bound by 
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reason. For this reason Nietzsche warns that we lose the deepest and richest aspects of 
our nature if we reject what he considers the Dionysian forces within us. For Nietzsche as 
well as for Emerson, Benn, and Stevens, art is not just a form of human activity but the 
highest expression of the human spirit because art alone can impose order and thus 
provide meaning in life.
Gottfried Benn and Wallace Stevens subscribe to a world of process as well as to 
the notion that the mind must initially let go of old conceptions; only then can the self 
assert itself, and both self and world can be created anew. This process, which Emerson 
and Nietzsche described as an act of purging, is for Stevens the procedure of decreation 
that must precede creation. Benn does not decreate; he initially seeks solace in the act of 
regression in order to return to a pre-rational state. Eventually, however, he propagates a 
kind of Nietzschean active nihilism in which “nothingness” actually represents pure 
potential. “Transcendence,” then, is part of the system itself.
Essentially, our search for order is based on the chaos we perceive around us. 
Chaos is thus the prerequisite for order. There would be no impulse to create order, form, 
and thereby meaning if there was no need to do so. It is for this reason that Emerson, 
Nietzsche, Benn, and Stevens embrace chaos and actually find solace in it: chaos lies at 
the very bottom of the creative act and therefore of life, and holds within in it an exquisite 
promise of transcendence.
Hence, this dissertation proposes a new interpretation of the concept of mimesis:
the act of poetic creation in the continuous and dynamic re-creation of form is grounded 
in natural forces themselves. In a world of ever changing and fleeting phenomena, the 
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poem functions as periodic center, as a salutary moment of confluence between subject 
and object. 
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APPENDIX
A. Gottfried Benn
„The late Ego“ (Das späte Ich)
I
Gillyflower billow, see it swell,
moist-eyed already, and abate,
drop out, and auto-immortelle,
for it is late.
At rose recession, when the fable
of summer long has left the mead –
moi haïssable,
though now maenadically surveyed.
II
At the beginning was the flood. A lemur raft
by Elk, the beast, is pushed, made pregnant by a stone.
Out of death’s kingdom, memory, animals tortured, cleft
God enters in.
All the great animals: eagles of the cohorts,
doves from Golgatha Vale –
all the great cities: palm and purple borders –
flowers of the desert, dream of Baal.
Scree of the Orient, ferry of Marmara,
Rome, set the horses of Lyssipus free –
last blood of the white bull over silent altars
and Amphitrite’s final sea –
Rubble. And bacchanalia. Prophetcraft.
Barcarolles. And filthy stuff.
In the beginning was the Flood. A lemur raft
into the last seas pushes off.
III
O soul, putrescent through and through,
hardly alive but still too much,
when not one grain of dust from glades,
when not one leaf from any forest
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but leaden hurtles through your shads.
The rocks are glowing, Tartarus is blue,
Hades ascends in oleander hues
into sleep’s eyelid, burning into sheaves
of mythic bliss the autopsy.
Bamboo tumescence, rubber tree,
lake water licks the Inca scrawls,
the moon château: shadows and scree
clutter the blue archaic walls.
Fraternal bliss of Cain and Abel
for whom god cleft the clouds, in spate –
aetiologic, haïssable:
the ego, late.
-Translation by Michael Hamburger, in Gottfried Benn: Prose, Essays, Poems, ed. by 
Volkmar Sander (New York: Continuum, 1987), pp.199-203. 
“Forsaken I” (“Verlorenes Ich”)
Forsaken I, in rout from stratospheres,
The ion’s victim―: radiation’s sacrificial lamb―
Particle and field―: infinity’s chimeras
On those grey stones of your new Notre Dame.
Your days go by without a night or morning,
The years conceal, no snow, no fruit in sight,
The infinite’s dark threatening warning―
The world as flight.
Where will you end, where pitch your camp, where see
Your spheres outspread―all’s one, or loss or gain―
A game where only wild beasts win: eternities
Along whose bars you flee in vain.
The bestial glaze: the stars as internalia,
The jungle death as being and creation’s ground,
Man, Leipzig’s slaughter, Catalaunias,
Down the beasts’ mw, all down.
World thought to bits. Space and the ages,
And what mankind groped for as guide,
Infinities are now their gauges―
The myth has lied.
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Where from, where to―no night, no morning,
No evoë, no requiem,
A cue might satisfy your yearning,
But who can cue you in?
Oh, when all wholely to one center tended
And even thinkers only thought of God
With Shepherd and with Lamb all lives were blended
And from His cup He cleansed them with His blood,
And all mankind from that one wound seemed welling,
Breaking the bread that each one might partake―
Oh distant hour, fulfilling and compelling,
That even the forsaken I did not forsake.
-Translation by Robert M. Browning, Prose, Essays, Poems, pp. 225-227.
“A Word” (“Ein Wort”)
A word, a phrase―: from Cyphers rise
Life recognized, a sudden sense,
The sun stands still, mute are the skies,
And all compacts it, stark and dense.
A word―, a gleam, a flight, a spark,
A thrust of flames, a stellar trace―,
And then again―immense―the dark
Round world and I in empty space.
-Translation by Richard Exner, Prose, Essays, Poems, p. 221.
B. Wallace Stevens
“Sunday Morning”
I
Complacencies of the peignoir, and late
Coffee and oranges in a sunny chair,
And the green freedom of a cockatoo
Upon a rug mingle to dissipate
The holy hush of ancient sacrifice.
She dreams a little, and she feels the dark
Encroachment of that old catastrophe,
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As a calm darkens among water-lights.
The pungent oranges and bright, green wings
Seem things in some procession of the dead,
Winding across wide water, without sound.
The day is like wide water, without sound.
Stilled for the passing of her dreaming feet
Over the seas, to silent Palestine,
Dominion of the blood and sepulchre.
II
Why should she give her bounty to the dead?
What is divinity if it can come
Only in silent shadows and in dreams?
Shall she not find in comforts of the sun,
In pungent fruit and bright green wings, or else
In any balm or beauty of the earth,
Things to be cherished like the thought of heaven?
Divinity must live within herself:
Passions of rain, or moods in falling snow;
Grievings in loneliness, or unsubdued
Elations when the forest blooms; gusty
Emotions on wet roads on autumn nights;
All pleasures and all pains, remembering
The bough of summer and the winter branch.
These are the measure destined for her soul.
III
Jove in the clouds had his inhuman birth.
No mother suckled him, no sweet land gave
Large-mannered motions to his mythy mind.
He moved among us, as a muttering king,
Magnificent, would move among his hinds,
Until our blood, commingling, virginal,
With heaven, brought such requital to desire
The very hinds discerned it, in a star.
Shall our blood fail? Or shall it come to be
The blood of paradise? And shall the earth
Seem all of paradise that we shall know?
The sky will be much friendlier then than now,
A part of labor and a part of pain,
And next in glory to enduring love,
Not this dividing and indifferent blue.
IV
She says, "I am content when wakened birds,
Before they fly, test the reality
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Of misty fields, by their sweet questionings;
But when the birds are gone, and their warm fields
Return no more, where, then, is paradise?"
There is not any haunt of prophecy,
Nor any old chimera of the grave,
Neither the golden underground, nor isle
Melodious, where spirits gat them home,
Nor visionary south, nor cloudy palm
Remote on heaven's hill, that has endured
As April's green endures; or will endure
Like her remembrance of awakened birds,
Or her desire for June and evening, tipped
By the consummation of the swallow's wings.
V
She says, “But in contentment I still feel
The need of some imperishable bliss.”
Death is the mother of beauty; hence from her,
Alone, shall come fulfillment to our dreams
And our desires. Although she strews the leaves
Of sure obliteration on our paths,
The path sick sorrow took, the many paths
Where triumph rang its brassy phrase, or love
Whispered a little out of tenderness,
She makes the willow shiver in the sun
For maidens who were wont to sit and gaze
Upon the grass, relinquished to their feet.
She causes boys to pile new plums and pears
On disregarded plate. The maidens taste
And stray impassioned in the littering leaves.
VI
Is there no change of death in paradise?
Does ripe fruit never fall? Or do the boughs
Hang always heavy in that perfect sky,
Unchanging, yet so like our perishing earth,
With rivers like our own that seek for seas
They never find, the same receding shores
That never touch with inarticulate pang?
Why set pear upon those river-banks
Or spice the shores with odors of the plum?
Alas, that they should wear our colors there,
The silken weavings of our afternoons,
And pick the strings of our insipid lutes!
Death is the mother of beauty, mystical,
Within whose burning bosom we devise
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Our earthly mothers waiting, sleeplessly.
VII
Supple and turbulent, a ring of men
Shall chant in orgy on a summer morn
Their boisterous devotion to the sun,
Not as a god, but as a god might be,
Naked among them, like a savage source.
Their chant shall be a chant of paradise,
Out of their blood, returning to the sky;
And in their chant shall enter, voice by voice,
The windy lake wherein their lord delights,
The trees, like serafin, and echoing hills,
That choir among themselves long afterward.
They shall know well the heavenly fellowship
Of men that perish and of summer morn.
And whence they came and whither they shall go
The dew upon their feel shall manifest.
VIII
She hears, upon that water without sound,
A voice that cries, "The tomb in Palestine
Is not the porch of spirits lingering.
It is the grave of Jesus, where he lay."
We live in an old chaos of the sun,
Or old dependency of day and night,
Or island solitude, unsponsored, free,
Of that wide water, inescapable.
Deer walk upon our mountains, and the quail
Whistle about us their spontaneous cries;
Sweet berries ripen in the wilderness;
And, in the isolation of the sky,
At evening, casual flocks of pigeons make
Ambiguous undulations as they sink,
Downward to darkness, on extended wings. 
-in CPP, pp. 53-58.
“The Snowman” 
One must have a mind of winter
To regard the frost and the boughs
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow;
And have been cold a long time
To behold the junipers shagged with ice,
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The spruces rough in the distant glitter
Of the January sun; and not to think
Of any misery in the sound of the wind,
In the sound of a few leaves,
Which is the sound of the land
Full of the same wind
That is blowing in the same bare place
For the listener, who listens in the snow,
And, nothing himself, beholds
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is. 
-in CPP, p. 8.
“The Idea of Order at Key West”
She sang beyond the genius of the sea.
The water never formed to mind or voice,
Like a body wholly body, fluttering
Its empty sleeves; and yet its mimic motion
Made constant cry, caused constantly a cry,
That was not ours although we understood,
Inhuman, of the veritable ocean. 
The sea was not a mask. No more was she.
The song and water were not medleyed sound
Even if what she sang was what she heard,
Since what she sang was uttered word by word.
It may be that in all her phrases stirred
The grinding water and the gasping wind;
But it was she and not the sea we heard.
For she was the maker of the song she sang.
The ever-hooded, tragic-gestured sea
Was merely a place by which she walked to sing.
Whose spirit is this? we said, because we knew
It was the spirit that we sought and knew
That we should ask this often as she sang.
If it was only the dark voice of the sea
That rose, or even colored by many waves;
If it was only the outer voice of sky
And cloud, of the sunken coral water-walled,
However clear, it would have been deep air,
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The heaving speech of air, a summer sound
Repeated in a summer without end
And sound alone. But it was more than that,
More even than her voice, and ours, among
The meaningless plungings of water and the wind,
Theatrical distances, bronze shadows heaped
On high horizons, mountainous atmospheres
Of sky and sea. 
               It was her voice that made
The sky acutest at its vanishing.
She measured to the hour its solitude.
She was the single artificer of the world
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea,
Whatever self it had, became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we,
As we beheld her striding there alone,
Knew that there never was a world for her
Except the one she sang and, singing, made. 
Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know,
Why, when the singing ended and we turned
Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights,
The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there,
As the night descended, tilting in the air,
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea,
Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles,
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night. 
Oh! Blessed rage for order, pale Ramon,
The maker's rage to order words of the sea,
Words of the fragrant portals, dimly-starred,
And of ourselves and of our origins,
In ghostlier demarcations, keener sounds. 
in CPP, pp. 105-106.
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